

SOPhiA

7th Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy

2016




Programme and Abstracts

Organisation: Department of Philosophy
University of Salzburg
Date: September 7–9, 2016
Venue: University of Salzburg
Unipark, Erzabt-Klotz-Straße 1, 5020 Salzburg
Languages: English and German
Website: <http://www.sophia-conference.org/>

Contents

Preface	4
General Information	6
Schedule	8
Plenary Talks	13
Workshops	19
Contributed Talks	29
Index of Names	175

Preface

 In recent years the opportunities for keeping track of science-business for students of philosophy have increased. The raising number of essay competitions and graduate conferences support this claim.



In 2016, the Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy is, once again, joining the midst of these events. The title of the conference already reveals some details about the organisers, the contributors and the conference's guiding principles. To avoid misunderstandings, we want to add the following remarks: (i) Because of the high number of international participants, 'Salzburg' stands for the location of the conference only. (ii) One of the conference's distinctive features compared to similar events is that we do not make any constraints regarding the topic of presentations. (iii) On the contrary, every philosophical discipline – as long as it is carried out in an analytic way – has its place at SOPhiA.



By combining (ii) and (iii) we want to demonstrate, in contrast to some voices which claim that Analytic Philosophy constrains our intellectual life, that all traditional topics can be advantageously examined in Analytic Philosophy. It is our utmost concern to unite analytic philosophers from all around the world (cf. (i)). This is also in the sense of Carnap, who claims in his early work *The Logical Structure of the World*:



“The new type of philosophy has arisen in close contact with the work of the special sciences, especially mathematics and physics. Consequently they have taken the strict and responsible orientation of the scientific investigator as their guideline for philosophical work, while the attitude of the traditional philosopher is more like that of a poet. This new attitude not only changes the style of thinking but also the

type of problem that is posed. The individual no longer undertakes to erect in one bold stroke an entire system of philosophy. Rather, each works at his special place within the one unified science.”



In spirit of this motto, we wish you an interesting conference, fruitful discussions and stimulating thoughts.

The Organising Committee



The Organising Committee:

Albert J. J. Anglberger, Simone Badergruber, Christian J. Feldbacher, Alexander Gebharter, Markus Hierl, Laurenz Hudetz, Sebastian Krempelmeier, Pascale Lötscher, Stefanie Orter, Mandy Stake, Tobias Wagner

Special thanks to our sponsors:



General Information

TIMEFRAME AND GENERAL INFORMATION. From September 7–9 2016 the seventh Salzburg Conference for Young Analytic Philosophy (SOPhiA 2016) will be held at the University of Salzburg's Department of Philosophy (Humanities). The conference is public and attending it is free of charge. The official languages of the conference are English and German. Contributed talks will be given by philosophy students (pre-doc). The conference is hosted by members of the University of Salzburg's Department of Philosophy (Humanities). The organisers can be contacted via organization@sophia-conference.org.



MISSION STATEMENT. In the conference, problems of all areas of philosophy should be discussed. The conference has no specific topic. The presentations should rather set themselves apart by a methodological limitation to the tradition of Analytic Philosophy by usage of clear language and comprehensible arguments. The conference is meant to be a common effort to clearly formulate and critically assess some of the problems of philosophy. No individual is expected to construct “a whole building of philosophy” all by himself; rather, the conference hosts expect everyone, as Carnap proposes, to bring the undertaking forward “at his specific place within” philosophy.



PROCEDURE. The speakers are from institutions of the following 19 countries: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, India, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Turkey, UK, USA . There are three types of talks:

Plenary talks: held by invited speakers

Workshop talks: held by invited speakers

Contributed talks: held by student speakers

INVITED SPEAKERS.

- Jeremy Butterfield (Trinity College, Cambridge, UK): *Scientific realism and primordial cosmology*
- Dorothy Edgington (Birkbeck College, London, UK): *Vagueness, Indeterminacy and Conditionals*
- Julien Murzi (University of Salzburg): *Generalised Revenge*
- Sylvia Wenmackers (KU Leuven and University of Groningen, Netherlands): *Infinitesimal Probabilities and Ultra-Additivity*

WORKSHOP SPEAKERS.

Affiliated Workshop: *Dispositions in Action: Laws of Nature, Explanation and Modality*

- Andreas Bartels (University of Bonn): *Between contingency and necessity of laws – Armstrong revisited*
- Florian Fischer (University of Bonn): *Dispositional nomological necessity*
- Andreas Hüttemann (University of Cologne): *Conditional metaphysical necessity and the role of dispositions in scientific practice*
- Ludger Jansen (University of Bochum and University of Rostock): *Dispositions and the scientific explanation of actions*
- Antje Rumberg (University of Konstanz): *Potentialities for branching time*

Affiliated Workshop: *Equivalence and Reduction of Scientific Theories*

- Hajnal Andréka & István Németi (Alfréd Rényi Institute of Mathematics, Budapest): *Theories of Everything: Unity of Science*
- Thomas Barrett (Princeton University): *Equivalent and inequivalent formulations of classical mechanics*
- Laurenz Hudetz (University of Salzburg): *Definable Categorical Equivalence and Reduction*
- Sarita Rosenstock (University of California, Irvine): *Categories and the Foundations of Yang-Mills Theory*
- James Weatherall (University of California, Irvine): *Theoretical Structure and Theoretical Equivalence*

Schedule

Time	Location					
	HS E.002	SR 1.003	SR 1.004	SR 1.005	SR 1.006	SR 1.007
09:00-13:00			Affiliated Workshop Andreas Bartels & Florian Fischer & Andreas Hüttemann & Ludger Jansen & Antje Rumberg <i>Dispositions in Action: Laws of Nature, Explanation and Modality</i> Chair: Florian Fischer (English)	Affiliated Workshop James Weatherall & Thomas Barrett & Sarita Rosenstock & Laurenz Hudetz & Hajnal Andr�eka & Istv�an N�emeti <i>Equivalence and Reduction of Scientific Theories</i> Chair: Laurenz Hudetz (English)		
13:00-14:15	Lunch Break					
14:15-14:30	Opening and Best Paper Award					
14:30-16:00	Plenary Lecture Julien Murzi <i>Generalised Revenge</i> Chair: Pascale L�otischer (English, Location: HS E.002)					
16:00-16:15	Coffee Break					
16:15-16:45	Epistemology Maximilian Kiener <i>Moral and Non-Moral Testimony: Revisiting an Alleged Asymmetry</i> Chair: Yannic Kappes (English)	Ethics Lukas Naegeli <i>Supererogation and Over-Demandingness</i> Chair: Albert Anglberger (English)	Metaphysics and Ontology Karol Kleczka <i>Truthmakers and the theory of truth</i> Chair: Thomas Spiegel (English)		Political Philosophy Elias Moser <i>Contractual Slavery and the Impossibility-Argument</i> Chair: Maciej Juzaszek (English)	History of Philosophy Roman Zavadil <i>The Ambivalent Nature of the Hume-Newton Relationship</i> Chair: Christian Feldbacher (English)
16:50-17:20	Epistemology Jakob Oehlhorst <i>Trust Responsibly - Towards a Virtue-Account of Entitlement</i> Chair: Yannic Kappes (English)	Ethics Yuhang Guo <i>Why formalist reconstructions cannot identify moral laws in Kant's ethics?</i> Chair: Albert Anglberger (English)	Metaphysics and Ontology Matthias Schirrmann <i>Are there propositions? Hofweber's objections to the so-called easy arguments.</i> Chair: Thomas Spiegel (German)	Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics Felix Hagenstr�om <i>How arithmetic is (not) about the empirical world</i> Chair: Elena Tassoni (English)	Political Philosophy Nathan Wood <i>A Duty to Kill</i> Chair: Maciej Juzaszek (English)	History of Philosophy Chapman Waters <i>Gottlob Fregean Notion of Mind-Independence</i> Chair: Christian Feldbacher (English)
17:25-17:55	Epistemology Linus Lutz <i>On the relation between performance and belief in Sosa's epistemology</i> Chair: Yannic Kappes (English)	Ethics Christoph Lerna�a <i>Can Humean Global Constructivism Do Without Substantive Evaluative Assumptions?</i> Chair: Albert Anglberger (English)	Metaphysics and Ontology Siobhan Moriarty <i>Against Thomsson's Easy Ontology</i> Chair: Thomas Spiegel (English)	Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics Hasen Khudairi <i>Grothendieck Universes and Indefinite Extensibility</i> Chair: Elena Tassoni (English)	Political Philosophy Abhay Nidhi Sharma <i>Re-Inspecting Inequality</i> Chair: Maciej Juzaszek (English) <i>CHANGE. The talk is cancelled!</i>	History of Philosophy Jan Claas <i>Leibniz and Bolzano on Conceptual Containment</i> Chair: Christian Feldbacher (English)
18:00-18:30	Epistemology Stanislaw Ruczaj <i>Two Wittgensteinian approaches to religious beliefs</i> Chair: Yannic Kappes (English)	Ethics Gustav Alexandrie <i>Hedonistic Utilitarianism and Evolutionary Debunking Arguments</i> Chair: Albert Anglberger (English)	Metaphysics and Ontology Szymon Bogacz <i>Cheap Platonism and Analyticity</i> Chair: Thomas Spiegel (English)	Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics Sean Aidan McIntosh <i>Against Richard Heck on the Epistemological Significance of Frege's Theorem</i> Chair: Elena Tassoni (English)	Political Philosophy Andreas Wolkenstein <i>Ethics through institutions or ethics of institutions? On moral foundations of order ethics and the idea of indidocracy</i> Chair: Maciej Juzaszek (English) <i>CHANGE. The talk is cancelled!</i>	History of Philosophy Maria Matuszkiewicz <i>Signifying and picturing: Wilfrid Sellars' two-conceptions of language</i> Chair: Christian Feldbacher (English)
18:30-	Warm evening buffet					

Time	Location					
	HS E.002	SR 1.003	SR 1.004	SR 1.005	SR 1.006	SR 1.007
09:30-11:00	Plenary Lecture Jeremy Butterfield <i>Scientific realism and primordial cosmology</i> Chair: Laurenz Hudetz (English, Location: HS E.002)					
11:00-11:15	Short Break					
11:15-11:45	Epistemology Adem Mulamustafic <i>The World of Perception and The World in Itself</i> <i>Experiential Naïve Realism, Metaphysical Naïve Realism, and Science</i> Chair: Maximilian Kiener (German)	Ethics Roland Hesse <i>The Problem of Deontic Restrictions</i> Chair: Christoph Lernpaß (English) CHANGE! The talk is cancelled!	Metaphysics and Ontology Jonathan Diltrich & Farbod Akhlagi-Ghaffarokh <i>Theoretical Virtues and Methodology in Metaphysics: Dethinking the Hierarchy</i> Chair: Julio de Rizzo (English)	Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics Sara Ipakchi <i>The Crux of Coanexive Logic</i> Chair: Hasen Khudairi (German)	Philosophy of Law Johannes Knödtel <i>Problems of vagueness in legal texts</i> Chair: Elias Moser (German)	Philosophy of Language Jan Stępanek <i>Sorites Paradoxes and the Legacy of the Ideal Language Approach</i> Chair: Meagan Phillips (English)
11:50-12:20	Epistemology Till Hopfe <i>Naïve Realism, Perception and Reasons</i> Chair: Maximilian Kiener (German) CHANGE! The talk is cancelled!	Ethics Jakob Reckhenrich <i>Against Duties of Friendship</i> Chair: Christoph Lernpaß (English)	Metaphysics and Ontology Thomas Spiegel <i>Is Naturalism Coherent?</i> Chair: Julio de Rizzo (English)	Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics Sebastian G.W. Speitel <i>Catnap-Categoricity and the Question of Logicality</i> Chair: Hasen Khudairi (English)	Philosophy of Law Maciej Juzaszek <i>The paradoxes in legal philosophy: A way out?</i> Chair: Elias Moser (English)	Philosophy of Language Sara Ayhan <i>Vagueness as the route to semantic dialetheism</i> Chair: Meagan Phillips (English)
12:25-12:55	Epistemology Laila Kühle <i>Naïve Realism or Intentionalism?</i> Chair: Maximilian Kiener (German)	Ethics Charlotte Franziska Unruh <i>On future generations' present rights</i> Chair: Christoph Lernpaß (English)		Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics Elena Tassoni <i>Logical Pluralism, Deductive Justification, and Transmission</i> Chair: Hasen Khudairi (English)		Philosophy of Language Viktoria Knoll <i>On the ambiguity of 'I'</i> Chair: Meagan Phillips (English)
13:00-14:30	Lunch Break					
14:30-15:00		Ethics Michael Klensk <i>Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity</i> Chair: Enno Fischer (English)	Metaphysics and Ontology Julio de Rizzo <i>On differences as grounds for negative truths</i> Chair: Jonas Werner (English)	Philosophy of Mind Florian Leonhard Wustholz <i>Shortcomings of two-dimensional theories of de se beliefs</i> Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English)	Philosophy of Science Garry Moore Soronoi <i>The Species Problem and an Analysis for a Criterion of Species Concept</i> Chair: Matthew Baxendale (English)	Philosophy of Language Wojciech Rostworowski <i>Attitude ascriptions, substitutivity, and descriptions</i> Chair: Viktoria Knoll (English)
15:05-15:35	Epistemology Yannic Kappes <i>Modal Epistemology and Abduction</i> Chair: Pascale Lötscher (English)	Ethics Jiwon (Sonia) Kim <i>In Defense of A Contractualist Boundaries of Morality: On Reasonableness and Reflective Equilibrium</i> Chair: Enno Fischer (English)	Metaphysics and Ontology Marco Hausmann <i>Occultism's Distinction</i> Chair: Jonas Werner (English) CHANGE! The talk is cancelled!	Philosophy of Mind Mandy Stake <i>Shared attention as requirement for self-consciousness?</i> Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English)	Philosophy of Science Gregor P. Gresleiner <i>From Molecules to Biological Systems: Explaining Life at Different Levels</i> Chair: Matthew Baxendale (English)	Philosophy of Language David Bordonaba <i>Presuppositional Rule Pluralism: A new account of the assertion conditions of taste predicates</i> Chair: Viktoria Knoll (English)
15:40-16:10	Epistemology Shuyi Feng <i>The Inability of Conceivability Arguments in Physicalist Dualism Debate</i> Chair: Pascale Lötscher (English)	Ethics Eva Maria Parisi <i>Interdependency as a source of moral duties and claims. Toward a universal understanding</i> Chair: Enno Fischer (English)	Metaphysics and Ontology Gregory Miller <i>I'm Not Simple! Panpsychism and "The Datum"</i> Chair: Jonas Werner (English)	Philosophy of Mind Garrett Mindt <i>Fixing the "Information" in Integrated Information Theory</i> Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English)	Philosophy of Science Karim Baraghith <i>The Emergence of Public Meaning from a Generalized-Evolutionary and Gauge-Theoretical Perspective</i> Chair: Matthew Baxendale (English)	Philosophy of Language Till Gallasch <i>A Tribute to Putnam's Brain</i> Chair: Viktoria Knoll (English)
16:15-16:45	Epistemology Paweł Zięba <i>In Defense of Epistemological Disjunctivism</i> Chair: Pascale Lötscher (English)	Ethics Markus Seethaler <i>Prima-Facie and Non-Iderential Justification as well as Basic Falsibility -- Defining Characteristics of an Ethical Intuitionism</i> Chair: Enno Fischer (German)	Metaphysics and Ontology Valerio Buonomo <i>Personal identity over time and the ontology of temporal parts</i> Chair: Jonas Werner (English)		Philosophy of Science Rodolfo Marratta <i>Every explanation in cognitive science is mechanistic? A perspective from Dynamical Field Theory</i> Chair: Matthew Baxendale (English)	Philosophy of Language Hsuan-Chih Lin <i>Compositionality in Semantic Relationism</i> Chair: Viktoria Knoll (English)
16:45-17:00	Coffee Break					
17:00-18:30	Plenary Lecture Dorothy Edgington <i>Vagueness, Indeterminacy and Conditions</i> Chair: Christian Feldbacher-Escamilla (English, Location: HS E.002)					
18:30-	Dinner: on your own					

Time	Location					
	HS E.002	SR 1.003	SR 1.004	SR 1.005	SR 1.006	SR 1.007
10:00-10:30	Epistemology Lukas Lang <i>Common Sense Almightly</i> Chair: Philip Fox (English)	Ethics Enno Fischer <i>The Ethics of Genetic Intervention in Human Embryos</i> Chair: Michael Klensk (English)	Metaphysics and Ontology Eirini Georgia Mandopoulou <i>Privileged Present: The Moving Spotlight Theory</i> Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English)	Philosophy of Mind Jessica Struchhold <i>On some Problems with Fodor's Causal Theory of Content</i> Chair: Mandy Stake (English) <i>CHANGE. The talk is cancelled!</i>	Philosophy of Science Colin Elliot <i>Inference with non-standard probabilities</i> Chair: Gregor Greslehner (English)	Philosophy of Language Christopher Badura <i>Truth in Fiction via Non-Standard Belief Revision</i> Chair: Till Gallasch (English)
10:35-11:05	Epistemology Giada Fratantonio <i>Evidential Externalism and The Armchair Access Problem</i> Chair: Philip Fox (English)	Ethics Hannah Schickl <i>Are part-totipoties really not embryos?</i> Chair: Michael Klensk (German)	Metaphysics and Ontology Jonas Werner <i>Grounding/Non-Existence in Colligately Fundamental Totality Facts</i> Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English)	Philosophy of Mind Annika Schuster <i>Explaining Fuzzy Concepts with Prototype Frames</i> Chair: Mandy Stake (English)	Philosophy of Science Matthew Baxendale <i>The Ubiquity of Causation: Causal Closure from a Post-Layer Cake Perspective</i> Chair: Gregor Greslehner (English)	Philosophy of Language Meagan Phillips <i>Epistemic Possibility and the Future Aspect</i> Chair: Till Gallasch (English)
11:10-11:40	Epistemology Cyrill Mamin <i>Intuition and Justification</i> Chair: Philip Fox (English)	Ethics Lovro Savic <i>Bioethics Committees and Collective Moral Responsibility</i> Chair: Michael Klensk (English) <i>CHANGE. The talk is cancelled!</i>	Metaphysics and Ontology Gonzalo Nunez <i>The Boundaries Around us: An Ontological Approach to the Surfaces of Things</i> Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English)	Philosophy of Mind Tereza Zhiralova <i>The Rationality Debate from the Perspective of X-phi and Psychology</i> Chair: Mandy Stake (English)	Philosophy of Science Johannes Roehl <i>Composition of Causes, Superposables and Combination Laws</i> Chair: Gregor Greslehner (English)	Philosophy of Language Grzegorz Gaszczyk <i>The Hybrid Theory of Assertion</i> Chair: Till Gallasch (English)
11:45-12:15	Epistemology Kamil Cekiera <i>Conceptual Analysis and the Problem of Philosophical Intuition</i> Chair: Philip Fox (English)	Ethics Kritika Maheshwari <i>Persuasive definitions in the human enhancement debate</i> Chair: Michael Klensk (English)	Metaphysics and Ontology Tien-Chun Lo <i>On the Occamist Definition of Hard and Soft Facts</i> Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English)		Philosophy of Science Chloé de Canson <i>How Bayesianism Addresses the Problem(s) of Induction</i> Chair: Gregor Greslehner (English) <i>CHANGE. The talk is cancelled!</i>	
12:15-14:00	Lunch Break					
14:00-14:30	Epistemology Philip Fox <i>Constitutivism about epistemic rationality</i> Chair: Giada Fratantonio (English)	Ethics Daniel Matthias Mayerhöffer <i>Working out an inconsistency in J. Harris' essay 'The Survival Lottery'</i> Chair: Albert Anglberger (English)	Metaphysics and Ontology Andreea Popescu <i>Proxies, Necessary Existents and Necessitism</i> Chair: Eirini Georgia Mandopoulou (English)	Philosophy of Mind Serdal Tunkaya & Aysun Sen <i>Thomas Nagel is, at bottom, not an anti-physicalist but a defender of it</i> Chair: Florian Wüstholtz (English)	Philosophy of Science Kate Vredenburg <i>Explanation, idealization, and scientific realism</i> Chair: Colin Elliot (English)	
14:35-15:05	Epistemology Bernd Liedl <i>Broome's Problems with the Instrumental Requirement of Rationality: Sketching a Solution</i> Chair: Giada Fratantonio (English)	Ethics Dennis Kalde <i>Removing the differences: Deontology and Consequentialism</i> Chair: Albert Anglberger (English)	Metaphysics and Ontology Petter Sandstad <i>Essentiality without Necessity</i> Chair: Eirini Georgia Mandopoulou (English)	Philosophy of Mind Alen Lipuš <i>What makes the Mind-body problem tick?</i> Chair: Florian Wüstholtz (English)	Philosophy of Science Agnieszka Proszewska <i>Structural Representation and the Role of Mathematics in Natural Sciences</i> Chair: Colin Elliot (English)	
15:10-15:40	Epistemology Gábor Tasnádi <i>An Evidential Place for Epistemic Normativity</i> Chair: Giada Fratantonio (English)	Ethics Andreas Joecks <i>What speaks against a grounding of ethics in the empirical sciences?</i> Chair: Albert Anglberger (German)	Metaphysics and Ontology Tomasz Zygiewicz <i>Advanced modal claims. Disambiguating between the intra- and trans-world quantification.</i> Chair: Eirini Georgia Mandopoulou (English)	Philosophy of Mind Marta Zaręba <i>Reductionist and anti-reductionist theories of intention</i> Chair: Florian Wüstholtz (English)	Philosophy of Science Michele Luchetti <i>The Pluralist Challenge to Constitutive Principles in Science: Steps towards a New Modal Basis</i> Chair: Colin Elliot (English)	
15:45-16:15	Epistemology Shambhavi Shankar & Torsten Nies <i>Understanding as an Activity: The Role of Apt Reasoning in Understanding</i> Chair: Giada Fratantonio (English)	Ethics Sybren Heyndels <i>A Semiotic Critique of Moral Incompatibilism</i> Chair: Albert Anglberger (English)		Philosophy of Mind Clemens Emanuel Schlink <i>How to think about Weakness of Will?</i> Chair: Florian Wüstholtz (English)	Philosophy of Science Nina Retzlaff <i>How to inaugurate a photon?</i> Chair: Colin Elliot (German)	
16:15-16:30	Coffee Break					
16:30-18:00	Plenary Lecture Sylvia Wenmackers <i>Infinitesimal probabilities and ultra-additivity</i> Chair: Alexander Gebharter (English, Location: HS E.002)					
18:00-	Closing Dinner (Restaurant)					

Plenary Talks

Scientific realism and primordial cosmology

Jeremy Butterfield

We discuss scientific realism in relation to modern cosmology, especially primordial cosmology. This is the cosmological investigation of the very early universe: where “very early” means, roughly, much earlier (logarithmically) than one second after the Big Bang: say, less than 10^{-11} seconds (!). We first state our allegiance to scientific realism, and then take up two issues which illustrate that familiar philosophical threat to scientific realism, the under-determination of theory by data—on a cosmic scale.

The first issue concerns the difficulty of observationally probing the very early universe: of ascertaining details of the putative inflationary epoch. The second issue concerns difficulties about confirming a cosmological theory that postulates a multiverse, i.e. a set of domains (universes) each of whose inhabitants (if any) cannot directly observe, or otherwise causally interact with, other domains. This again concerns inflation, since many inflationary models postulate a multiverse.


For all these issues, it will be clear that much remains unsettled, as regards both physics and philosophy. But we will maintain that these remaining controversies do not threaten scientific realism.

The paper is available at: <http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/12192/> and at: <https://arxiv.org/abs/1606.04071>

Section: Plenary
Language: English
Chair: Laurenz Hudetz
Date: 09:30–11:00, September 8th 2016 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002

Vagueness, Indeterminacy and Conditionals


Dorothy Edgington

ost of this talk is about vagueness, and how best to reason in its presence. Vagueness is a species of indeterminacy, and I apply the theory I develop to other varieties of indeterminacy. I will discuss its application to the ineliminable indeterminacy in the assessment of many conditionals.

Section: Plenary
Language: English
Chair: Christian Feldbacher
Date: 17:00–18:30, September 8th 2016 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002

Generalised Revenge


Julien Murzi

ince Saul Kripke's influential work in the 70's, the revisionary approach to semantic paradox—the idea that the semantic paradoxes must be solved by weakening classical logic—has been increasingly popular. In this paper, we present a new revenge argument to the effect that revisionary approaches breed new paradoxes that cannot be blocked by weakening the logic. More specifically, we argue that each of the main revisionary approaches to paradox are subject to what we call object-linguistic revenge. Most revisionists agree that certain unparadoxical sentences can be safely reasoned with classically, whereas other paradoxical sentences yield absurdity if reasoned with classically. We show that consistent non-classical theories cannot express paradoxicality so understood, and that inconsistent but non-trivial theories cannot express the dual notion of unparadoxicality. (This is joint work with Lorenzo Rossi.)

Section: Plenary
Language: English
Chair: Pascale Lötscher
Date: 14:30–16:00, September 7th 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: HS E.002

Infinitesimal Probabilities and Ultra-Additivity

Sylvia Wenmackers

 In this presentation, I discuss the motivations for a particular set of axioms for a non-Archimedean probability theory (NAP, developed together with Vieri Benci and Leon Horsten), which allows us to assign non-zero infinitesimal probabilities to remote contingencies. I also address some criticisms that have been raised against this approach in the recent literature.

Section: Plenary
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharder
Date: 16:30–18:00, September 9th 2016 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002

Workshops

Dispositions in Action: Laws of Nature, Explanation and Modality

Andreas Bartels & Florian Fischer & Andreas & Ludger Jansen & Antje Rumberg

Section: Affiliated Workshop

Language: English

Chair: Florian Fischer

Date: 09:00–12:45, September 7th 2016 (Wednesday)

Location: HS SR 1.004


Schedule

09:00–09:30	Florian Fischer: <i>Dispositional nomological necessity</i>
09:35–10:15	Andreas Bartels: <i>Between contingency and necessity of laws – Armstrong revisited</i>
10:20–11:00	Andreas Hüttemann: <i>Conditional metaphysical necessity and the role of dispositions in scientific practice</i>
11:00–11:20	Coffee break
11:20–12:00	Antje Rumberg: <i>Potentialities for branching time</i>
12:05–12:45	Ludger Jansen: <i>Dispositions and the scientific explanation of actions</i>




Abstracts


Florian Fischer (Bonn): Dispositional nomological necessity

aws of nature are supposed to be neither pure contingencies nor as necessary as logical truth. A lot of accounts struggle with this peculiar modal status. Neo-Humeans seem to abolish the necessity of the laws all together. ADT (Armstrong/Dretske/Tooley) accept the necessity but instead of accounting for it they just posit it. Lange gives an interesting analysis of laws and necessity, which, however, is based on the obscure notion of counterfactual facts. Dispositional essentialists think that the laws hold with metaphysical necessity, which arguably can't deal with interferences. Mumford and Anjum have posited dispositional modality as an unanalysed basic, distinct from necessity, in the lights of this difficulties. I present an alternative dispositional account of laws of nature, which is centred around natural kinds. The necessity of the laws is not an unanalysed basic on this account but derived from the disposition manifestations and their combination rules. The resulting necessity is nomological instead of metaphysical necessity. This understanding of dispositional nomological necessity may come with costs, as it accepts dispositions and natural kinds in its fundamental ontology, but these are outweighed by the benefits, or so I argue.


Andreas Bartels (Bonn): Between contingency and necessity of laws – Armstrong revisited

he talk examines the chances of solving problems occurring for Armstrong's approach to laws (in particular the "inference problem") by implementing some non-essential dispositional element into the approach. Thereby, I argue, the most favorable feature of this approach – it's ability to unify contingency and necessity of laws – will be saved.

Andreas Hüttemann (Cologne): Conditional metaphysical necessity and the role of dispositions in scientific practice


 will analyse the role of generalizations in scientific practice. The first feature I will look at is that when we explain, confirm, manipulate or predict typically lawstatements or generalizations are involved in one way or another. I will argue that these practices require a particular reading of the generalizations involved, namely as making claims about the behaviour of systems. These practices therefore presuppose the existence of systems or things. I will argue that this presupposition is not undermined by recent claims according to which fundamental physics implies that there are no things or objects. The second feature I will look at concerns the fact that generalizations typically concern the behaviour of systems considered as isolated while explanations, confirmations, manipulations and predictions typically concern non-isolated systems. Ceteris paribus clauses, which are often attached to law-statements, take account of the fact that systems are typically not on their own. Systems are interacted on and interfered with by other systems. Understanding how ceteris paribus clauses work thus helps us to understand why we can explain, confirm or manipulate the behaviour of systems that are parts of a larger whole. An analysis of the role of ceteris paribus clauses shows that we need to read laws (generalizations) as attributing dispositional properties to systems. Third, an analysis of the content of paradigmatic examples of generalizations shows that these dispositional properties are determinable properties with a highly complex, functional structure. I will argue that objections that have been raised against determinable properties need not worry us.

Antje Rumberg (Konstanz): Potentialities for branching time

 n the Prior-Thomason theory of branching time, the modal-temporal structure of our world is pictured as a tree of histories, all of which share some common past and branch toward the future. What makes branching time structures especially appealing is that they allow for a direct representation of real possibilities, viz. of the alternative possibilities for the future in an indeterministic world. In order to obtain a model for real possibility, a close link between a branching time structure and the world needs to be es-

tablished. What is needed is a specification of what is the case at the various moments of the branching structure. The specification has to be such that every history represents a course of events that is possible against the background of the prevailing laws of nature, and, what is more, the specification must respect the underlying branching time structure. In my talk, I will provide a dynamic, modal explanation of branching time models in terms of potentialities. The basic idea is as follows: by manifesting their potentialities, objects jointly give direction to the possible future courses of events. Potentialities are thereby understood as genuine modal properties of objects whose manifestations point toward the future. I show that, starting out with a single moment and a specification of what is the case at that moment, a branching time model can be lifted step by step from the local arrangement of the objects existing at that moment and interaction of the manifestations of their potentialities. The result is a limited kind of indeterminism. What is really possible is determined by the potentialities, which, in a certain sense, can be considered the bearers of the laws of nature.

Ludger Jansen (Bochum/Rostock): Dispositions and the scientific explanation of actions

his paper examines the role of dispositions in the explanation of actions in Aristotle and Max Weber. In Aristotle we find both emotional and rational explanations for actions. Emotional explanations explicitly refer to specific dispositions for actions that come along with certain emotions. Rational explanations also presuppose a specific disposition, in order to solve the old chestnut how a practical deliberation in syllogistic form can lead to an action. Similarly, Max Weber's ideal-typical agents come along with specific dispositions. The problem is, however, how to account for less-than-ideal cases, that are mixtures of two or more of Weber's ideal types.



Equivalence and Reduction of Scientific Theories

Hajnal Andréka & Thomas Barrett & Laurenz Hudetz & István Németi
& Sarita Rosenstock & James Weatherall

Section: Affiliated Workshop

Language: English

Chair: Laurenz Hudetz

Date: 09:00–13:00, September 7th 2016 (Wednesday)

Location: HS SR 1.005


Schedule

- | | |
|-------------|--|
| 09:00–09:45 | James Weatherall: <i>Theoretical Structure and Theoretical Equivalence</i> |
| 09:45–10:30 | Thomas Barrett: <i>Equivalent and inequivalent formulations of classical mechanics</i> |
| 10:30–11:15 | Sarita Rosenstock: <i>Categories and the Foundations of Yang-Mills Theory</i> |
| 11:15–11:30 | Coffee Break |
| 11:30–12:15 | Laurenz Hudetz: <i>Definable Categorical Equivalence and Reduction</i> |
| 12:15–13:00 | Hajnal Andréka & István Németi: <i>Theories of Everything: Unity of Science</i> |




Abstracts


James Weatherall (Irvine): Theoretical Structure and Theoretical Equivalence

ur physical theories often admit multiple formulations or variants. Although these variants are generally empirically indistinguishable, they nonetheless appear to represent the world as having different structures. In this talk, I will discuss some criteria for comparing empirically equivalent theories that may be used to identify (1) when one variant has more structure than another (i.e., when a formulation of a theory has “excess structure”) and (2) when two variants are theoretically equivalent, even though they appear to represent the world differently.

Thomas Barrett (Princeton): Equivalent and Inequivalent Formulations of Classical Mechanics


n this talk, I consider whether or not the Hamiltonian and Lagrangian formulations of classical mechanics are equivalent theories. I do so by applying a criterion for theoretical equivalence that was recently introduced into philosophy of science by Halvorson (2012, 2015) and Weatherall (2015). Discussion of this specific case yields two general philosophical payoffs. The first concerns the verdicts we make about equivalence of theories, and the second concerns how we might interpret what a physical theory “says about the world.”

Sarita Rosenstock (Irvine): Categories and the Foundations of Yang-Mills Theory


n this talk, I’ll discuss the prospect of using a category theoretic notion of physical theory comparison, due to Weatherall and Halvorson, to evaluate the relationships between various formulations of classical Yang-Mills theory. I’ll show how in this framework, a formulation of Yang-Mills theory using principal bundles is theoretically equivalent to one using holonomies, despite some claims by philosophers that the latter has less structure than the

former. I'll also show that another formulation in terms of Wilson loops has strictly less structure than these, but contrary to the arguments of other scholars, this formulation does not preserve all of the gauge invariant content of the previous formations, which I argue is fully captured by their category theoretic structures.

Laurenz Hudetz (Salzburg): Definable Categorical Equivalence and Reduction

 recently, categorical equivalence has been frequently considered as a fruitful criterion of theoretical equivalence (cf. Weatherall, 2015; Barrett, Rosenstock and Weatherall, 2015; Hudetz, 2015; Halvorson, 2016; Barrett and Halvorson, 2016; Weatherall, 2016; Halvorson and Tsementzis, 2016). Yet, the criterion of categorical equivalence is not free of problems. I show that categorial equivalence is too wide as a criterion of equivalence of theories. Then I propose a solution to this problem by specifying a strengthening of categorical equivalence, called 'definable categorical equivalence'. This strengthened criterion employs the model-theoretic notion of definability in order to capture the idea that, if two theories are equivalent, it must be possible to reconstruct the models of one theory from the models of the other theory, and vice versa. I argue that the criterion of definable categorical equivalence constitutes an adequate explication. Finally, I show how to explicate reduction relations in terms of category-theoretic as well as model-theoretic notions along similar lines.

Hajnal Andréka & István Németi (Budapest): Theories of Everything: Unity of Science

etwork of theories is an efficient way of organizing scientific knowledge. Science can be thought of as a network of theories, where communication and division of labor between scientists can be achieved by various connections between theories. Team-work, and unity of science—dream of the Vienna Circle—can be realized by strenghtening the connections aspect of this network. Birth of new concepts, emergence and reduction of theories can be addressed in the context of this network.

In this talk, we will be concerned with theories written in first-order language (FOL) and interpretations between these theories. We understand FOL in a general way, e.g., many-sorted, modal, even Henkin-style

higher order logics count as FOL. An interpretation is the act of refining the basic concepts of the language of a given theory by interpreting them as compound, derived concepts of another theory. We will use more general interpretations than is common today in logic. The novelty is that we can interpret both the universe of discourse—the kind of entities (objects) the theory talks about—, and the basic relations as derived, compound universes and derived compound relations, respectively. Thus, a kind of “object-relation” balance is restored and ontology gets refined, see e.g., Barrett and Halvorson 2016.

We want to illustrate that the above network is convenient to work with. We used it first in Madarász 2002 when we stated a precise logical equivalence between the observer-oriented and the observer-free approaches to special relativity. We had to face then that interpreting the universe of discourse is indispensable, and we elaborated tools for defining derived, compound universes (sorts, in logical terminology) in analogy with derived, compound relations. We will present two worked examples to some detail.


The first example is the equivalence of a 5-axiom FOL theory SpecRel of special relativity, and another 24-axiom theory SigTh for special relativity that uses meager resources as far as basic concepts are concerned. Both theories have advantages over the other. Interpreting SpecRel into SigTh gives, among others, an operational definition for building coordinate systems via using just signals. These investigations are being extended, in ongoing research, from special relativity to general relativistic space-times, e.g., to Schwarzschild black hole, de Sitter and anti-de-Sitter space-times. The second example is a research just started. It is an interpretation of the above 5-axiom SpecRel into a FOL-theory Maxwel of electrodynamics. This interpretation amounts to analysing the basic concept of a photon of SpecRel as electromagnetic wave (derived concept in Maxwel). To write up the axiom system Maxwel we use some ideas from Gömöri 2016.

– Barrett, T. and Halvorson, H., From geometry to conceptual relativity. PhilSci Archive, 2016. – Madarász, J. X., Logic and Relativity (in the light of definability theory). PhD Dissertation, 2002. <http://www.math-inst.hu/pub/algebraic-logic/diszi.pdf> – Gömöri, M., The principle of relativity – an empiricist analysis. PhD Dissertation, 2016. <http://doktori.btk.elte.hu/phil/gomorimarton/diss.pdf>

Contributed Talks

Hedonistic Utilitarianism and Evolutionary Debunking Arguments

Gustav Alexandrie

 n Sharon Street's paper "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value" (*Philosophical Studies*, 127(1), 109-166), it is argued that value realists must either deny or assert a relation between independent evaluative truths and the evolutionary forces that shape the content of our evaluative beliefs. On Street's view, this poses a Darwinian dilemma for value realism since the former option leads to skepticism while the latter option implies a scientific hypothesis that lack in clarity, explanatory power and parsimony. Contrary to Street, I argue that the latter option is viable and that evolutionary considerations may only undermine the justification for some, but not all, evaluative beliefs. I then introduce the first probabilistic framework for dealing with evolutionary debunking arguments. This is used to support an evolutionary debunking argument against rational egoism and for rational impartialism presented in Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer's paper "The Objectivity of Ethics and the Unity of Practical Reason" (*Ethics*, 123(1), 9-31). The probabilistic framework is also used to weaken an argument put forward in Guy Kahane's "Evolution and Impartiality" (*Ethics*, 124(2), 103-125), which states that if evolutionary considerations undermine the justification for rational egoism, then they also undermine the justification for belief in the badness of pain and goodness of pleasure. It is concluded that at least hedonistic utilitarianism may withstand the challenge from evolutionary debunking arguments.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Albert Anglberger
Date: 18:00-18:30, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.003



Gustav Alexandrie (Stockholm University, Sweden)
I'm an undergraduate in philosophy at Stockholm University.
E-Mail: gustav.alexandrie@yahoo.com

Vagueness as the route to semantic dialetheism

Sara Ayhan

A person may be standing in the supermarket and trying to decide whether or not to buy lemons which are kind of between green and yellow. Hence, it seems true to say that they are both green and yellow and therefore green and not green—a clear violation of the Law of Non-Contradiction.

In this paper I will argue that there are indeed good reasons to give up the LNC and even to take the stronger position, namely that there can be true contradictions (dialetheism). However, my main motivation to do so differs from that of the traditional line of argumentation, e.g. Priest's, and thereby I also come to a different kind of dialetheism than the one he proposes. In my opinion, it is the vagueness of natural languages that offers the most plausible route towards allowing true contradictions. With this background I will argue for a semantic dialetheism but not for a metaphysical one. It is the way how we describe the world that can lead to inconsistencies but not the world itself that is inconsistent.

To make this point, I will reconsider what is understood as the Law of Non-Contradiction and how Priest's Logic of Paradox deals with contradictions. Here it is important to clarify what exactly is assumed and what is rejected and also on which grounds this is done. Afterwards, I will argue for vagueness of natural languages as a better motivation to consider the possibility of true contradictions and therefore for a semantic dialetheism, which can combine the logical system of LP with our intuitions about language and the world.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Meagan Phillips
Date: 11:50-12:20, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007



Sara Ayhan (Ruhr University Bochum, Germany)

Studying in the Master of Arts program philosophy at the Ruhr University of Bochum. 2015 degree of 1st state exam in philosophy and

English. State Exam thesis about Donald Davidson's conception of truth. Interests: philosophy of language, logic, epistemology, philosophy of mind.

E-Mail: sara.ayhan@rub.de

No ground for Identity?

Lorenzo Azzano

It is sometimes stated that identity conditions for a kind K have a metaphysical role to play: they provide a metaphysical explanation for the identity of K s. There is an argument according to which, if we assume a “standard view” about identity (viz., “identity” is an univocal expression standing for a very basic and almost fundamental relation), this cannot be the case. Since this argument is cryptic in the existing formulations (Lewis 1986: 192–193, Horsten 2010, Fine 2016), my goal is to shed some light on its merit and limitations.

The kernel of the argument is that identity facts are very basic, perhaps even fundamental, and are not suited to have kind-relative grounds. It suggests that the traditional problems of fundamentality and circularity that one encounters when trying to define the notion of identity will have a metaphysical fallout, and the alleged conclusion is that identity facts cannot be grounded or explained in this way. To proceed, consider that conditions for the instantiation of a property or relation P , would both provide a grounding base for facts involving P , and a definition for P (for the concept, or a real definition of P itself). Yet identity, being a very undemanding relation, does not require almost any condition for its instantiation: everything is only identical with itself. Thus nothing makes one thing one. Contrariwise, if facts concerning identity could be grounded, the grounding facts could offer elements for a non-circular and kind-relative definition of identity, and this is, again, unacceptable.

A very close line of reasoning is one according to which, if identity is not kind-relative, its grounds cannot be kind-relative, although a full evaluation of this point depends on a study on grounding, and, more precisely, on the link between grounding and reduction (and identity).

Finally I suggest an alternative. Identity conditions have a metaphysical value, albeit a different one: they are grounded in the nature of K s. To be grounded is the whole biconditional, not the identity in one

side. And given that, if A grounds $(B \wedge C)$ that does not immediately imply that A grounds B, nor that A grounds C, this position does not imply that the identity fact is amongst the grounded - which is what the argument rejects.

Bibliography

Fine, Kit (2016). Identity criteria and ground. *Philosophical Studies* 173 (1):1–19.

Horsten, Leon (2010). Impredicative Identity Criteria. *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 80 (2):411–439.

Lewis, David K. (1986). *On the Plurality of Worlds*. Blackwell Publishers.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Jonas Werner
Date: 15:05-15:35, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004




Lorenzo Azzano (SNS Pisa, Italy)

I am a PhD student at the Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa, and I am currently working on a PhD thesis on the relational elements in power ontology. I've been a visiting student at the University of Nottingham, to study with my external supervisor (Stephen Mumford), and at the University of Oxford, Corpus Christi College, at the Power Structuralism in Ancient Ontologies project. My area of expertise is mainly the metaphysics of powers and dispositions, and, secondly, metaphysics of modality; but I am also very interested in other sectors of metaphysics such as structuralism (broadly conceived), theory of properties and relations, neo-Aristotelian outlooks on essentialism and metaphysics in general, and, finally, mereology, especially the problems of extensional mereology. Lately I am developing an interest in metametaphysical issues and grounding.

E-Mail: lorenzo.az@hotmail.it

Truth in Fiction via Non-Standard Belief Revision

Christopher Badura

iction operators such as ‘In the fiction f ’ (Inf) or ‘According to the story f ’ have seen applications particularly in philosophy of fiction, but more broadly in any ontological/metaphysical debate. For example there are fiction operator approaches towards modality, mathematics and morality. Giving a suitable analysis for when a sentence of the form ‘Inf, p ’ is true, is hence of importance. The most famous approach has been David Lewis’ analysis. However, it has certain shortcomings, especially when applied to inconsistent fictions in which not everything is true. We start by taking Lewis’ analysis 2 and give it a formal interpretation in terms of impossible world semantics and belief revision. Our formal framework comprises multi-agent plausibility models with a domain of possible and impossible worlds, ordered by a group plausibility ordering. This gives rise to Grove-style sphere models which are known from analyses of counterfactuals. The novelty is to extend these models to an impossible world setting and perform belief revision on such models. We thus treat engagement with fiction as pretended belief revision. To account for pretense, our revision operation changes the plausibility ordering but does not delete worlds from the model. Then, Inf p is true under our interpretation of analysis 2 iff. for any common belief world of the community of origin, there is, after revising the common beliefs with the explicit content of fiction f , a most plausible world u that makes p true and is strictly more plausible, wrt the *revised* ordering, than any world where p is not true. This can be expressed formally precise in our framework. Since we use impossible worlds, we can account for truth in fiction in inconsistent fictions in a non-trivial way.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Till Gallasch
Date: 10:00-10:30, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007




Christopher Badura (University of Amsterdam, Netherlands)
In 2013, I graduated in philosophy with my thesis “The ontological sta-

tus of fictional objects. Peter van Inwagen’s Argument for the existence of fictional objects.” under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Benjamin Schnieder at the University of Hamburg. After one year in the master of philosophy in Hamburg, I started the Master of Logic programme at the Institute for Logic, Language and Computation at the University of Amsterdam, where I will be graduating end of June 2016 with my thesis “Truth in Fiction via Non-Standard Belief Revision”, supervised by Prof. Dr. Francesco Berto.

E-Mail: c.badura@online.de

The Emergence of Public Meaning from a Generalized-Evolutionary and Game-Theoretical Perspective

Karim Baraghith

 erhard Schurz’ Generalized-Evolutionary Theory (2011) suggests that an evolutionary algorithm (EA) can be applied to biological and cultural processes alike. Variation, Selection and Reproduction can be seen as abstract and formal traits of complex, open and often self-regulating systems that exhibit a high degree of freedom. Various interesting questions can be raised within the framework of cultural evolution, e.g. how primitive forms of “meaning” have emerged in social groups. Following Ruth Millikan’s functionalistic Teleosemantics (1984, 2005, 2008), there are at least two relevant kinds of meaning: the speakers meaning and the conventional meaning (which again can be divided in several subclasses). From an evolutionary perspective, emphasizing the stability and path-dependency of communication and institutionalized patterns of behavior, it has long been suggested, that the emergence of primitive forms of conventional meaning – or “public” meaning, as we shall call it – can be formalized with game-theoretical tools (see e.g. Lewis 1969, Skyrms 1996, Harms 2004 Huttegger 2008 and Schurz 2011).

In the following talk, I will (1) try to embed the semantic approach within the framework of signaling games of coordination in order to shed light to philosophical and linguistic concepts, e.g. truth conditions, intension/extension, information-transmission and the distinction of indicatives and imperatives from this naturalizing perspective and (2) try to show the fruitfulness of this conceptual and formal fusion for the

explanation of culturally evolved phenomena and their stabilizing functions on a scientific-theoretical level.


Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Matthew Baxendale
Date: 15:40-16:10, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006



Karim Baraghith (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Germany)
Doktorand und wissenschaftliche Hilfskraft an der Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf.
E-Mail: karim.baraghith@uni-duesseldorf.de

The Ubiquity of Causation: Causal Closure from a Post-Layer Cake Perspective

Matthew Baxendale

nterest in the levels of organisation concept in the life sciences has seen a recent resurgence (Brooks 2016; Eronen 2015; Potochnik and McGill 2012), particularly a thorough rejection of global, distinctly stratified, hierarchical levels of organisation; in other words the layer cake model of the world (LCM). Much work remains to be done on what falls out of this rejection of the LCM, particularly how several much-discussed metaphysical issues appear from a a post-LCM perspective. One such issue is that of the casual closure argument (CCA) and the supposed causal closure of the physical world. In this paper I argue that the CCA has much less force from a post-LCM perspective. More precisely, that if the LCM is false then there should be no reason to privilege one class of phenomena over all others in terms of causal efficacy. Contrary to the CCA, there is good reason to think that causation is ubiquitous across a wide-range of phenomena varying in scale, studied by various sciences, and apt to figure to irreducible causal explanations. Traditionally the CCA has been put to work in several debates in philosophy of mind. I begin, however, by demonstrating how the CCA generalises from questioning the causal

efficacy of mental properties to doing so for all and any properties other than those within the discourse of physics thus bringing it firmly within the remit of discussions concerning levels of organisation. In order to test the viability of the post-LCM perspective I draw on recent work in the metaphysics of causation. Firstly, I demonstrate how the CCA can be rejected from either a causal powers or a dependence account of causation and secondly, how both prominent accounts of causation are compatible with the ubiquity of causation found in the post-LCM perspective. This, I argue, gives us excellent reason to reject causal closure and pursue an account of levels of organisation that supports the ubiquity of causation across all domains of inquiry.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Gregor P. Greslehner
Date: 11:45-12:15, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



Matthew Baxendale (Central European University , Hungary)
I am currently working on my PhD in Philosophy at CEU Budapest. Before that I completed my MA at The University of Sheffield and my BA at Queen's Belfast. My current focus is on the Layer Cake Model and its role in contemporary post-unity accounts of levels of organisation and scientific explanation. I also maintain a research interest in the Vienna Circle, particularly the work of Otto Neurath.
E-Mail: Baxendale_Matthew@phd.ceu.edu

Cheap Platonism and Analyticity

Szymon Bogacz

Assume that you are a cheap Platonist. You believe that (1) ontological questions are not epistemically metaphysical (ontological questions are epistemically metaphysical if “they resist direct empirical methods but are nevertheless not answerable by conceptual analysis” (Sider 2011, 187)) and (2) the following inference is sound, valid, and proves existence of numbers:

- i. There are two apples in the basket.
- ii. The number of apples in the basket equals two.
- iii. There exist number two.

In my paper I will argue that cheap Platonism is false: if you accept (2), then you reject (1); if you accept (1), then you don't know if (2) is true (and you cannot know). I will show that there are two types of analyticity in play here: intra- and trans-theoretical. As will be argued, for (2) to be true, analyticity needs to be trans-theoretical. But to prove that there are true analytical trans-theoretical sentences, serious metaphysical arguments must be advanced.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Thomas Spiegel
Date: 18:00-18:30, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.004




Szymon Bogacz (Jagiellonian University, Polska)

Szymon is Ph.D. Student at Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland. He did MA degree in philosophy in 2013 at the Institute of Philosophy. He is interested in Indian philosophy, metaontology, and theories of argumentation. He teaches Buddhist philosophy in the Centre for Comparative Studies of Civilisations of the Jagiellonian University.

E-Mail: bogaczszymon@gmail.com

Presuppositional Rule Pluralism: A new account of the assertion conditions of taste predicates

David Bordonaba

ohn MacFarlane (2014) states that the rule determining assertion conditions of taste predicates is the Taste Pleasing (TP) Rule: “If you know first-hand how something tastes, call it ‘tasty’ just in case its flavour is pleasing to you, and ‘not tasty’ just in case its flavour is not pleasing to you.” (MacFarlane 2014, p. 4).

In this work, I will argue for presuppositional rule pluralism for assertion conditions of taste predicates.

I acknowledge that TP is the default rule, that is, the rule that is presupposed at the beginning of a conversation in most contexts, but I will show that there can be cases in which other rules can make an impact on the assertion conditions of taste predicates. Specifically, I will contend that other rules, such as ethical or cultural rules, can raise exceptions to TP that shift it into a different rule, e.g. TP*. If one speaker “updates” the context with new information, while still upholding that TP is the rule at stake, the other party can express disagreement if he or she is unwilling to accept the new content while still presupposing that TP is the rule at stake. One way for the two speakers to accommodate this is to add the content to the common ground as an exception to TP. To explain how speakers introduce these changes, I will follow those theories that conceive context as common ground (Stalnaker 2002, 2014). I will take the Lewisian route, arguing that both the rule for asserting that something is tasty as well as the set of exceptions to TP that speakers can introduce, are both components of the score of a conversation (Lewis 1979).

Presuppositional rule pluralism, unlike MacFarlane’s framework, will allow us to explain a wider range of cases, those in which TP evolves because of the conversational moves of the speakers.

References

- Lewis, D. (1979). Scorekeeping in a language game. *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 8(1), 339-359.
- MacFarlane, J. (2014). *Assessment-Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications*. New York, Oxford University Press.
- Stalnaker, R. (2002). Common ground. *Linguistics and philosophy*, 25, 701-721.
- Stalnaker, R. (2014). *Context*. New York, Oxford University Press.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Viktoria Knoll
Date: 15:05-15:35, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007




David Bordonaba (University of Granada, Spain)

I'm David Bordonaba Plou from the University of Granada, Spain. I'm a PhD student under the supervision of María José Frápolli, professor of Logic and Philosophy of Science at the University of Granada. I am currently preparing my thesis discussion on predicates of personal taste and disagreement. My research interests are focused on: i) Philosophy of Language: relations between pragmatism, contextualism and expressivism; disagreement and predicates of personal taste; relation between predicates of personal taste and aesthetic predicates; ii) Philosophy of logic: logical constants, truth-ascriptions; iii) Philosophy of science: scientific disagreement.

E-Mail: bordonaba@ugr.es

Personal identity over time and the ontology of temporal parts

Valerio Buonomo

 In this paper I consider how the problem of defining a criterion of personal identity over time (PIoT) might be inquired assuming a perdurantist account of persistence, and I present the problems that any anti-criterialist approach ought to face within this framework.

In the first part, I introduce the standard way to classify the different solutions to the problem of criteria of PIoT, which distinguishes three clusters of views: the “psychological views”, the “brute-physical views”, and the “anti-criterialist (or simple) views” (Gasser 2012, Olson 2015). I point out that such a classification of the different solutions about PIoT rests upon a determinate metaphysical assumption on the way things persist, namely a general endurantist account of persistence. But what happens if we consider the problem from a perdurantist perspective?

In the second part of the paper, I suggest then to analyze the persistence question from a perdurantist perspective (Lewis 1976), sketching a corresponding taxonomy of the PIoT solutions and wondering whether something has to be changed in respect to the standard classification. As a result, I argue that on the one hand it seems to be reasonable to keep safe the distinction between psychological and somatic views.

On the other hand, however, no simple view does appear metaphysically convincing within a perdurantist account of persistence - although strongly downplaying its own premises (Merricks 1998: 122). In particular, I claim that a perdurantist anti-criterialist view would commit us either to the negation of persistence (denying both connection and unity among temporal stages, recognizing hence nothing but the stages themselves), or to the existence of somewhat “special and mysterious principle of composition” among temporal parts (accepting the unity relations but no sort of informative connectedness among them).

Therefore, even though anti-criterialism might appear a good way to deal with PIoT within an endurantist world (at least *prima facie*), I conclude that it does not provide any convincing solution from a perdurantist account of persistence.

References

- Gasser, George, and Matthias Stefan, (eds.), 2012. *Personal Identity: Complex or Simple?*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Lewis, David K., 1976. “Survival and Identity”, in Amélie O. Rorty (ed.), *The Identities of Persons*, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 17–40.
- Merricks, T., 1998. “There Are No Criteria of Identity Over Time”, *Noûs*, 32: 106–124.
- Olson, Eric T., 2015. “Personal Identity”, in Edward N. Zalta (ed.), *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, (Spring 2016 Edition), available at:
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2016/entries/identity-personal/>.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Jonas Werner
Date: 16:15-16:45, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



Valerio Buonomo (University of Milan, Italia)


I am a PhD Student in Philosophy at the University of Milan (Italy) under the supervision of Professor Paolo Valore and Professor Giuliano

Torrenco. I am a research member within the OntoForMat research project and research member of the Center for Philosophy of Time. As a graduate student, I received my Master in Philosophy from the State University of Milan in December, 2014 with the highest honors (110/110 cum laude). In 2014 I have also been a Visiting Scholar at Logos Research Group, University of Barcelona (Spain) for a five months term, while in 2010-11 I have been Visiting Student at the Department of Philosophy of the Eberhard-Karls University of Tübingen (Germany).

E-Mail: valerio.buonomo@unimi.it

How Bayesianism Addresses the Problem(s) of Induction

Chloé de Canson

he paper seeks to examine how, if at all, Bayesianism addresses the problem of induction. It begins by distinguishing two versions of the problem, the weak and the strong versions; where the weak version is attributed to Karl Popper, and the strong version to David Hume. The rest of the talk has two parts. (i) A criterion is identified which an account of confirmation (and knowledge more broadly) must have if it hopes to address the weak problem of induction. It is shown that no objective version of Bayesianism satisfies this criterion, and therefore can in principle succeed in addressing this problem, but that subjective Bayesianism can. These considerations lead to (ii) an analysis of the strong problem of induction. Some work is done to give a precise formulation of the problem, using in particular Nelson Goodman's and David Johnson's treatments. Given this, a parallel is made between the form of the problem of induction, and that of the problem of the priors. Further parallels are also made between the tempting ways out of both. This provides support to an argument that the problem of the priors is no more than the probabilistic formulation of the problem of induction – and that, because subjective Bayesianism gives rise to the problem of the priors, it also takes maximally seriously the problem of induction.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Gregor P. Greslehner
Date: 10:35-11:05, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



Chloé de Canson (University of Cambridge, United Kingdom)
Chloé is completing an MPhil in Philosophy at the University of Cambridge. In September, she will return to the London School of Economics, where she graduated with a BSc in Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method in 2015, to start a PhD. Her main areas of interest are the philosophy of probability and Bayesian philosophy of science. She has also written on the early work of Bertrand Russell (1894–1910).
E-Mail: chloe.decanson@gmail.com

Conceptual Analysis and the Problem of Philosophical Intuition

Kamil Cekiera

One of the most vibrant debates in contemporary metaphilosophy concerns the epistemic status of philosophical intuition. It is often claimed that analytic philosophers seeking answers for conceptual “truths” rely on intuition. Hilary Kornblith, for instance, puts it this way: “Most philosophers do it openly and unapologetically, and the rest arguably do it too, although some of them would deny it. What they all do is appeal to intuitions in constructing, shaping, and refining their philosophical views” (1998: 129). However, it remains unclear what exactly intuitions are. Intuition is commonly defined as a spontaneous, noninferential judgment on whether some particular case is an instance of the analyzed concept. Popularly, philosophers construct thought experiments which are supposed to yield some specific intuitions. Thus, for example, when Edmund Gettier famously attacked the classical concept of knowledge as justified true belief, his argumentation contained nothing but two thought experiments and appeal to intuition that those cases do not present the instance of knowledge. Intuitions, then, are treated as evidence in formulating and shaping philosophical theories. Nevertheless, according to some philosophers

this way of practicing philosophy is unwarranted since we lack a proper philosophical method to rely on. One way to reply to this sort of criticism is that it is a conceptual analysis that provides us with an accurate method. After being relentlessly criticized by Quine, conceptual analysis was out of fashion. This situation has changed recently because of the works of philosophers like Frank Jackson or Laurence Bonjour. In my presentation I would like to argue why the method of conceptual analysis cannot satisfy the demands of being the proper method that accommodate our intuitions.

References:

Kornblith H., 1998, The Role of Intuitions in Philosophical Enquiry: An Account with No Unnatural Ingredients, in: DePaul M., Ramsey W. (ed.) Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Philip Fox
Date: 11:45-12:15, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002




Kamil Cekiera (University of Wrocław, Poland)

Second-year PhD candidate at the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Wrocław, Poland. The doctoral dissertation in progress concerns the question of the status and the role of intuition in contemporary analytic philosophy.

E-Mail: kamil.cekiera@gmail.com

Gottobjectivity: The Fregean Notion of Mind-Independence

Chapman Waters

 hose of us interested in Frege's influence on the so called "Analytic Tradition" tend to focus on his views about logic, mathematics, and language. This paper, however, will consider one much neglected aspect of Frege's thinking, namely, his philosophy of aesthetics. It turns out, and surprisingly so, that Frege endorsed a rather extreme version of aesthetic anti-realism: subjectivism. It is surprising because Frege is normally assumed to be fundamentally opposed to subjectivist views. More importantly, though, is that Frege's aesthetic subjectivism sheds light on a number of issues that are crucial for understanding his views about logic, mathematics, and language. One such issue, the one I will focus on here, concerns Frege's preferred notion of "objectivity" or "mind-independence."

What is important about Frege's conception of objectivity – what I dub 'gottobjectivity' – is its metaphysical implications. I contend that Frege's aesthetic subjectivism, when conjoined with certain of his claims about truth, reveal that gottobjectivity is a metaphysical notion. More specifically, it reveals that Frege's conception of mind-independence is that of mind-independent existence. In this way, Frege's commitment to the "objectivity" of mathematics, logic, and meaning, also commits him to a variety of theses falling under the rubrics "realism"/"Platonism". This is significant for the following reason: the notion that Frege was a realist or Platonist, though historically popular, has fallen out of fashion in recent decades. Somewhat ironically, however, it is Frege's commitment to an anti-realist view – aesthetic subjectivism – that shows this more recent interpretive trend to be mistaken.

Section: History of Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher
Date: 16:50-17:20, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.007




Chapman Waters (Purdue University, United States of America) 2009 B.A. in philosophy, Western Illinois University. Currently a doctoral candidate in Philosophy at Purdue University; dissertation title “Frege’s Realism Revisited: A critique of Recent Trends in Frege scholarship.”

E-Mail: waters3@purdue.edu

Leibniz and Bolzano on Conceptual Containment

Jan Claas

 Leibniz and Bolzano are two among several philosophers who frequently talk about conceptual containment. We can find a criterion for conceptual containment at the very heart of Leibniz’s system as well as an elaborate logical calculus for conceptual containment and concept addition. I will reconstruct and discuss a selection of counterexamples and arguments against this account, which have been brought forward by Bolzano in his seminal Theory of Science (TS).

Leibniz’s criterion is a substantial part of his containment theory of truth, according to which in every truth the predicate concept is contained in the subject concept. From this theory I will retrieve the criterion Bolzano actually attacks in §64 of the TS. According to this criterion, an objectual concept A contains the attribute concept B if and only if everything must have the attribute represented by B in order to fall under the concept A.

I will focus on one counterexample and two arguments that make use of mereological background assumptions. The counterexample shows that Leibniz has to identify concepts that necessarily represent the same things. I will show how this leads Leibniz to violate a plausible mereological principle. In the two arguments I will discuss afterwards, Bolzano

relies on a mereological principle governing concept formation. It tells us further which concepts can make it as parts into the complex concept that is the result of combining two concepts. After fixing a defect of this principle, I will show that Bolzano puts his opponent under some pressure to show how certain concepts are suddenly supposed to be constituents of the complex concept.

While his objections are in principle defusable, Bolzano successfully draws attention to serious problems Leibniz's criterion has to accommodate mereological principles and intuitions. I will suggest that Leibnizian concepts, unlike Bolzanian concepts, are best not understood to be compounds in a mereologically demanding sense.

Section: History of Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher
Date: 17:25-17:55, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.007




Jan Claas (Hamburg University, Germany)

Jan Claas is a PhD student at Hamburg University, where he writes his dissertation on Bernard Bolzano's conception of concepts. He received his basic training in Heidelberg and has been fascinated by early analytic philosophy since his first seminar on Frege. He mainly works on concepts and is especially interested in conceptual analysis and the enigmatic process of grasping abstract senses. Among his further favourites are Leibniz, Russell and Ryle.

E-Mail: jan.claas@gmx.de

Theoretical Virtues and Methodology in Metaphysics: Deflating the Hierarchy

Jonathan Dittrich & Farbod Akhlagi-Ghaffarokh

ne common criteria for theory-choice in first-order metaphysics is to appeal to certain putative theoretical virtues, such as simplicity, strength and elegance, in adjudicating between rival first-order theories in metaphysics. In this paper,

we, firstly, raise a worry about the employment of theoretical virtues as a criteria for theory-choice in first-order metaphysics, and secondly argue that this worry is best accommodated by the meta-metaphysical position we call epistemic deflationism.

Epistemic deflationism is the meta-metaphysical position according to which i) first-order metaphysical questions are substantial, and ii) we cannot know the answers to them (see Bennett, 2009). This view is to be distinguished from more familiar and common forms of ontological deflationism in meta-metaphysics, according to which first-order metaphysical questions are insubstantial or trivial (see e.g. Tahko, 2015).

We proceed as follows. In 1, we argue that the employment of theoretical virtues in adjudicating between different answers to first-order metaphysical questions faces the following difficulty. One will have to provide both a suitable list of theoretical virtues, as well as a weighing between them. The necessity for the latter arises due to situations in which different theories satisfy different virtues. Provision of this list of virtues, and a weighing system amongst them, forces one to ask the third-order question what, if any, the correct set of criteria is to choose and weigh the second-order theoretical virtues accordingly. But those choices and the weighing will have to rely on further virtues on the pain of different sets of second-order virtues satisfying different third-order virtues. It appears that these considerations force upon us an infinite hierarchy of virtues. If this is so, then it seems that there cannot be a positive answer to the initial second-order question, leaving the first-order dispute undecided.

However, in 2, we argue that this last step is too quick. What the hierarchy worry shows is not that there is no positive answer to the second-order (and thus, indirectly, to the first-order) question. Rather, it (at best) shows that we do not or possibly cannot know the answer to these questions. As such, the hierarchy worry of 1 raises a mere epistemic problem instead of a metaphysical one. We argue that this understanding of the hierarchy worry is both compatible with, and best explained by, epistemic deflationism.

References

- Bennett, Karen (2009). Composition, colocation, and metaontology. In David John Chalmers, David Manley & Ryan Wasserman (eds.), *Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology*. Oxford University Press.

Tahko, Tuomas E. (2015). *An Introduction to Metametaphysics*. Cambridge University Press.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Julio de Rizzo
Date: 11:15-11:45, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



Jonathan Dittrich (University of St Andrews, United Kingdom)
Jonathan Dittrich is currently studying for an MLitt in Logic & Metaphysics at the University of St Andrews. Before that, he completed a First-Class Bachelor Degree in Philosophy & General Rhetoric at the University of Tübingen, spending one year at the University of Oslo. After the completion of his Master's degree, he will move to the MCMP in Munich to write his dissertation on substructural approaches to paradox under the supervision of Hannes Leitgeb funded by the European DIAPHORA project. His main research interests lie in the philosophy of logic and language—especially logical and semantic paradoxes and (formal) theories of truth. He has secondary interests in epistemology and the metaphysics of modality and time.

E-Mail: Jonathan.Dittrich@gmx.de




Farbod Akhlaghi-Ghaffarokh (University of St Andrews, United Kingdom)

Farbod Akhlaghi-Ghaffarokh is a M.Litt. Philosophy candidate at the University of St. Andrews, on the St. Andrews/Stirling Philosophy Graduate Programme (SASP - where he is funded by a Philosophical Quarterly Scholarship). Before studying on the SASP, he completed a BA (Hons) Philosophy degree at the University of Reading, with First Class Honours, the Philosophy Department Prize, the Laurie Brain Prize, and a Chancellor's Award. In the 2016/17 academic year, he will be reading for an M.Phil. in Philosophy at the University of Cambridge (Darwin College). He is also the President of the British Postgraduate Philosophy Association, and is the former President of the

British Undergraduate Philosophy Society and the University of Reading Philosophy Society. He has a broad range of research interests in philosophy, which include: Metaphysics, Meta-Metaphysics, Moral Philosophy and the Philosophy of Normativity, Meta-Normativity, Epistemology, Philosophy of Mind, and Meta-Philosophy. For his website, see: <http://farbodakhlaghi-g.weebly.com/>
E-Mail: farbod.akhlaghi.g@st-andrews.ac.uk

Inference with non-standard probabilities

Colin Elliot

 In a fair infinite lottery we have a countably infinite number of tickets (one for each natural number, say), each with an equal chance of winning. We can intuitively grasp such a game, but within the usual axioms of mathematical probability it is impossible to model. An axiom in particular, Countable Additivity (CA), forces us to place nearly all probability on some finite initial number of tickets. If we abandon CA, on the other hand, we can assign the same probability of winning to all tickets, but this common probability would be zero. Now we have the counter-intuitive result that the single probabilities of each ticket do not add up to the probability of their union. Now, as noted by K.T. Kelly and others, the axiom of CA has a powerful effect also on probabilistic inference. If we have a countable number of alternative hypotheses, we see the problem of the infinite lottery present itself again: in particular, we are forced to place nearly all probability for the refutation to a universal hypothesis to be placed on some finite initial number of trials. This means that we can be sure, with arbitrarily high probability, that our universal hypothesis is correct, after a finite number of positive trials but we are somehow forgetting the fact that the next trial could always be negative. S. Wenmackers and L. Horsten suggest solving the problem of the infinite lottery by using non-standard analysis. With a hyperrational-valued probability measure, they are able to give a mathematical description of a fair infinite lottery. In this talk I apply Wenmackers and Horsten's solution to a dynamic setting. That is, I explore probabilistic inference with non-standard probabilities, compare it to Bayesian inference with standard probabilities, and discuss the expressive power and epistemological consequences these different axiomatisations of probability carry.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Gregor P. Greslehner
Date: 10:00-10:30, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



Colin Elliot (University of Tilburg, Netherlands)

Colin Elliot studied mathematics at the University of Edinburgh and history and philosophy of science at the University of Utrecht. He is now a PhD candidate at the University of Tilburg, in the Tilburg center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (TiLPS) and is working in the philosophy of probability.

E-Mail: c.elliott@uvt.nl

The Inability of Conceivability Arguments in Physicalism vs. Dualism Debate

Shuyi Feng

Shalmers provides a conceivability argument against physicalism. The argument can be reformulated as below:
Premise 1: it is negatively/positively conceivable that P entails Q fails.[1]

Premise 2: negative/positive conceivability entails possibility.

Premise 3: physicalism is true iff that P entails Q holds.

Premise 4: if P entails Q, then necessarily P entails Q.

Conclusion: physicalism fails.

There are generally three ways to challenge this argument: 1) premise 1 cannot hold; 2) premise 2 cannot hold; 3) even if all premises are true, the conclusion cannot be drawn. In this essay, I argue in a different way. I show that even if all premises are true and the argument can go through, that is, even if this argument is sound, we have no idea that the first premise holds, in other words, we cannot determine whether this argument is a sound one.

Step 1. I show that if $(P \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow \Box(P \rightarrow Q)$, then $\neg(P \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow \Box\neg(P \rightarrow Q)$ also holds.

Step 2. Since we assume that $(P \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow \Box(P \rightarrow Q)$ holds, then we have that both $(P \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow \Box(P \rightarrow Q)$ and $\neg(P \rightarrow Q) \rightarrow \Box\neg(P \rightarrow Q)$ are true. It is obvious that the converse entailments of the two conditionals are also true. Hence, we actually have two bi-conditionals: $(P \rightarrow Q) \leftrightarrow \Box(P \rightarrow Q)$ and $\neg(P \rightarrow Q) \leftrightarrow \Box\neg(P \rightarrow Q)$. Put this two bi-conditionals together, we have $\Box(P \rightarrow Q) \vee \Box\neg(P \rightarrow Q)$. It means that $P \rightarrow Q$ is a necessary proposition, either necessarily true or necessarily false.

Step 3. Chalmers provides the definition for negative conceivability: for any proposition S , S is negatively conceivable iff S is a priori ruled out. I take “a priori ruled out” as the synonymous of “a priori knowable false”. Then according to CP- thesis, negative conceivability entails possibility, we have, if S is necessary, then S is a priori true. In the same way, if S is necessary false, then S is a priori false. Hence, if S is a necessary proposition, then S is a priori knowable to be true or knowable to be false. In other words, if S is a necessary proposition, then it is an a priori proposition.

Step 4. $P \rightarrow Q$ is a necessary proposition, so its truth value is a priori knowable. If $P \rightarrow Q$ is true, then $\neg(P \rightarrow Q)$ is a priori ruled out, hence inconceivable, with $P \rightarrow Q$ being conceivable. In the same way, if $\neg(P \rightarrow Q)$ is true, then $P \rightarrow Q$ is a priori ruled out, hence inconceivable, with $\neg(P \rightarrow Q)$ being conceivable. However, when we claim that one is inconceivable, no matter which one, assume we claim $P \rightarrow Q$ is inconceivable, we actually a priori ruled out $P \rightarrow Q$, that is, we have a priori known $P \rightarrow Q$ being false, in other words, we have a priori known $\neg(P \rightarrow Q)$ being true. Thus, a conceivability argument is redundant. On the other hand, if we don't know whether $P \rightarrow Q$ or its negation is true, then we don't know which one is false, either. It follows that we don't know which one is inconceivable, hence, we don't know which one is conceivable, either. Thus, we cannot decide whether a zombie argument or anti-zombie argument is sound.

[1] P and Q are two long sentences that describe all microphysical facts and all phenomenal facts.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Pascale Lötscher
Date: 15:40-16:10, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002



Shuyi Feng (University of Heidelberg, Germany)

2014.10-2018 doctoral study at Philosophy Dept., Heidelberg University, Germany

2011.9-2013.6 M.A, Philosophy Dept., Wuhan University, China


2007.7-2010.8 work in a company in China

2003.9-2007.6 B.A, School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, China

E-Mail: shuyi.f@gmail.com

The Ethics of Genetic Intervention in Human Embryos

Enno Fischer

 In the light of recent advancements in stem cell research genetic intervention in human embryos seems to be possible in the not so far future. For example such a technology could develop CRISPR/Cas9-mediated gene editing. We can imagine that such intervention could be performed with the aim of influencing the appearance and character of the prospective human.

In recent years the debate on how to deal with such a technology has raged. One prominent position is Jürgen Habermas's view who asks whether we should develop technologies for genetic intervention at all. His main point is that this technology would give parents an unprecedented control over their children's life. This brings about a strong asymmetry in intergenerational relationships and has the consequence that genetically manipulated children cannot consider themselves the sole authors of their own life history.

Habermas's position has come under widespread criticism. These

critics argue that Habermas's argument relies on implausible assumptions about human nature. Moreover, they argue that genetic intervention does not add anything new to intergenerational relationships: the relationship between parents and children is already asymmetric and parents are co-authors of their childrens' life history through educational influence.

In my talk I suggest a new approach to Habermas's theory which makes clear that he has a strong point against genetic intervention in human embryos. I will argue that the standard objections to his approach result partly from a misunderstanding of his argument and partly are a reaction to unnecessarily strong assumptions contained in his approach. On the one hand, I aim at a more charitable reading of Habermas with respect to his assumptions concerning human nature. On the other hand, I suggest a revision of his strong assumptions concerning the control that can be exerted through genetic intervention and the contrast between genetic intervention and educational influence.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Michael Klenk
Date: 10:00-10:30, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003



Enno Fischer (University of Hannover, Germany)
MPhil at the Department for History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Cambridge. Now PhD student at the University of Hannover.
E-Mail: enno-fischer@gmx.de

Constitutivism about epistemic rationality

Philip Fox



n most cases, to have contradictory beliefs is strongly irrational. However, it is unclear what best explains this purported truth about rationality.

In the first part, I reject what I call the Traditional View about the irrationality of contradictory beliefs. On this view, having contradictory beliefs guarantees having false beliefs, which it is always strongly irrational to guarantee. Although straightforward, the Traditional View faces serious problems. First, on pain of being uninformative, it faces the troubling task of explaining why it is always irrational to guarantee false beliefs, even if these beliefs are entirely trivial or inconsequential. Second, to meet this task, it is of no avail to ground the irrationality in moral, prudential, or instrumental requirements against believing falsely. The alleged moral, prudential, or instrumental wrongness is often dubiously far-fetched and, even if defensible, does not measure up with the strong rational criticism that contradictory beliefs in fact warrant (Problem of Asymmetry). Third, even if these problems can be solved, the Traditional View does not account for the distinctively subjective dimension of the irrationality in question: Someone with contradictory beliefs does not primarily contradict the facts, but herself.

Hence, in the second part, I develop a novel account of the irrationality of contradictory beliefs. On this account, an agent with contradictory beliefs is irrational in virtue of setting for herself two epistemic standards under which her beliefs cannot permissibly coexist even by her own lights. In particular, I argue that by believing p , one commits oneself to an epistemic standard condemning belief in not- p , while believing not- p commits oneself to the opposite standard. These standards follow from the correctness condition that is constitutive of the very representational state that one enters through believing something, and hence license an inescapable rational criticism.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Giada Fratantonio
Date: 14:00-14:30, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002



Philip Fox (University of Bayreuth, Germany)

Philip Fox has just finished his BA in Philosophy & Economics at the University of Bayreuth. Prior to that, he was a Visiting Student in Philosophy at the University of Oxford. His main research interests are

in meta-ethics, moral & political philosophy, and epistemology.

E-Mail: pfox@online.de

Evidential Externalism and The Armchair Access Problem

Giada Fratantonio

According to Williamson's theory of evidence (Williamson, 2000), one's evidence is constituted by all and only one's known propositions (henceforth, $E=K$). Given $E=K$, it follows that, if one knows a proposition p , then p becomes part of one's evidence. Crucially, in his (2005), Silins formulates the so-called Armchair Access Argument, which (allegedly) represents a *reductio ad absurdum* of Williamson's ($E=K$).

Let E be any specific empirical proposition. Silins' Armchair Access Argument runs – schematically – as follows:

- 1) If E is part of my evidence, then it is sometimes possible to have armchair knowledge of the fact that E is part of my evidence.
 - 2) If E is part of my evidence, then I know that E (Given $E=K$).
 - 3) If I know that E , then E is true. (Given Factivity of Knowledge).
 - 4) If a proposition p entails a proposition q , I have armchair knowledge that p , and I come to competently deduce q from p , while retaining my knowledge that p , then I come to have armchair knowledge that q . (Closure Principle for Armchair Knowledge).
- C) Therefore, it is sometimes possible to have armchair knowledge of a specific empirical proposition E . (Given, 1), 2), 3), and 4))

The foregoing argument is valid. Crucially, it seems absurd to say that we can know empirical propositions from the armchair alone. If Williamson wants to save his $E=K$ – Silins claims – he has to resist the argument from 1) to C).

In this talk, first, I reconstruct Silins' Armchair Access Argument. Second, I argue that the Armchair Access Argument does not represent a real challenge for Williamson's ($E=K$). More precisely, I argue

that Silins' argument relies on a notion of armchair knowledge that Williamson should reject.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Philip Fox
Date: 10:35-11:05, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002



Giada Fratantonio (University of Edinburgh, United Kingdom)

I am a second year PhD student at the University of Edinburgh. I work on epistemology under the supervision of Prof. Duncan Pritchard, Aidan McGlynn and Martin Smith. In my thesis, I defend an externalist theory of evidence, namely, evidential externalism, according to which one's evidence does not supervene on one's non-factive mental states. My main interests in epistemology concern the nature of justification and evidence and its relation to our beliefs.

E-Mail: giada.fratantonio@gmail.com

A Tribute to Putnam's Brains

Till Gallasch

Silary Putnam (1926-2016) famously attacked metaphysical/external realism in the late 1970s using his model-theoretic argument and the argument from Brains in the Vat. Thereby he put forward his version of internal realism. In this talk I will focus on the second argument. Firstly, I will introduce Putnam's semantic externalism and compare it to semantic internalism using the *de re* / *de dicto* distinction. After a short characterisation of external realism (cf. Button 2013, *The Limits of Realism.*), I will reconstruct Putnam's argument in its disjunctive form, and attempt to show what Putnam's argument from Brains in the Vat actually proves. I will argue that, granted semantic externalism, it does actually prove that we are not forever envatted brains in the vat, yet it fails to overcome the epistemic gap and, thereby, Cartesian angst and external realism. Using 2D-semantics and taking 'brain' and 'vat' as directly referring terms, I

hope to elucidate the argument and dissolve some common confusion about Putnam's Brains.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Viktoria Knoll
Date: 15:40-16:10, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007




Till Gallasch (Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Germany)

Till Gallasch is a master's student at the Heinrich-Heine-University Düsseldorf, Germany. He finished his B.A. in 2015 with a major in Philosophy and a minor in History. His thesis was about Hilary Putnam's "Brains in the Vat". Philosophy of language, Logic, Epistemology and Metaphysics are his main interests. He is a student assistant since 2014 and has conducted several tutorials on philosophy of language, logic and metaphysics.

E-Mail: gallasch@phil.hhu.de

The Hybrid Theory of Assertion

Grzegorz Gaszczyk

 In my talk I examine the hybrid model of assertion which combines the constitutive rule account with the elements of the commitment account. I argue that linking these two approaches provide satisfactory answer to the question 'What is assertion?'. Both of them focus on different aspects concerning the assertoric speech, but both provide a description of assertion in normative terms. The constitutive rule approach defines the norm for making an assertion, i.e. aims at specifying conditions under which we can make an assertion. The commitment approach provides a straightforward answer to the question what it is to make an assertion, i.e. aims at explaining what we do when we make an assertion. My goal is to show that the commitment account complements the constitutive rule account.

My strategy is the following. Firstly, I examine some constitutive rule approaches which take elements from the commitment approach.

My aim is to show that at least some of the writers who follow the rule account explain some features of the assertoric practice in commitment terms. Secondly, I focus on the specific features and challenges of the hybrid proposal. Analyzing Milić's (2015) proposal, I claim that arguing in favor of any constitutive rule of assertion, we need additionally the assertoric commitment. This unique type of commitment helps us not only to describe the features of assertoric practice, i.e. what we do in an assertion, but also to compare assertion with different types of assertives (arguing, convincing, presenting, etc.). In each of the latter we undertake different kinds of commitment than in case of the assertion. I explain also to what we are committing ourselves in an assertion and how strong this commitment must be. I claim that the commitment framework provides natural explanation of the assessment of flat sentences, like *p*, and qualified, like 'I am certain that *p*', or 'I know that *p*'. Finally, I tackle the issue of anonymous assertions (Goldberg 2013) and argue that we undertake certain sort of commitment in every such case.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Till Gallasch
Date: 11:10-11:40, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007



Grzegorz Gaszczyk (Jagiellonian University, Poland)

I'm a PhD student at Jagiellonian University. I finished the master in Analytic Philosophy at The University of Barcelona (LOGOS Research Group in Analytic Philosophy) and Inter-faculty Individual Studies in the Humanities at Jagiellonian University. My research is focused on philosophy of language and I'm working on my PhD concerning theories of assertion.

E-Mail: gaszczyk.grzegorz@gmail.com

From Molecules to Biological Systems: Explaining Life at Different Levels

Gregor P. Greslehner

Scientific explanation has been and still is a central issue in philosophy of science. In biology, explanations are given on several levels. Explanations at the molecular level are at the core of recent biological interest. On the other hand, explanations on higher levels, e.g., physiological or evolutionary explanations, usually differ from explanations of molecular mechanisms. Do we need another type of scientific explanation at higher levels in biology, and how and to what extent can these explanations at higher levels be obtained from the respective molecular explanations? What kinds of explanations are given at the molecular level in biological practice? And how can they be linked to higher levels without a naive form of reductionism?

In addition to the diversity of explanatory patterns and practice in biology, the massive amount of accumulated data in the life sciences lacks an overarching, integrative picture which some expect to be found in systems biology. In this talk, I would like to make a critical assessment of the prospects and claims being made from system biologists with respect to explaining biological phenomena.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Matthew Baxendale
Date: 15:05-15:35, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006



Gregor P. Greslehner (University of Salzburg, Austria)

Gregor Greslehner is a PhD student in philosophy at the University of Salzburg, working on the philosophy of molecular biology. He also holds a bachelor's degree in molecular biosciences (from the Universities of Salzburg and Linz). Currently, he is doing his master's thesis in molecular biology at the University of Salzburg.

E-Mail: greslehnergr@stud.sbg.ac.at

Why formalist reconstructions cannot identify moral laws in Kant's ethics?

Yuhang Guo

At least since Hegel, Kant's ethical theory is characterized as the paradigm for empty formalism in ethics. It contends that Kant's supreme principle of morality is too abstract and general to tell us what we ought to actually do in the concrete particular.

This essay seeks to contribute to current debates about the emptiness critique of Kant's Categorical Imperative. Kantian formalists, like Silber, Rawls, and O'Neill, try to defend Kant by treating Formula of Universal Law as a formal accomplishment and argue that it functions as a moral test. Under formalist expression, there is a decision procedure for testing maxims from which, by running our proposed maxims through this procedure and testing them for universality, we can construct rational maxims, either to disclose the real nature of the Categorical Imperative or spell out the specific procedures for applying it. One possibility, due to Silber, is that the moral law specifies the procedure of judgment in the act of moral schemata or determining the embodiment of the highest good. Silber sees the Formula of Universal Law of nature as Kant's purpose of providing the content for the rationality of the procedure. The second possibility, due to Rawls, is that moral content does not directly come from the ends or values, but rather rests on a special rationality and social-political background. As a third possibility, O'Neill advocates the formula of universal law as the canonical case of universality test, by showing how achieving consistency of action in the approach of textually-close recognizing of Kant's universality test.

Although those reconstructions might refute what Allen Wood calls a stronger form of the formalism charge (Hegel's), that is, the Formula of Universal Law can make no distinction between good and evil and are unable to exclude any action whatever as morally wrong. I will show that they are not free from a weaker form of it, that is, the formula cannot give us a completely satisfactory account of our duties. They essentially agree on where their theories would be going, in sense of formalist interpretation. There are merely disagreements on how to get there.

In this paper, I will argue that even those reconstructions could not

resolve the “emptiness” of Kantian ethics. To defend this claim, I will, firstly, show how formalists reconstruct Kant’s ethics in various ways. I will argue that the formalist reconstructions have to appeal to certain background theories in some common-sense rules, such rules are called, variously, postulates of rationality by Silber, constraining principles of empirical practical reason by Rawls, and principles of rational intending by O’Neill.

Secondly, I will argue that two problems remain within such interpretations of Kant’s ethics. On the one hand, introducing background theories based on common sense, rationality, or socio-politics is too heavy for Kant’s ethics to bear. Moreover, it remains questionable how they, in turn, may be (morally) justified in order to function within such a complemented Kantian ethics in the first place. On the other hand, formalism merely plays a subsidiary role in Kant’s ethics at best. Formalism, indeed, demonstrates the moral law, but the question is how an effective procedure for determining moral obligation or duty can be operated by such a formal moral law. Hence, even if Kant’s ethic is interpreted in such a current formalist way, the resulting content of the procedure or moral law is still not clear enough.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Albert Anglberger
Date: 16:50-17:20, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.003



Yuhang Guo (Münster University, Germany)

Doctoral candidate at Münster University since 2013. Visiting scholar at the Australian National University, three months at Cambridge University, and three months at Hastings Center in New York. Interests in philosophy of science, mind theory, value theory, ethics and German idealism.

E-Mail: 121684092@qq.com

How arithmetic is (not) about the empirical world

Felix Hagenström

My paper addresses the relation between language and reality by focusing on a special case of this relation: arithmetical statements such as “ $2 + 2 = 4$ ” and their referring to quantities of things in the world (e.g. two apples and another two apples). On the one hand, arithmetical propositions are independent from empirical reality, and it is precisely this fact which constitutes their necessity and apriority. On the other hand, arithmetic features in empirical statements, thereby allowing us to calculate things, make predictions (e.g. in the sciences), and do engineering.

So if we want to understand the relation between arithmetical propositions and empirical reality, we seem to face a dilemma: either we hold on to arithmetic’s non-empirical nature, in which case we can ensure its necessity but leave its useful applicability unexplained, or we regard arithmetic as grounded in empirical reality, in which case we can explain arithmetic’s applicability but seem to jeopardise its necessity.

My paper discusses this dilemma by drawing on the later Wittgenstein’s idea that mathematical propositions are rules of grammar, i.e. rules governing our use of words (here: number words and arithmetical signs). According to this idea, arithmetical propositions do not describe objects (neither Platonic nor empirical), but are norms of description that make descriptions possible. This implies that arithmetical propositions themselves lack truth-aptness, i.e. they cannot strictu sensu be true or false. Something rather counter-intuitive follows from this: we cannot reject the proposition “ $2 + 2 = 5$ ” as false. Yet we would probably not accept that proposition, since it is impractical.

By critically examining Wittgenstein’s view I give an account of elementary arithmetic and its relation to the empirical world. This account is based on the idea that, just as other grammatical rules for concept application, arithmetical propositions have three distinctive features:

- (1) Normativity (2 plus 2 must be 4)
- (2) Arbitrariness (non-truth-aptness)
- (3) Practicality (useful applicability)

I explain these features in virtue of which the above dilemma cannot

only be better understood but also resolved. Finally, I will briefly sketch why the presented account is superior to its empiricist, conventionalist and Platonist rivals.


Section: Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics
Language: English
Chair: Elena Tassoni
Date: 16:50-17:20, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.005



Felix Hagenström (University of Southampton, United Kingdom)
Felix Hagenström (M.A.) studied Philosophy and German Philology at the Universities of Göttingen and Southampton (UK). He has also worked in several academic positions, most recently at the Department of Medical Ethics and History of Medicine in Göttingen and as a teaching assistant at the University of Southampton. He is currently working on an AHRC-funded PhD project on Wittgenstein at the Universities of Southampton and Reading (UK).
E-Mail: foh1u12@soton.ac.uk

Ockham's Distinction

Marco Hausmann

ckham famously distinguished between propositions that are about the present (as regards their wording and their subject matter) and propositions that are about the present (as regards their wording only). Ockhamism, roughly, is the claim that this distinction provides a successful solution to the dilemma of freedom, fatalism and foreknowledge. Considerable debate over Ockhamism in the eighties and nineties showed, however, that all attempts to give a satisfactory analysis of Ockham's distinction had to face serious problems.

The aim of my talk is to suggest a new and promising analysis of Ockham's distinction and to conclude that Ockhamism is partially true (or to put it differently: that Ockham's distinction provides a partial but only a partial solution to the dilemma of freedom, fatalism and

foreknowledge). At the beginning of my talk I briefly outline and criticize the most famous versions of Ockhamism (Marilyn McCord Adams, Alvin Plantinga). As a conclusion I point out that nowadays – due to recent developments in philosophy of language – elaborate accounts of “subject matter” or “aboutness” are available. Following up on this, I first show why David Lewis’ account of “subject matter” fails to explain Ockham’s distinction. I then argue that Kit Fine’s Truthmaker Semantics provides a suitable formal framework for an adequate analysis of Ockham’s distinction. Finally I show why such an analysis would yield a partial but only a partial solution to the dilemma of freedom, fatalism and foreknowledge.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Till Gallasch
Date: 11:45-12:15, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.007



Marco Hausmann (Ludwig-Maximilians-University Munich, Germany)

Marco Hausmann (M.A.), LMU Munich. Currently working on a PhD-thesis on freedom and determinism. Research interests mainly lie in logic (counterfactuals, modal logic, grounding) and metaphysics (free will, personal identity, philosophy of religion).

E-Mail: marco.hausmann1@gmx.de

E-Mail: marco.hausmann1@gmx.de

The Problem of Deontic Restrictions

Roland Hesse



here is a deontic restriction against some type of action ϕ if, and only if, there are situations for which it holds that (i) it is morally wrong to ϕ , (ii) there are no other morally relevant factors, and (iii) ϕ -ing would reduce the overall number of actions of the ϕ -type. For instance, it is often held that there is a deontic restrictions against killing the innocent against her will such that it will

not be permissible to kill the innocent against her will in circumstances where doing so would reduce the overall number of innocents killed against their wills.

Many authors find such restrictions puzzling or even paradoxical. However, it is surprisingly difficult to identify the properties in virtue of which deontic restrictions are supposed to be puzzling. In my talk I will critically discuss three such proposals. According to the first, deontic restrictions must appear puzzling because they rest on rationales that simultaneously undermine the validity of deontic restrictions. A second proposal has it that deontic restrictions are puzzling because they conflict with the notion of what one might call “maximizing rationality”. I will reject these proposals and argue that it is a third proposal that is most promising: deontic restrictions are puzzling because the agent-relativity implied by them contrasts with the victim-focussed account of wrongness that is most adequate for many types of actions for which there are such restrictions.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Christoph Lernpaß
Date: 11:15-11:45, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003



Roland Hesse (Humboldt-University Berlin, Germany)
Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy and Economics, University of Bayreuth, 2009. MPhil in Philosophy, Cambridge University (UK), 2011. Currently: Doctoral Candidate at the Humboldt-University of Berlin. Topic: Deontic Restrictions. Scholarship from the “Studienstiftung des Deutschen Volkes”. Single-parenting, 1 kid.
E-Mail: rolandhesse11783@gmail.com

A Semantic Critique of Moral Incompatibilism

Sybren Heyndels

Common sense says that we are responsible for at least some of our actions. “Moral incompatibilists” claim that if determinism is true, this common sense belief would turn out to be false. As we do not know whether determinism is true, we do not know whether we ever are and were truly responsible for our actions. In this paper, I aim to do two things. First, I defend the claim that moral incompatibilism is committed to the denial of semantic inferentialism. Secondly, I outline an inferentialist argument against moral incompatibilism based on this discovery.

According to inferentialist semantics (Brandom 1994), endorsing a claim (‘The table is red’) consists in (1) taking responsibility for the set of (material) inferences that follow from that claim (e.g. ‘The table is colored’) as well as (2) being precluded entitlement to the set of claims (materially) incompatible with it (e.g. ‘The table is yellow’). One only counts as meaningfully saying something, i.e. as “making a move in a language-game”, if one has a minimal grasp of the claims and actions one takes responsibility for when making a claim. If being an appropriate target of responsibility and entitlement ascriptions is a pragmatic condition of possibility for meaningfully uttering something, these normative statuses do not have the status of things that can be meaningfully doubted.

As moral incompatibilists do doubt whether we ever are responsible, they must reject semantic inferentialism. At the same time, inferentialist semantics offers an argument that exempts our responsibility practices from any meaningful doubt. Although it does not offer a knock-down argument against the incompatibilist (one can reject semantic inferentialism), the paper recommends further investigations into the semantic presuppositions of positions in the contemporary free will debate.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Albert Anglberger
Date: 15:45-16:15, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003




Sybrein Heyndels (KU Leuven, Belgium)

Sybrein Heyndels is a PhD student at the Institute of Philosophy in Leuven. His project aims at developing an analytic pragmatist compatibilist position in the contemporary free will debate. His main interests lie in the philosophy of language, philosophy of action, free will and the nature of rules, intentionality and normativity. Next to this, he is highly interested in the philosophy of Wittgenstein, Davidson, Brandom and McDowell. Heyndels did his BA at the Free University of Brussels and his MA at the Freie Universität Berlin.

E-Mail: sybrein.heyndels@kuleuven.be

Naiver Realismus, Wahrnehmung und Gründe

Till Hopfe

er Naive Realismus (NR) ist eine Position in der Theorie der Wahrnehmung, die im Rahmen der letzten 15 Jahre mehr und mehr an Bedeutung gewonnen hat. NR enthält eine metaphysische und eine epistemologische These.

Die metaphysische These besagt, dass die Natur der Wahrnehmung grundlegend in einer nicht-repräsentationalen Bekanntschaftsrelation zu geistunabhängigen Objekten (und ihren Eigenschaften) besteht.

Die epistemologische These besagt, dass Wahrnehmung – verstanden entsprechend der metaphysischen These – die Grundlage für unser empirisches Wissen bildet.

Nach NR soll die nicht-repräsentationale Bekanntschaftsrelation zu Objekten (und ihren Eigenschaften) die Grundlage für unser empirisches Wissen bilden können, indem sie uns Gründe für empirische Überzeugungen zugänglich macht. Aber wie ist dies genau zu verstehen? Wie ist die Grundlegungsrelation zwischen Wahrnehmungen und empirischen Überzeugungen konzipiert? Welcher Begriff des Grundes wird hierbei verwendet?

Im Vortrag soll zunächst eine Antwort auf die angeführten Fragen gegeben und darauf aufbauend für folgende These argumentiert werden: Wenn Wahrnehmung als nicht-repräsentationale Bekanntschaftsrelation zu Objekten (und ihren Eigenschaften) verstanden wird, dann kann sie

für sich genommen nicht als rationale Grundlage für die Rechtfertigung empirischer Überzeugungen verstanden werden. Eine solche Grundlage wäre jedoch die epistemologisch relevante Art der Fundierung unseres empirischen Wissens.

Section: Epistemology
Language: German
Chair: Maximilian Kiener
Date: 11:50-12:20, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002



Till Hopfe (University of Potsdam, Germany)
Doktorand im Fach Philosophie an der Universität Potsdam. Primäre Forschungsinteressen sind die Metaphysik und Epistemologie der Wahrnehmung.
E-Mail: hopfe.till@gmail.com

Die Krux der konnexiven Logik

Sara Ipakchi

Aristoteles' These (AT) und Boethius' These (BT)

$$\text{AT: } \neg(\neg p \rightarrow p)$$

$$\text{BT: } (p \rightarrow q) \rightarrow \neg(p \rightarrow \neg q),$$

sind keine allgemeingültigen Aussagen in der klassischen Logik. Dennoch haben wir die starke Intuition der Richtigkeit dieser Aussagen. Beispielsweise sind wir nicht davon überzeugt, dass wenn wir etwas (z. B. diesen Abstrakt) nicht lesen, dann lesen wir es. Um jener Intuition zu genügen, wurden sie in sogenannten konnexiven Logiken als logisch allgemeingültige Aussagen interpretiert. Mit anderen Worten, AT und BT sind nicht-klassische Axiome/Theoreme konnexiver Systeme. Es handelt sich dabei um mehrere komplexe mathematische Modelle, die diese Aussagen als allgemeingültige Aussagen darstellen können. Dadurch gibt es auch unterschiedliche konnexive Systeme, die sich in einem bestimmten Punkt ähneln: Sie müssen, um ihre Kompatibilität mit AT und BT zu bewahren, in ihren Axiomen eine oder mehrere in der klassischen Logik allgemeingültige Aussagen ausschließen. Eine bestimmte

Kombination von intuitiv allgemeingültigen Aussagen mit der Aristoteles These führt zu einem Widerspruch in konnexiven Systemen.

In meinem Vortrag werde ich diese Aussagen in konnexiven Systemen vorstellen und konnexive Systeme neben anderen Logiksystemen (Relevanz-Logik, intuitionistische Logik und parakonsistente Logik dialetheistischer Art) insofern kritisieren, als dass sie durch Lösung eines Problems mit neuen Problemen konfrontiert sind, die im Vergleich zu dem gelösten Problem nicht unbedingt unwichtiger oder intuitiver sind.

Section: Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics
Language: German
Chair: Hasen Khudairi
Date: 11:15-11:45, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



Sara Ipakchi (Heinrich-Heine-University, Germany)


Sara Ipakchi studiert seit 2016 Philosophie (Master) und seit 2015 Mathematik (Bachelor) an der HHU Düsseldorf. Neben dem Bachelorabschluss in Philosophie an der Heinrich-Heine-Universität in Düsseldorf hat sie einen Bachelorabschluss in Informatik an der University of Science and Culture in Teheran, Iran erworben.

Das Thema ihre Bachelorarbeit in der Philosophie lautet: “konnexive Logik”. Sie interessiert sich innerhalb der analytischen Philosophie, besonders für Logik, Wissenschaftsphilosophie und Sprachphilosophie. In diesem Vortrag stellt sie einen Abschnitt ihrer Bachelorarbeit vor.

E-Mail: ipakchi@phil.hhu.de

Was spricht gegen eine Erdung der Ethik in den empirischen Wissenschaften?

Andreas Joecks

 In meinem Vortrag werde ich einen Aspekt näher untersuchen, der aus der Forderung Kwame Appiahs nach mehr Berücksichtigung von Ergebnissen der empirischen Wissenschaften in der Ethik folgt. In seinem 2008 veröffentlichten Buch “Experiments in Ethics” argumentiert Appiah insgesamt dafür, dass die

Erkenntnisse, die uns z.B. die Psychologie über das menschliche Verhalten verrät, auch in unseren ethischen Überlegungen eine Rolle spielen sollten. Für Appiah ist klar, dass eine moderne Ethik nicht ohne einen Rückgriff auf empirische Untersuchungen funktionieren kann.

Eine Frage ist nun, warum etwaige Ergebnisse dieser Untersuchungen überhaupt eine Rolle spielen sollten, wenn es darum geht zu überlegen was richtiges Handeln und was falsches Handeln ist. Konsequentialisten und Tugendethiker scheinen auf den ersten Blick durchaus offen für diese Art von Überlegung zu sein, wiewohl es en detail noch Diskursbedarf geben wird. Daher haben sie im Prinzip gegen die Forderung Appiahs nichts einzuwenden. Deontologen dagegen scheinen von vornherein ein größeres Problem mit Appiahs Ansatz zu haben. Schon die Position Kants widerspricht diesem Ansatz, da Kant für die Grundlagen der Ethik keine empirischen Befunde zulässt. Zu zeigen bleibt, wie stark moderne Varianten der Deontologie der ursprünglichen Idee Kants verbunden sind.

Ich werde also zuerst Appiahs Ethikkonzeption vorstellen. Danach werde ich diese mit der Deontologie kontrastieren und zeigen, (i) dass die klassisch-kantische Deontologie nicht haltbar ist und (ii) die nicht klassischen deontologischen Positionen prinzipiell offen für Erkenntnisse aus den empirischen Wissenschaften sind. Damit werde ich dann gezeigt haben, dass prinzipiell nichts gegen eine Erdung der Ethik spricht.

Section: Ethics
Language: German
Chair: Albert Anglberger
Date: 15:10-15:40, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003



Andreas Joecks (Universität Bielefeld, Germany)


Andreas Joecks (M.A.) Promotionsstudent an Universität Bielefeld. 2014 Master of Arts in Philosophie an der Universität Bielefeld mit einer Arbeit über Hans Reichenbach und dessen Idee des apriori. 2009 Bachelor of Arts in Philosophie und Mathematik an der Universität Bremen mit einer Arbeit über Ludwig Wittgenstein und seine Philosophie der Mathematik. Studium der Philosophie, Mathematik, Informatik, Filmwissenschaften und Linguistik an den Universitäten Bremen, Oslo,

Notre Dame (USA) und Bielefeld. Seit 2009 an der Universität Bielefeld beschäftigt, dort zunächst wissenschaftliche Hilfskraft, dann Teaching Assistant für praktische und theoretische Philosophie, sowie diverse Veranstaltungen.

E-Mail: ajoecks@uni-bielefeld.de

The paradoxes in legal philosophy. A way out?

Maciej Juzaszek

aradoxes occur in every domain of philosophy so it cannot be otherwise that we do not face them as legal philosophers. It is often believed that the existence of paradoxes and antinomies is a symptom of disease which affects our rationality and the role of philosophers is to find a cure. In the paper I will argue that the purification of legal sphere from paradoxes is either impossible or excessively costly. Law as a social artefact reflects the complexity of society and the pluralism within it. It also performs not one but many functions which do not need to be compatible with each other.

Although the non-eliminative approach to legal paradoxes has been adopted in the literature, I will develop it in a bit different direction. My first goal will be to apply the methodological framework of the functional model of analysis which says that the most important considerations regarding social normative institutions (like morality, ethics, law) are these referring to the functions of these institutions in the society, and describe what the main relations between the functions of law.

Then, I will move to normative deliberation, focusing on what function law should perform. I will sketch a few monistic possibilities but eventually argue for the theory of Institutional Hybrid Function Consequentialism (IHFC), previously used for consideration on functions of normative ethics.

IHFC says that instead of looking for one main normative function which law should perform, we should rather search for the homeostasis of many equally important normative functions. This equilibrium is assessed from the consequential but not utilitarian point of view, which means that we should choose the equilibrium which serves not all the normative functions but only as many as possible to the greatest possible extent.

From such a perspective, if the optimization requires some inconsistencies or even contradictions within law, they should be accepted and we just need to get used to them.

Section: Philosophy of Law
Language: English
Chair: Elias Moser
Date: 11:50-12:20, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006



Maciej Juzaszek (Jagiellonian University, Polska)

As an academic, I'm interested in ethics, philosophy of law, moral psychology, moral epistemology and methodology of philosophy. I focus mainly on the problems concerning justice in health care, moral and legal responsibility and the epistemological status of intuitions.

I work as a research assistant in the Department of Professional Ethics at Jagiellonian University, Krakow, Poland. There I participate in the project "Justice in Health Care" (funded by Polish National Science Centre) and in the same time I do my (first) PhD in philosophy on the topic of sufficientarianism in ethics. My supervisor and the PI of the project is Professor Włodzimierz Galewicz.


I also prepare (second) PhD, this time in law in the Department of Legal Theory. It is a part of another project, "Legal luck – description and assessment" (funded by the Polish Ministry of Science) in which I participate as the Principal Investigator. My work concerns the paradox of moral and legal luck and the justification of criminal responsibility. My supervisor is Professor Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki.

I'm also an alumnus of Collegium Invisibile Scientific Society, where I studied philosophy of law.

E-Mail: m.juzaszek@gmail.com

Removing the differences: Deontology and Consequentialism

Dennis Kalde

 In my paper I argue that metaethical reflections on deontology and consequentialism show that the relation between the two theories is not – as generally considered – mutually exclusive. I start by considering two of the most important reasons why consequentialism and deontology are thought as deeply opposed to one another.

(1) It is assumed that only consequentialism is an agent-neutral theory. This is because consequentialists define moral rightness in terms of states of affairs that actions bring about. Deontological accounts on the contrary highlight that it is the intentions and attitudes of agents that determine it. Deontology is, therefore, agent-relative.

(2) Because consequentialism in opposition to deontology does not capture the idea of intrinsically moral values, it can justify nearly everything. Hence, consequentialists can argue that it is morally permissible to harm one person in order to save hundreds of others.

I claim both assumptions to be misleading. Deontology is a theory about action. This means that whenever it is thought that x is what ought to be done, deontologists understand x as a state of affairs such as non-harming. So it is not just the intention of an agent toward some acts that counts as morally relevant, but more accurately it is the attitude toward a certain state of affairs (harm, death). Hence, it is wrong to claim that consequentialism is an agent-neutral theory while deontology is not.

Secondly, consequentialists cannot justify everything. While they can argue that to harm one person is justified if hundreds are saved, they still acknowledge that there is some badness in harming. And this badness provides at least a pro-tanto reason not to harm.

If this is correct, then deontology and consequentialism are not as opposite to one another as it might be assumed. For while deontology too includes the morally relevant notion of states of affairs, consequentialism can hold that there are general moral values as well.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Albert Anglberger
Date: 14:35-15:05, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003



Dennis Kalde (LMU Munich, Germany)

Dennis Kalde was born on the 8. of September in 1988. After his Bachelor of Philosophy at the University of Georg-August in Göttingen (Germany), he continued and finished his Master of Philosophy at the University of Ludwig-Maximilian München (Germany).


He is currently a PhD student at the department of Practical Philosophy at Ludwig-Maximilian. His research interests lie in Metaethics, Normative Ethics, Applied Ethics, practical rationality and reasons, and personal identity. He gave a speech at the international Objectivity in Ethics conference at the University of Utrecht in March/April 2016. He prepares for another speech at the Rationality and Normativity conference at the University of Bern in June. He is currently working on two forthcoming papers about Metaethical Constructivism and the rational requirement of coherence.

In 2015 he worked as a scientific assistant at the University of Ludwig-Maximilian, where he is currently employed as an academic assistant. He is offering a tutorial to the lecture about Ethics. Also he works at the Adult Education Center in Munich since 2015. Besides his academic research he is engaged in various political activities in the Social Democratic Party.

E-Mail: dennis.kalde@gmail.com

Modal Epistemology and Abduction

Yannic Kappes

y talk's topic is whether and how abduction can establish metaphysical necessities. Abductive arguments are sometimes used to argue for necessities, e.g. for the truth of physicalism in the philosophy of mind or for the necessity of there

being anything at all as an answer to the corresponding why-question. Nevertheless, Biggs' "Abduction and Modality" remains the only explicit treatment of abduction in the context of modal epistemology. I argue that his account faces several problems:

1. It conflicts with the thesis (cf. Kim "Explanatory Knowledge and Metaphysical Dependence") that explanations track dependency relations. This is because necessities do not stand in the dependency relations that the account requires.
2. Solving the first problem requires that metaphysical necessitation is an explanatory relation. But it is not.
3. The scope of Biggs' account is severely limited in that it only applies to strict conditionals.
4. The abductive method advocated by Biggs threatens to overgenerate necessities.

Making use of the tripartite-structure account of explanation (Schaffer "The Ground Between the Gaps") I then make suggestions on how to address the problems:

1. Abduction cannot only establish an explanans based on an explanandum, but can also establish a dependency relation or law that connects explanans and explanandum. Given explanans and explanandum, abduction can also establish a corresponding dependency relation or law.
2. Thus, abduction can establish dependency relations or laws of the form $\blacksquare(P \rightarrow Q)$. Strict conditionals can be derived from these.
3. I introduce and motivate the idea of base-less (or explanans-less) explanation which allows abduction towards a law or dependency-relation of the form $\blacksquare P$. Metaphysical necessities of the form $\square P$ can be derived from these.
4. Overgeneration can be avoided in a number of ways. Roca-Royes' "Similarity and Possibility" might supplement my proposal to reach a unified abductive epistemology for both necessity and possibility.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Pascale Lötscher
Date: 15:05-15:35, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002




Yannic Kappes (Universität Hamburg, Germany)

I am currently a PhD-student at the University of Hamburg. My research interests lie mostly in metaphysics and epistemology. Currently I am thinking a lot about grounding and essence in general, their epistemology and their role in the philosophy of mind.

E-Mail: yannickappes@gmail.com

Grothendieck Universes and Indefinite Extensibility

Hasen Khudairi

his essay endeavors to define the concept of indefinite extensibility in the setting of category theory. I argue that the generative property of indefinite extensibility in the category-theoretic setting is identifiable with the Kripke functors of modal coalgebraic automata, where the automata model Grothendieck Universes and the functors are further inter-definable with the elementary embeddings of large cardinal axioms. The Kripke functors definable in Grothendieck universes are argued to account for the ontological expansion effected by the elementary embeddings in the category of sets. By characterizing the modal profile of Ω -logical validity, and thus the generic invariance of mathematical truth, modal coalgebraic automata are further capable of capturing the notion of definiteness, in order to yield a non-circular definition of indefinite extensibility.

Section: Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics
Language: English
Chair: Elena Tassoni
Date: 17:25-17:55, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.005



Hasen Khudairi (Arché, University of St Andrews, United Kingdom)
Hasen Khudairi is a Ph.D. Student at the Arché Philosophical Research Centre at the University of St Andrews. He is a member of the Arché Research Groups on the “History and Philosophy of Logic and Mathematics” and “Identity, Existence, and Structure”, and is also a member

of the Arché Logic Group. From 2014 to 2015, he was a member of the Arché Research Group on “Models, Modality, and Meaning”.

E-Mail: hk44@st-andrews.ac.uk

Moral and Non-Moral Testimony. Revisiting an Alleged Asymmetry

Maximilian Kiener

According to the “Asymmetry Thesis” (AT) there is a difference in kind between moral and non-moral matters when it comes to testimony – viz. coming to know something on the basis of other people’s say-so – because moral matters require understanding in a way in which non-moral matters do not. Since testimony cannot transmit understanding, this difference makes moral testimony problematic in a way in which non-moral testimony is not.

Opposing AT, I argue that (1) there is no understanding problem unique to moral testimony that (2) it is not plausible to pin down what is often problematic in cases of moral testimony in terms of understanding in the first place. What makes cases of moral and non-moral testimony equally troubling is the violation of what I call the “Symmetric Requirement” (SR): Across moral or nonmoral matters, one is required to use one’s own cognitive faculties instead of accepting testimony when it is both “possible” and “feasible” for one to do so.

I present a bipartite argument to spell out this proposal: firstly, I briefly present cases of problematic non-moral testimony (maths, logic, and perception) which aim to render initially plausible (1) & (2) and inductively lead to SR as a preliminary hypothesis. Secondly, I present a transcendental argument from the social function of testimony and explain why SR in fact holds. I thereby make three claims:

i) We already actively endorse a testimonial practice and presuppose the value of testimony as a source of reliable information.

ii) A testimonial practice can guarantee reliable information only if sufficient critical monitoring of circulating beliefs is maintained. Spelling this out specifies a sense in which it is a “necessary” condition for a functioning system of testimony that people accord to SR.

iii) Therefore, by endorsing a testimonial practice one is committed to complying with SR.

I conclude that, although AT fails, there are still moderately pessimistic prospects for moral testimony.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Yannic Kappes
Date: 16:15-16:45, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: HS E.002



Maximilian Kiener (University of Oxford, United Kingdom)

I am currently studying for the BPhil in Philosophy, a two-year taught graduate degree at the University of Oxford. I hold a BA degree in Philosophy and Law from the University of Regensburg.

E-Mail: maximilian.kiener@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

In Defense of A Contractualist Boundaries of Morality: On Reasonableness and Reflective Equilibrium

Jiwon (Sonia) Kim

My aim in this paper is to defend Thomas Scanlon's contractualism by asserting that Nicholas Southwood's two objections, the circularity objection and the non-fundamentality objection, are neither strong enough to refute the holistic aspect of Scanlonian contractualism nor convincing enough to endure a closer look at the reason-fundamentalism of Scanlon. After outlining Southwood's understanding of contractualism, I raise counter-arguments against both the circularity objection and the non-fundamental objection, which are both misguidedly construed from different presumptions about the foundation of morality. The foundation of morality is not constituted of non-moral, contract-independent facts. Instead, the foundation of morality, constructed by Scanlonian contractualism, is established through the method of reflective equilibrium, taking personal and contract-dependent reasons into account. From these answers to Southwood's objection, I reveal the meaning of what appears to be the limits of Scanlonian Contractualism: 1) the characterization of what is morally wrong rather than what is morally right and 2) a reflection of the general process of how individuals stand in relation to each other. These

limits aim to provide autonomous agents with the freedom to make right moral decisions on their own within the boundaries set by morality while taking the notion of reasonable rejectability into account.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Enno Fischer
Date: 15:05-15:35, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003




Jiwon (Sonia) Kim (Korea University, South Korea)

Jiwon Kim is a graduate student at a department of Philosophy at Korea University in South Korea. She is interested in meta-ethics and normative ethics, especially with the concepts of contractualism regarding reasons, justifiability, reasonableness, motivation, value, relationship, and blame. Her current research focuses on how the foundation of morality can be established within contractualist moral theory. She is interested in the connections between relationship and normativity, value and reasons, justifiability and reasonable rejectability. Currently, she is a researcher in charge, running a project on Ethics of Artificial Intelligence. She has spoken at a number of international workshops and conferences on contractualism, especially about blame. She is now a research assistant at the Institute of Philosophical Studies, Korea University, and at Logical Pluralisms Project at Yonsei University, South Korea, both funded by National Research Foundation.

E-Mail: havegreentea@korea.ac.kr

Truthmakers and the theory of truth

Karol Kleczka

 In my presentation I wish to present different approaches to metaphysical truthmaking and its consequences in the dimension of truth-theory. If we take into account Truthmaker Principle, then in conclusion we are obliged to claim that every truth has its own truthmaker. It allows us to put forward two possible theses. The first one works on so called minimal truthmakers

which were comprehensively described by O’Connail and Tahko (2015). Minimal truthmakers are the smallest portions of reality that make a particular sentence true.

It seems that minimal truthmakers perform their proper function only in case of atomic sentences. However, we can easily list a lot of sentences for which it is impossible to be made true by a concrete, particular entities or which at least are suspicious in this dimension. It includes undecidable sentences which are a special case of modal sentences, negative truths and general truths. If we accept the minimal truthmaking thesis, then it gets more complicated when we try to capture suitable truthmakers for the cases mentioned above. In order to accomplish that task I am going to turn to the second solution presented by Armstrong (2004) and Lewis (2001). Both philosophers claim that suspicious class of sentences is made true by a specific state of affairs. For the purposes of my argument, I will dub both solutions as an “absolute truthmaker strategy”.

Here the problem arises: if we have to turn to an absolute truthmaker, which – in at least some problematic cases – is the world, then it turns out that the minimal solution proposed by some truthmaker-supporters is metaphysically insufficient. However, the second approach has its own disadvantage which is an unavoidable turn to the concept of truth expressed in terms of coherence. If each true sentence is made true by a whole world, then each true sentence corresponds to an absolute truthmaker. This conclusion is highly disappointing, since it seems to disavow the explanatory role which is one of the aims of truthmaker-theories. Because of that fact I am going to conclude that metaphysical truthmakers cannot play the role of an “ontological glue” for the truth presented in terms of correspondence. One has to either accept both views on the notion of truth and make it an equivocal concept, or accept the coherence intuitions.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Thomas Spiegel
Date: 16:15-16:45, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.004




Karol Kleczka (Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Poland)

Karol Kleczka (1988) (M.A. philosophy). Jagiellonian University. 2010 baccalaureate in philosophy; 2012 masters degree in philosophy (with distinction); title of the thesis: “The problem of foundations of meaning in modern realism vs anti-realism debate”. PhD student on the fourth year of his studies at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow. Works on a dissertation that is going to cover the discussion between semantical realism and anti-realism (specifically on possible metaphysical consequences of Dummett’s semantical anti-realism).

E-Mail: karolkleczka@gmail.com

Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity

Michael Klenk

ost non-robust-realist metaethical theories, such as sophisticated expressivism (cf. Gibbard 2003), constructivism (cf. Korsgaard 1996), and non-robust forms of realism (cf. Putnam 2004), claim to retain a sense of objectivity in ethics. A persistent issue for these theories is to identify a criterion for moral truth and falsity that meets their objectivist aspirations.

This objectivist aspiration is often probed by confronting non-realists with abject moral positions, such as those of rational racists or eccentrics such as an ideally coherent Caligula, which are licensed by the framework of the respective non-robust-realist theory but nevertheless strike us a wrong. In such cases, non-realist theories face a dilemma. Either they allow that “anything goes”, accepting that their criteria for moral truth would be satisfied in the cases of rational racists or the coherent Caligula, and thereby forgoing their objectivist aspirations, or they disallow abject moral positions. In the latter case, however, they have nothing to turn to but subjective criteria ultimately related to one’s personal outlook. This is unacceptably smug.

I argue that pragmatism in the spirit of Charles S. Peirce avoids this dilemma by providing an in-between notion of moral objectivity. According to pragmatism, true belief is what would not be improved upon by taking into consideration more experiences and arguments (cf. Misak 2002). In my presentation, I elucidate this notion and argue that it provides us with an objective criterion for moral truth and falsity, insofar as the pragmatist account entails that a truth value would be

determined for each moral claim were we to inquire as far as we could on the matter. This gives us good reasons to consider pragmatism as a genuine metaethical answer to the shortcomings of its rival non-realist theories. This is relevant because the pragmatist approach is not considered appropriately in recent metaethical discussions of the aforementioned challenge.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Enno Fischer
Date: 14:30-15:00, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003



Michael Klenk (Utrecht University, The Netherlands)

Since October 2014, I am working as a Ph.D. candidate in Philosophy at Utrecht University, The Netherlands. In my research project, I focus on the metaethical implications of evolutionary theory. Currently, I investigate whether pragmatist conceptions of moral objectivity are convincing in light of what I take to be normative challenges based on worries about moral relativism. My project is funded by the Dutch Research Organisation (NWO) and is embedded in a larger research programme, headed by Prof Dr Herman Philipse and Prof Dr Johan Bolhuis. So far, I have been oscillating between philosophy and the business world. Before coming to Utrecht, I worked for two years as a management consultant for Atos Consulting in Munich, Germany. I obtained my M.A. in philosophy at University College London in 2012. Prior to that, I studied Business Administration in Stuttgart and Brisbane, Australia. During my course in Stuttgart, I did an advanced apprenticeship in international fruit trade. I thus know a thing or two about bananas. My philosophical interest responds to my practical experiences – I was concerned with business ethics in the fruit trade sector and thus decided to pursue an M.A. in philosophy to find a justifying ground for ethical judgements. I did not, however, find an answer that convinced me during my M.A. I am still looking. Since 2013, I am also pursuing a part-time B.Sc. in Psychology to understand more about human behaviour and experience, which I hope will aid my philosophy.
E-Mail: m.b.o.t.klenk@uu.nl

Probleme der Vagheit in Gesetzestexten

Johannes Knödtel

Viele Philosophen und Juristen sehen vage Ausdrücke als vorteilhafte und notwendige Bestandteile von Rechtstexten. Im Gegensatz zu exakten Definitionen lassen sie einen Spielraum bei der Auslegung zu, der es erlaubt unserem Rechtsempfinden und den Intentionen der Verfasser Rechnung zu tragen. Doch beispielsweise im Strafrecht zeigen sich auch Nachteile bei der Verwendung von vagen Begriffen in juristischen Texten: Meist halten wir den objektiven Tatbestand, der in einem Gesetz beschrieben ist, für unabhängig von der Vorsatz des Täters. In Anwesenheit von vagen Begriffen kann diese Trennung manchmal nicht aufrecht erhalten werden. Die Vagheitstheorie von Diana Raffman ist geeignet, um das Entstehen solcher Effekte auf psychologische Ursachen zurückzuführen. Auch im deutschen Recht finden sich derartige Fälle, wie zum Beispiel bei der Beurteilung von Gegenständen nach dem Waffengesetz. Im Vortrag soll die Theorie hinter dem Entstehen dieser Probleme anhand von abstrakten und konkreten Fallbeispielen diskutiert werden und die ethischen Fragestellungen, die sich dadurch ergeben, aufgezeigt werden.

Section: Philosophy of Law
Language: German
Chair: Elias Moser
Date: 11:15-11:45, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006




Johannes Knödtel (Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany)

Johannes Knödtel erhielt seinen Bachelor-Abschluss im Fach Informatik an der Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg im Wintersemester 2014. Derzeit ist er im Master-Studium im Fach Informatik an der Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg eingeschrieben. In seinem Nebenfach im Master belegte er Philosophie und beschäftigt sich auch weiterhin außeruniversitär mit Philosophie.

E-Mail: johannes.knoedtel@fau.de

On the Ambiguity of ‘I’

Viktoria Knoll

 There are many possible reasons why an expression could fail to have a clear reference within a given context; for example, it could be sense-general (like “grandmother”), vague (like “bold”) or simply ambiguous (like “bank”). The personal pronoun “I”, in contrast, is usually taken as a classic example of an indexical, which refers, relative to a given context, univocally to a certain object: “I” simply refers to me. In my talk I want to cast doubt upon this picture of “I”. It should *prima facie* become plausible or at least worth considering that “I” is not only context-sensitive but also ambiguous. To reach this goal, three steps will be taken. First, recalling the distinction between homonymy and polysemy should make clear that not all ambiguities are alike, and that personal pronouns can be ambiguous even if their ambiguity is not as manifest as that of “bank”. Second and mainly, two groups of example sentences will be discussed (including e.g. sentences like “I once was a fetus” or “I felt I was looking down on my body from above”). Third, I will turn to an objection against the ambiguity of “I”, which was raised in the literature and makes use of the zeugma-test. As I will argue, this objection rests on the mistaken assumption that all expressions which do not pass the zeugma-test cannot be ambiguous. The objection therefore can be dismissed.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Meagan Phillips
Date: 12:25-12:55, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007



Viktoria Knoll (Universität Hamburg, Germany)


Viktoria is a PhD student in philosophy at the University of Hamburg (supervisors: Ulrich Gähde, Benjamin Schnieder). She obtained her M.A. in 2015 with a thesis on persons as bundles of mental states. For her PhD project she wants to keep on exploring the debate about persons, but focus mainly on its methodological and metaontological problems. Viktoria has further research interests in the philosophy of

mind (e.g. the debate about selves or self-awareness), epistemology (e.g. questions of self-knowledge), philosophy of language (e.g. ambiguity) or ethics (especially animal ethics).

E-Mail: viktoria.knoll@uni-hamburg.de

Naiver Realismus oder Intentionalismus?

Laila Kühle

 In den letzten Jahren sind innerhalb der zeitgenössischen Wahrnehmungsphilosophie die Grenzen zwischen den Theorien des Naiven Realismus (NR) und des Intentionalismus durch viele Mischformen verwischt worden. Diese Mischformen versuchen einerseits durch relationale Aspekte den Vorteil des NR, direkten Bezug auf die Gegenstände der Außenwelt herstellen zu können, und andererseits durch repräsentationale Aspekte den Vorteil des Intentionalismus, Erklärungen für Halluzinationen liefern zu können, zu nutzen. So entwickelt Heather Logue in (2013, im Erscheinen) eine Version des NR, die das Label des NR auch für repräsentationalistische Theorien vorsieht, solange die Wahrnehmungserfahrung fundamental als Relation zwischen Subjekt und Objekt verstanden wird. Grundlage dafür ist eine Kritik am sogenannten Screening-off-Argument von Michael Martin in (2004), mit dem er zeigen möchte, dass der NR keinen positiven Halluzinationsbegriff beinhaltet.

Ich möchte in meinem Vortrag gegen Logues Variante des NR argumentieren und werde im Zuge dessen nach einem Kriterium suchen, das eine klare und sinnvolle Trennung beider Theorien ermöglicht. Nach Ausschluss verschiedener Kandidaten (Disjunktivismus, Relationalität, Propositionalität) wird am Ende folgendes Kriterium stehenbleiben: Der Naive Realismus ist die Position, mit der behauptet wird, dass Wahrnehmungen notwendigerweise wahr sein müssen, während der Intentionalismus die Position ist, mit der vertreten werden kann, dass Wahrnehmungserfahrungen nicht notwendigerweise wahr sein müssen. Somit fällt Logues Theorie in die Kategorie des Intentionalismus.

References:

Logue, Heather (2013), "Good News for the Disjunctivist about the bad cases", in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 86 (1): 105–133.

Logue, Heather (im Erscheinen), “Experiential Content and Naive Realismus: A Reconciliation”, in *Does Perception have content?*, herausgegeben von Berit Brogaard, Oxford University Press.

Martin, Michael (2004), “The Limits of Self-Awareness”, in *Philosophical Studies* 120: 37–89.

Section: Epistemology
Language: German
Chair: Maximilian Kiener
Date: 12:25-12:55, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002



Laila Kühle (University of Potsdam, Germany)

Laila Kühle (BA phil.). University of Potsdam. 2012 Bachelor in philosophy; master thesis title: epistemological challenges for the metaphysical structure of the content of perception

E-Mail: laila_kuehle@outlook.de

Common Sense Almighty

Lukas Lang

What if there was some way to finally lay to rest all those tedious and endless debates in metaphysics? I am not thinking here about the claims that the disputes are merely verbal, or lack any subject-matter at all. What I have in mind is the view that there is a group of propositions, each by lengths more plausible than any philosophical argument to the contrary. Given this, metaphysics becomes some sort of lunatic asylum, because the group of propositions is of course known as Common Sense, and denying them “would be to give evidence not that one was mistaken but that one was psychologically abnormal” (Lycan 2001: 49). Proponents of this view, who I will call Mooreans, can be characterised by a common attitude towards sceptical and revisionary arguments. They reject the argument without identifying any flaw. The rationale behind this is that the Common Sense proposition is more plausible than the conjunction of the premises of the argument, so something must be wrong with the

argument—we're just never told what it is. This attitude is faced with objections, among which are the following:

- (1) It is question begging,
- (2) being commonsensical confers no special status,
- (3) revisionary and sceptical arguments require deep philosophical answers, and
- (4) it is irrational to hold beliefs come what may.

Lycan's (2001) defence of Mooreanism against these four objections is built upon his view about the shortcomings of philosophy, some examples taken from McTaggart, a distinction between science and philosophy, and an inductive argument. I argue that the four objections still stand. Lycan's view of philosophy is contentious at best, his examples only show what they are supposed to show by adopting metaphysical principles, a move that is not open to Lycan. His distinction between philosophy and science faces counter-examples and the inductive argument, as it stands, speaks as much against science as it does against philosophy. So it's nothing to worry about.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Philip Fox
Date: 10:00-10:30, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002




Lukas Lang (University of Hamburg, Germany)

My name is Lukas Lang and I am currently a student of philosophy at the University of Hamburg. I am in the last year of my M.A., and I'll write my thesis in the upcoming term. After finishing the M.A. I'm looking forward to begin a PhD. In Hamburg I concentrated mainly on metaphysics and epistemology, although always with an interest into the methods employed in each discipline.

E-Mail: Lukas.Lang@gmx.net

Can Humean Global Constructivism Do Without Substantive Evaluative Assumptions?

Christoph Lernpaß

 In a couple of influential papers (2006, 2008), Sharon Street has argued for an anti-realist account of normativity. Her account features a negative part, the Darwinian dilemma, where she tries to establish the conclusion that realism is hard to reconcile with the theory of evolution. Therefore, it should be abandoned in favour of anti-realism. The positive part of her account, her Humean global constructivism, then builds on this conclusion and offers a way of thinking about the correctness and incorrectness of normative judgements in anti-realist terms. In this paper I will review and evaluate Street's anti-realist project. My concern will be to give an answer to the following question: Can her Humean global constructivism do without substantive evaluative assumptions? I will argue for a negative answer to this question, and I will argue that this spells trouble for Street's account.

In order to reach my conclusions, I will proceed as follows: I will start off with briefly presenting the Darwinian dilemma. I am then going to argue that a certain objection made by Selim Berker (2014) against Street ultimately holds: Berker is right in claiming that Street's account does rely on substantive evaluative assumptions in the negative part of her proposal, which undermines her argument. I will then introduce and evaluate possible replies one could make on Street's behalf, and I will argue that these replies are not very promising. In a next step, I will argue that the case for Street's positive story is importantly motivated by the success of her negative argument. In the finishing part of my paper, I will put the individual pieces of my argument together, and conclude that given the results of my prior discussion, the failure of Street's negative account leaves her positive story under motivated.

Section: Ethics
 Language: English
 Chair: Albert Anglberger
 Date: 17:25-17:55, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
 Location: SR 1.003




Christoph Lernpaß (University of Vienna, Austria)

Christoph Lernpaß, geboren am 1. Jänner 1990 in Schwarzach im Pongau, aufgewachsen in Mühlbach am Hochkönig, hat im Sommersemester 2016 sein Bachelorstudium Philosophie abgeschlossen. Philosophische Hauptinteressen sind Erkenntnistheorie, Handlungstheorie und Meta-Ethik.

E-Mail: CLernpass@gmail.com

Broome's Problems with the Instrumental Requirement of Rationality: Sketching a Solution

Bernd Liedl

 I want to present a solution to the problem of the symmetric and synchronic Instrumental Requirement of rationality within the theory of rationality of John Broome. To pursue this goal I want to sketch a formalisation of Broome's requirements of rationality. After that I outline Broome's theory and the problems: In his theory a subject S is rational if and only if S fulfils the requirements of rationality. S can fulfil these requirements through reasoning, which is following rules of thinking. Two very important requirements are Enkrasia – if S believes that S ought to F then S intends to F – and the Instrumental Requirement – if S intends an end then S intends the mean. Korsgaard and Pauer-Studer pointed out some problems of the Instrumental Requirement because it is symmetric and synchronic.

If you intend an end you can fulfil the Instrumental Requirement in two ways: Either you intend the means or you stop intending the end. This is possible because the Instrumental Requirement is symmetric. In some situations one would say that stop intending the end just because you do not intend the means is not rational. Due to that Pauer-Studer argues that fulfilling the requirements of rationality is not sufficient for being rational, but you have also to respond correctly to reasons in order to be rational. Similarly to that Korsgaard claims that thinking has a temporal direction; reasoning is diachronic rather than synchronic. Intending the end is temporal before intending the means and that is why it does matter which intention to drop. According to Pauer-Studer and Korsgaard the Instrumental Requirement fails to capture the connection of our ends and our means because this requirement is

symmetric and synchronic.

On the other hand, Enkrasia is not concerned by these two objections because Broome recognised the problem of symmetry in the case of Enkrasia and added a third important requirement: Basing Prohibition. If you cease believing you ought to F because you do not intend to F you are not rational. On the other hand, if you start intending to F because you believe you ought to F, you may be rational. Basing Prohibition prevents that S reasons that S does not believe that S ought to F just because S lacks the intention to F. Thus, Basing Prohibition adds an asymmetric – and also a diachronic – aspect to Enkrasia.

By substituting the Instrumental Requirement with a Theoretical Instrumental Requirement I hope to avoid the problems of the Instrumental Requirement. The Theoretical Instrumental Requirement says the following: if S intends an end then S believes that S ought to take the means. Using the Theoretical Instrumental Requirement one has to face two problems: First, you do not intend the means to reach the end, but you only get to a belief. Second, this requirement is still symmetric and synchronic. I shall argue that these problems can be solved by using Enkrasia and Basing Prohibition. By using the Theoretical Instrumental Requirement, instrumental reasoning is not direct reasoning from intending the end to taking the means, but – if you intend an end – you have to reason the long way round via your belief that you ought to take the means and Enkrasia. And this solves both problems: Your reasoning then ends in intending the means and this way has an asymmetric and diachronic aspect because Enkrasia is guarded by Basing Prohibition.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Giada Fratantonio
Date: 14:35-15:05, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002



Bernd Liedl (Universität Wien, AUT)


I am MA student in Philosophy and Sociology at the University of Vienna. My main interests are philosophical logic, social ontology (particularly theories of acting and intending together), practical reasoning,

relativism, and formalising other philosopher's ideas.

E-Mail: a0822762@unet.univie.ac.at

Compositionality in Semantic Relationism

Hsuan-Chih Lin

 In Semantic Relationism, Fine proposes a new solution to Frege's puzzle for the Referentialist by rejecting the standard notion of compositionality. According to the standard notion of compositionality, if two sentences are structurally the same and yet semantically different, it must be the case that their basic constituents are semantically different. It follows that the semantic difference between the identity sentences 'Cicero = Cicero' and 'Cicero = Tully' is that the semantic roles or the meanings of 'Cicero' and 'Tully' are different.

In contrast, Fine accepts that the meaning of a name is simply its referent, so 'Cicero' and 'Tully' have the same semantic role provided that they co-refer. Yet it would follow that the identity sentences are semantically the same if the standard notion of compositionality holds. His proposal is that in order to explain the semantic difference, it is the semantic relation coordination, which holds between 'Cicero, Cicero' but not 'Cicero, Tully', that provides the basis for the required compositionality.

In what follows, I shall examine whether Fine has provided a satisfactory account which explains the semantic difference between sentences and whether the proposed notion of compositionality is plausible. I argue that Fine's explanation of the semantic difference between sentences has some shortcomings if we consider some sentences in which there is only one occurrence of proper name, e.g. Tully is a Roman orator. Furthermore, from Fine's suggestion that we can tell the semantic difference of the conjunctions 'Cicero is R and Cicero is O', and 'Cicero is R and Tully is O', by taking them as positively and negatively coordinated propositions of the original propositions 'Cicero is R, Cicero is O'. It implies that for each (coordinated) proposition, its content cannot be given directly and is somehow derived from the original proposition and the coordination-scheme. I argue that the result is problematic for semantic relationism.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Viktoria Knoll
Date: 16:15-16:45, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007



Hsuan-Chih Lin (Birkbeck College, University of London, United Kingdom)

I am one of the two Asian PhD students at Birkbeck College, University of London. I came to Birkbeck in 2013 after obtaining MA and BA in philosophy at National Taiwan University (Taiwan). My research interest, which has been influenced by Dr. Keith Hossack, lies in philosophy of language and metaphysics, especially their overlapping topics. Currently I am writing my thesis on the basis of compositionality under the supervision of Professor Dorothy Edgington.

E-Mail: hlin06@mail.bbk.ac.uk

What makes the Mind-body problem tick?

Alen Lipuš

We will discuss the problem of the appearance of contingency in the case of a posteriori identity of mind and body. This is the so-called Kripke's challenge. Most aposteriori identities are not problematic because the appearance of contingency can be explained in Kripke's way. Appearance of contingency is present whenever one of the elements in the identity statement refers contingently. In the case of identity of mental and physical, there is no contingent referring and thus it seems that these propositions are unexplainable via Kripke's route. However, there is a way to explain the appearance of contingency and it is with the help of the Intuition approach i.e. intuition of distinctness. We will see how this can be accomplished and what problems await this strategy. The powers of this approach are twofold. First it can combat one of the main epistemic arguments against physicalism e.g. Conceivability Argument. Second it can explain the existence of the Explanatory Gap, which is typically an wrongly thought of as a consequence of our epistemic situation, namely the inability of a priori derivability of mental facts from physical facts.

We will answer Kripke's challenge: the appearance of contingency is a consequence of the intuition of distinctness. We will present the arguments that this intuition is founded upon a fallacy, and then show that we can expand this logic to the broader mind-body problem, from which we can draw a conclusion that the problem has no ontological basis. Despite these strengths the intuition strategy has its opponents and we will also discuss certain crucial issues raised by them.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Florian Leonhard Wüstholtz
Date: 14:35-15:05, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005




Alen Lipuš (University of Maribor, Slovenia)

In October 2015 I became a member of the Philosophy Department at University of Maribor as a Young Researcher. I am currently enrolled in the philosophy Ph.D. program. Although I have received a good deal of basic knowledge of philosophy, I have developed an ever-growing interest in metaphysics, especially the philosophy of mind. During my study I have worked mostly on the mind-body problem. From then on I tried to occupy myself with philosophy of mind. I wrote papers (published one of them) and had presentations on Davidson's Anomalous monism, Searle's Chinese room argument and Panpsychism, to name a few. At the moment I am researching the metaphilosophical side of the mind-body problem with the main research question of "What makes the mind-body problem tick?".

E-Mail: alen.lipus1@um.si

On the Ockhamist Definitions of Hard and Soft Facts

Tien-Chun Lo

heological fatalists argue that God's infallible foreknowledge makes human actions unfree. The Ockhamist solution is to argue that God's past beliefs about the future are soft facts, i.e. roughly, a soft fact is something whose occurrence depends

on the future. Hence, the principle of the fixity of the past (PFP) is not applicable to them. However, it is not so clear that God's past beliefs about the future are soft facts. To argue that God's past beliefs are soft facts rather than hard facts, contemporary Ockhamists lay down some definitions of hard and soft facts. They attempt to show that God's past beliefs about the future share some crucial features with some classical cases of soft facts, e.g. World War II was over 70 years before I type this paragraph. Hence, God's past beliefs about the future are soft facts rather than hard facts. Although there is some disagreement among these Ockhamist definitions on the technical details, all of them share the same methodology which I characterize as the "proposition-based approach".

In what follows, I argue that all proposition-based Ockhamist definitions suffer from a general problem. The problem is that the Ockhamists cannot justify that (PFP) is not applicable to God's past beliefs about the future only by classifying them as soft. Some facts merely about the past are also classified as soft in the proposition-based Ockhamist definitions, but (PFP) is surely applicable to them. Instead, I propose a "fact-based approach" for the Ockhamist definitions as an alternative which is not susceptible to the problem. The problem of the proposition-based approach is that it takes all essential properties, including those extrinsic ones, of the object in the fact into consideration when we judge whether it is soft or not. However, I argue that what we really should take into account is its intrinsic properties. According to this fact-based approach, hard/soft facthood is explained in terms of intrinsic properties of object(s) involved in the fact. I argue that an Ockhamist definition constructed in this way could avoid the general problem, and it also provides a more fine-grained distinction between hard and soft facts which tells us what really makes God's past beliefs about the future soft.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Date: 11:45-12:15, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004




Tien-Chun Lo (National Taiwan University, Taiwan)

I am currently an MA student at National Taiwan University. I will start my MScR study in the University of Edinburgh in September 2016. My research interests, which have been developed throughout tutorials with my supervisor at NTU, Dr Duen-Min Deng, are issues in metaphysics and philosophy of religion, especially the metaphysical aspect of the latter.

E-Mail: edge5566@gmail.com

The Pluralist Challenge to Constitutive Principles in Science: Steps towards a New Modal Basis

Michele Luchetti

 ecently, philosophy has witnessed the revival of a variety of constitutivist views in epistemology of science (Shaffer 2011). In contrast with Quine's holism (Quine 1951), these views attribute a different status to some parts of a scientific theory – namely, the constitutive principles – in that they function as preconditions for the formulation and the testing of other propositions of a theory. According to Friedman (2000, 2001, 2010, 2012) these principles are universal theoretical principles of mathematical physics that define a certain spatio-temporal framework for all empirical science at any particular stage of its development. Chang (2008, 2009) criticises the universality of Friedman's principles and the theory-centrism of constitutive views in general. His alternative view is based on the pluralist premise that different epistemic communities can implement a variety of epistemic activities oriented to the achievement of different epistemic aims.

In this talk I will argue for a more pluralistic perspective on constitutive principles than Chang's. I contend that Chang's activity-based view sits too far towards the practical end of the theory-practice spectrum, thus obscuring the dynamics between scientific theories and epistemic activities. The fact that – according to his view – each activity requires the assumption of a “locally valid” principle, conditionally necessary to carry out that particular activity, does not itself rule out that other elements may play a constitutive role. By teasing out the intimate connection between constitutive principles and the modal notions of necessity and possibility, I argue that Chang's “reduction” of necessity to

pragmatic necessity is foundational for his activity-centred perspective. In contrast, I offer a framework that can accommodate both theoretical and pragmatic principles, on the basis of a conciliation between logical and practical necessity and a less sharp contrast between theory and practice.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Colin Elliot
Date: 15:10-15:40, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



Michele Luchetti (Central European University, Hungary)


I am currently a first year PhD student at CEU, Budapest. I completed my MA in philosophy at the University of Milan, Italy, where I worked on contemporary issues in ontology and metaphysics, more specifically on theories of time and persistence of material objects. During my BA, I mainly focused on philosophical issues in the history of science and philosophy between the end of the XIX and the beginning of the XX centuries.

My main research interests are in philosophy of science and its foundations, contemporary metaphysics, neo-kantian transcendental epistemology, and both formal and material ontology.

E-Mail: Luchetti_Michele@phd.ceu.edu

On the relation between performance and belief in Sosa's epistemology

Linus Lutz

 n the relation between performance and belief in Sosa's epistemology it is a core feature of Ernest Sosa's virtue epistemology (2007) to conceive of beliefs as a special case of performances with an aim. According to Sosa, such performances are generally assessable in three respects: A performance is accurate iff it succeeds in its aim, adroit iff it manifests skill and apt iff it is accurate because adroit. Applying the AAA normative structure of performances with an

aim to beliefs, Sosa ends up with an account of beliefs as performances whose accuracy consists in their truth, whose adroitness consists in their manifesting epistemic competence and whose aptness, therefore, consists in their being true because competent.

First, I argue against Sosa's account of beliefs as performances and suggest an alternative account of epistemic performance to be incorporated into Sosa's epistemology. My main worry is that by applying the concept of performance to beliefs, Sosa draws a phenomenologically distorted picture of belief and knowledge. The much more natural view seems to be to take the actualizations of belief forming processes, rather than beliefs themselves, to be epistemic performances aiming at true belief and the avoidance of false belief and to apply the AAA structure to these.

Second, I discuss the consequences of my alternative account. On the one hand, it is still much in line with the spirit of Sosa's epistemology, allowing us to develop analogues of Sosa's animal and reflective knowledge and thus to treat central problems such as fake barn cases, Gettier cases and skepticism in essentially the same way as Sosa does. Nevertheless, it might well be a starting point for further substantial revision. I argue that, unlike Sosa's account (cf. 2009), my account has the resources to explain suspension of belief without reference to meta-beliefs. Moreover, taking it to provide the adequate picture of epistemic performance for Sosa's virtue reliabilism, doubts should arise concerning the solution of the Meno problem as proposed by this theory: After arguing that there are cases of success due to skill that are not better than mere success, I show that the virtue reliabilist understanding of knowledge as the epistemic success of true belief due to competence makes it look like just such a case.

Literature

Sosa, E. (2007). *A Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and Reflective Knowledge*, Volume I. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sosa, E. (2009). Knowing Full Well: The Normativity of Beliefs as Performances. *Philosophical Studies*, 142, 5–15.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Yannic Kappes
Date: 17:25-17:55, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: HS E.002



Linus Lutz (Technical University of Berlin, Germany)

I completed my B.A. in philosophy (major) and German literature (minor) at Eberhard Karls University, Tübingen, in 2013. Currently, I am a M.A. candidate in philosophy at Technical University of Berlin, planning my final thesis. I have settled for some questions in epistemology as possible topics although two earlier interests – in the philosophy of art and especially in Wittgenstein’s philosophy – keep attracting me.

E-Mail: lutz.linus@gmail.com

Persuasive definitions in the human enhancement debate

Kritika Maheshwari

Advances in biological research has made it possible to prevent, treat, alter, or even enhance biological as well as psychological functioning of humans, for example, drug use for enhancing cognitive powers, injecting vaccines to enhance immunity and altering genetics for treating disorders of genetic disorders. However, the permissibility of all of these medical interventions is not without ethical dispute and disagreements. For the purpose of sound argumentation within bioethical debates on whether a particular medical intervention is permissible or impermissible, discussion of how we define treatment and enhancement is of significance because it entails a moral component - treatment is often seen as morally permissible whereas the practice of enhancement is seen as morally problematic or sometimes impermissible. Drawing on fact that there are difficulties and ambiguities involved in defining what strictly counts as enhancement and treatment, I want to make a case for the possibility of employing the argumentative strategy of “persuasive definitions” (Stevenson, 1938; Macagno and Walton, 2008) within bioethical debates on human enhancement. Persuasive definitions are redefinitions of terms which involve a use of argument from

values, often used as a means for strategically maneuvering the debate to one's own side and are usually condemned as fallacious when they are used as a deceptive strategy to win a debate. In my talk, I will argue that within the human enhancement debate, the presence of multiple different definitions of what counts as an enhancement allows for strategic redefining of the term "enhancement" in order to make a case for one's standpoint on whether enhancement should be made impermissible or permissible. I will also focus on whether the use of persuasive definitions can be accepted within the enhancement debate and if not, how can it be rendered defeasible or fallacious.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Michael Klenk
Date: 11:45-12:15, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003




Kritika Maheshwari (University of Groningen , Netherlands)

I am Kritika Maheshwari from India, and I joined the Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen in september last year. Currently, I am finishing my first year as a research master's student in Philosophy and I also work as a teaching assistant in the faculty. Prior to joining Groningen, I earned a Master's degree in Philosophy at the University of Birmingham. Both of my Masters degree have been facilitated by scholarships awarded by Holland Ministry of Education and University of Birmingham, respectively. Before studying philosophy, I earned a bachelor's degree in natural sciences, specifically chemistry. My current research interests include issues in bioethics, philosophy and sociology of science and science policy as well as issues mental health and ethics and I hope to pursue a PhD in Philosophy in near future.

E-Mail: k.maheshwari@student.rug.nl

Intuition and Justification

Cyrill Mamin

 intuition is sometimes seen as way to gain knowledge in alternative to deductive reasoning. Apart from this common starting point, “intuition” is understood quite differently, spreading from a priori-accounts in classical philosophy to contemporary psychological research and uses in colloquial language. My aim in the first part is to bridge the gap between the philosophical and the contemporary psychological and colloquial understandings of “intuition”.

To this end, I first demonstrate that the phenomenal features of immediacy and certainty are present in philosophical as well as psychological understandings. Second, I defend the claims that intuitions cannot be reduced to beliefs but, however, constitute inclinations to believe. This results in either intuitive beliefs that p or intuitions that p (the latter in case the original intuition is defeated by opposed beliefs). Both are propositional attitudes. However, third, I argue based on psychological dual-process theory against positions which narrow intuition to the propositional level. Instead, I hold that intuition fundamentally takes place at a nonpropositional level and, as a result, intuitions foremostly are nonconceptual representations.

The second part focuses on intuitive justification. Here, I first argue that with respect to justification, the different forms of intuition mentioned can all be properly understood within a framework which takes into account why intuition has evolved and in this sense takes intuitions to be adaptive. This lays the groundwork for an externalist account of intuitive justification. As an outlook, I recommend taking intuitive reasoning into account as a possibility to meet the internalist recognition requirement.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Philip Fox
Date: 11:10-11:40, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002




Cyrill Mamin (University of Lucerne, Switzerland)

Cyrill Mamin studied philosophy and german literature at university of Bern (CH) and Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (D), where in 2009 he received his MA with a thesis on nonconceptual mental content. Since 2013, he is a graduate student at University of Lucerne (CH), where he is writing a PhD thesis on intuition (supervisor: Prof. Christiane Schildknecht). Since 2016, he is working as an assistant at university of Lucerne's philosophy department, chair of theoretical philosophy. In addition, he is teaching philosophy in college.

E-Mail: mamincyrill@gmail.com

Privileged Present: The Moving Spotlight Theory

Eirini Georgia Mandopoulou

 The main aim of this presentation is to defend the Moving Spotlight Theory, which is an A-theoretic approach to the metaphysics of time. The Moving Spotlight Theory is a relatively unpopular version of the A theory, which champions an eternalistic time-framework with a constantly moving present, as a proper concept of ordering events and the individual times at which they occur.

After introducing the key notions of the A-series, the different ways in which A-theorists express the fundamental notion of temporal becoming will be presented. The four ontological options that represent the transitory nature of time are the Growing Block, the Shrinking Block, the Moving Spotlight, and Presentism. After a brief description of the aforementioned theories a more thorough definition of the Moving Spotlight Theory will be provided. In order to evaluate the feasibility of the Moving Spotlight Theory the two most popular objections that challenge the Moving Spotlight Theory of time will be presented.

The first objection, from McTaggart, tries to disqualify the A-series as a proper temporal order on the basis of it being inconsistent in the attribution of A-properties. The second, the epistemic objection, poses a sceptical puzzle to all non-presentist A-theorists. I conclude that the Moving Spotlight Theory does not deserve its current under-appreciated status and misfortuned credibility.


Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Date: 10:00-10:30, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004



Eirini Georgia Mandopoulou (University of Hamburg, Germany)
Currently I am an undergraduate student at the University of Hamburg pursuing my final year in Philosophy and Classics. After acquiring my Bachelor's degree I intend to continue my studies with a Master in the field of Philosophy of Science and more specifically Philosophy of Physics.
E-Mail: Georgia.Mandopoulou@studium.uni-hamburg.de

Every explanation in cognitive science is mechanistic? A perspective from Dynamic Field Theory.

Rodolfo Marraffa

e are living in a neuromania epoch. To be in step with the times, philosophy of science has tried to elaborate an account of explanation in neuroscience. The most famous accepted framework is labeled mechanistic: explanations in neuroscience are committed to mechanisms, which in turn are structures of the world organized in components and activities. Scientists are giving scientific explanations when they are highlighting the causal structure of the underlying mechanism responsible for a certain determined phenomenon. But Brain Sciences has been characterized as constitutively heterogeneous relying upon different strategies and experimental techniques.

Recently a debate is emerged that sees two opposite warring factions: one is represented by the neo-mechanists and the other one is represented by dynamicists. The core of this debate regards the explanatory power of models built exploiting the mathematical language of Dynamical Systems Theory (DST). According to neo-mechanists, dynamical models provide useful descriptions of the temporal evolution of the system, i.e. the phenomenon to be explained, without any causal reference

to the underlying mechanism. To put some sort of order, Craver and Kaplan have introduced a criterion of the 3M (model-to-mechanism-mapping) that distinguishes empirically the explanatory goodness between good models (mechanistic ones) and bad models (all the rest).

I argue against such a sort of conservative approach exemplified by the neo-mechanists who embracing the 3M criteria as it was an omniscient explanatory test bench, labeling this intellectual attitude panmechanicism. I will point out how case studies coming from the human science of movement modeled as embodied cognitive systems fail to meet the requirement of 3M criteria, in spite of being common accepted explanations in cognitive science.

With examples coming from the Dynamic Field Theory employing autonomous robots as explanatory tools, I will show that neo-mechanists have misunderstood the explanatory strategy of those models. The turning point in this diatribe would be the notion of level of explanation: dynamical models are not conceptually grounded in an hierarchical structure of mechanisms.

Instead of that brain centered approach, embodied dynamical models are committed to a diverse sense of level of explanation in absence of boundaries of cognition.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Matthew Baxendale
Date: 16:15-16:45, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006



Rodolfo Marraffa (Witten/Herdecke University, Germany)
Rodolfo studied Musicology and Cinema in Bologna, Theoretical Philosophy (BA, 2008) and Philosophy of Science (MA, 2012) at the Sapienza, University of Rome. He obtained his Master under the guide of prof. Roberto Cordeschi.


During his master thesis, he worked as research assistant at the Institute of Cognitive Sciences and Technologies (ISTC) within the laboratory of computational embodied neuroscience (LOCEN), under the guide of Prof. Gianluca Baldassarre. He also worked as research assistant at the University of Pompeu Fabra in Barcelona.

Now, he is conducting a Ph.D. in the field of philosophy of cognitive science working on different subjects:

- 1) Mechanistic Explanation and Dynamical System Theory;
 - 2) Biorobotics simulations as heuristics tool in the framework of mechanistic explanation;
 - 3) Levels of explanation in cognitive science.
- E-Mail: rodolfo.marraffa@libero.it

Signifying and picturing. Wilfrid Sellars' two-conceptions of language

Maria Matuszkiewicz

 The aim of my paper is to consider how Wilfrid Sellars' two parallel conceptions of language: functional role semantics and theory of picturing fit together and what roles do they play in Sellars' overall philosophical project. Functional role theory contributes to Sellars' naturalistic explanation of thoughts, it enabled his nominalistic account of abstract terms and it is consistent with his critique of the empiricist theory of concept formation. Due to its one main drawback: it does not account for how language can be about the world, Sellars introduced his second conception, inspired by Tractarian view, the theory of picturing. On this theory linguistic expressions picture the world due to an isomorphism between language and the world. It turns out, however, that this isomorphism is grounded in facts concerning the patterns of occurrence of linguistic expressions, which are the very same facts which – on the first view – determine these expressions' functional roles. As such they presuppose rule-governed behavior.

In the critical part of my paper I would like to consider (i) whether these two conceptions – which Sellars conceived of as complimentary – are consistent and whether they are really different if – as I argue – both semantic properties and picturing relation are grounded in the very same facts (ii) to what extent and at which point each of these conceptions presupposes the normative dimension and thus in what sense these views are consistent with naturalism.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher
Date: 18:00-18:30, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.007




Maria Matuszkiewicz (Warsaw University, Polska)

Maria Matuszkiewicz studied art history and philosophy at Warsaw University. She is a PHD candidate at the Institute of Philosophy at University of Warsaw. She writes a dissertation on naturalistic and pragmatic approaches to mental content.

E-Mail: maria.j.matuszkiewicz@gmail.com

Working out an inconsistency in J. Harris' essay "The Survival Lottery"

Daniel Matthias Mayerhoffer

 Harris' essay "The survival lottery" presents an argument for killing one healthy person in order to give her organs to two or more patients to save their lives. This initially seems preposterous but the reader has to admit that there is a surprisingly powerful defence of that position. Harris deals with possible counterarguments showing that most intuitive objections are buttressed by our current experiences of a society without the lottery.

Hence, the talk shall not engage in contentual discussions with Harris' propositions, but formally evaluates the structure of the argument to reveal an inconsistency regarding the question whether one should assign any objective value to an hour of lifetime: On the one hand, Harris' argument requires asserting a positive and thus external or objective value to each hour of lifetime of any person. On the other hand, to refute the proposal of preferably selecting donors among those who have least lifetime left, i.e. the dying who cannot be saved by any means, Harris points towards the subjectivity of valuing one's own lifetime that could result in weeks being more valuable to one person than years to another. The resulting inconsistency threatens the soundness and relevance of the argument as a whole. However, it is possible to save it

by dropping the appeal to subjectivity such that donors are primarily selected from certain groups. The first such group are cerebrally death patients, meaning that any laws allowing to opt-out from being an organ donor after one's cerebral death should be abolished. That might make suitable organs available for all patients in need for one and hence introducing a survival lottery becomes distinctly less pressing.

Thus, a synthesis between the proposal of a survival lottery and common positions regarding organ donation seems in reach, which shows the practical use of an analytical, formal argumentation theoretic approach for evaluating and improving arguments following the principle of charity.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Albert Anglberger
Date: 14:00-14:30, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003



Daniel Matthias Mayerhoffer (Otto-Friedrich-University of Bamberg & Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuemberg, Germany) Daniel Mayerhoffer currently is an MA student of Politics (focussing on Political Philosophy and Computational Social Modelling) at the Otto-Friedrich-University of Bamberg and of the elite study program Ethics of Textual Cultures at the Friedrich-Alexander University Erlangen-Nuemberg. Before that, he did his undergraduate studies in Philosophy & Economics at the University of Bayreuth.
E-Mail: daniel.mayerhoffer@gmx.de

Against Richard Heck on the Epistemological Significance of Frege's Theorem

Sean Aidan McIntosh



Richard Heck argues that Frege's Theorem – the fact that the Dedekind-Peano axioms are logical consequences of Hume's Principle, an abstraction principle which functions as an implicit definition of the cardinality operator, in second-order

logic with impredicative comprehension – taken together with the observation that Hume’s Principle (or something like it) is implicit in ordinary thought about the natural numbers, cannot suffice to make ordinary arithmetical beliefs knowledgeable. I argue that if we help ourselves to the notion of a kind of epistemic warrant called entitlement, then an explanation of how ordinary arithmetic beliefs are knowledgeable in light of Frege’s Theorem might be possible. Epistemic entitlements can be understood, broadly, to be warrants for a subject to believe (or presuppose) certain propositions without their having any reason to do so. I will discuss two routes that an explanation using entitlements might take, and notes problems with each which prevent them from being successful in their present forms.

Section: Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics
Language: English
Chair: Elena Tassoni
Date: 18:00-18:30, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.005




Sean Aidan McIntosh (University of Oxford, UK)

I read for my undergraduate degree in Philosophy at the University of Sheffield. I was awarded a first and one prizes in all three years of my study. Whilst at Sheffield I studied under Bob Hale, a prominent neo-logicist. Under Bob I began working in the philosophy of mathematics, and have continued to do so at the University of Oxford under Alex Paseau. In addition to the philosophy of mathematics, my main interest is in epistemology. The talk I will give draws on both areas.

E-Mail: sean.mcintosh@philosophy.ox.ac.uk

I’m Not Simple! Panpsychism and “The Datum”

Gregory Miller

avid Barnett has recently argued that subjects of experience are mereologically simple, i.e. they have no proper parts (Barnett 2010; Barnett 2008). His argument for this thesis is abductive and is based on what he calls “The Datum”: that a

pair of people cannot be conscious. Simplicity is the best explanation of why each member of the pair is conscious but the pair itself is not conscious, a pair of persons has proper parts so cannot be conscious. In this paper I put Barnett's argument into a dialogue with panpsychism, arguing that if Barnett is right that subjects are mereologically simple, then panpsychism is false. I argue, however, that the panpsychist should not be worried because Barnett's argument is unsound. There are better explanations of The Datum that Barnett does not consider: 1) that subjects are "topologically integrated", and 2) that being a subject is a "maximal property". Although these responses undermine Barnett's argument, they may not be ones the panpsychist can endorse. Considering these alternate explanations of The Datum, I formulate new and stronger arguments against panpsychism: 1) the "Integrated Subjects Argument", and 2) the "Maximal Subjects Argument". I offer tentative responses to these arguments too.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Jonas Werner
Date: 15:40-16:10, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



Gregory Miller (University of Liverpool, United Kingdom)
I am PhD student at the University of Liverpool. My main area of research is panpsychism and the problem of mental combination.
E-Mail: p10u90e7@liverpool.ac.uk

Fixing the “Information” in Integrated Information Theory

Garrett Mindt



Giulio Tononi's proposed theory of consciousness – Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of Consciousness – presents an interesting advance in the scientific study of consciousness. Tononi suggests that consciousness is quantifiable in both quantity and quality in terms of integrated information. Accordingly, information is one of IIT's two foundational pillars (alongside integration) and

if one such pillar were to fall, the theory would have little to stand on. I argue that IIT is committed to a physicalist notion of information. Because of this, IIT suffers from a number of objections commonly directed against physicalist accounts of consciousness. Furthermore, I argue that this commitment to a physicalist notion of information is in direct conflict with how the theory is developed and against some of the motivating reasons given to argue the theory. The damage, thus, is two-fold. Firstly, in its present form IIT exhibits an internal incoherence in adhering to a position of consciousness it was designed to stay neutral on, i.e., physicalism. Secondly, this fact strips IIT of its purported novel ability to avoid the objections that plague rival theories of consciousness. Once I have shown that IIT is committed to a physicalist account of information and falls victim to these objections, I move on to give a tentative response on behalf of IIT for solving these problems. My response is a recommendation that IIT amend its definition of information with something akin to David Chalmers dual-aspect account of information.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Date: 15:40-16:10, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



Garrett Mindt (Central European University, Hungary)

I am a first year PhD student in Budapest at Central European University. My research is focused on issues within philosophy of mind, specifically the study of consciousness. Currently I am working on issues within a relatively new account of consciousness—Integrated Information Theory. Specifically, and the focus of my proposed talk, how IIT defines and utilizes the notion of “information” in constructing a theory of consciousness.

E-Mail: Mindt_Garrett@phd.ceu.edu

Against Thomasson's Easy Ontology

Siobhan Moriarty

In her (2015), Amie Thomasson argues that properly understood, ontological questions are easy to answer and the answers are usually positive. Thomasson proposes as “an invariant core formal rule of use for ‘exists’: E: Ks exist iff the application conditions actually associated with ‘K’ are fulfilled” (Thomasson, 2015, 86) and contends that many existence claims are trivially true because the rules of use for relevant terms license the inference of existence claims from statements whose truth is uncontroversial, or sometimes from observation. Thomasson argues that consideration of the rules of use for relevant terms reveals that application of these terms just is warranted by various commonplace situations and this is enough for positive conclusions regarding the existence of the putative entities in question.

Thomasson's deflationary metaontological conclusion depends on her construal of existence statements holding with complete generality. I argue that it cannot plausibly be taken to do so. Thomasson needs there to be application conditions, and situations which fulfil, or fail to fulfil, them, in order to secure truth for the right hand sides of the biconditionals she uses to secure her “easy” conclusions concerning existence. However, applied to existence statements concerning application conditions Thomasson's schema E has the problem that it presupposes a positive answer; “application condition” is used on both sides of the biconditional (application conditions exist iff the application conditions associated with “application condition” are satisfied).

My contention is that the existence claims concerning application conditions and situations which Thomasson needs to count as true in order for her arguments to run cannot be satisfactorily analysed using a construal of ‘exists’ which is given in terms of them. If this is right, Thomasson's construal of ‘exists’ should not be accepted in a completely general way. At the very least, such a conclusion would limit the scope of the deflationary results of Thomasson's position and allow that some questions of ontology may not be easy. Alternatively, if one holds on to the claim that ‘exists’ is univocal, the conclusion for which I argue would undermine one of the key elements of Thomasson's argument and so block its conclusion.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Thomas Spiegel
Date: 17:25-17:55, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.004



Siobhan Moriarty (University of Sheffield, England)

Siobhan Moriarty is a postgraduate student working towards her PhD in philosophy at the University of Sheffield. She received a BA in Philosophy and Latin from Trinity College Dublin and an MPhil in Philosophy from the University of Cambridge. Her main research interests are metaontology and the metaphysics of modality. Her PhD focuses on the role of ontological categories in grounding statements of metaphysical possibility, necessity, and impossibility.

E-Mail: sfmoriarty1@sheffield.ac.uk

Contractual Slavery and the Impossibility-Argument

Elias Moser

The 18th century philosophical debate between advocates and contesters of slavery focussed on the idea of contractual slavery. The former defended slavery on the grounds of the possibility of a person voluntarily enslaving herself. As long as it was possible that a person voluntarily waives all of her rights and liberties, it seemed unjustified to categorically ban all kinds of slavery. In contrast, a categorical prohibition of slavery would exclude the permissibility of voluntary slavery. The philosophical argument did not qualify contractual slavery as illegitimate but as a mere impossibility. According to the argument, the act of enslaving oneself includes major inconsistencies. The case against possibility of contractual slavery thus represents a historically important idea in moral and political philosophy. Among nowadays philosophers the inadmissibility of slavery seems to be widely undisputed. However, it is questionable if voluntary slavery really is impossible.

This presentation elucidates several arguments for the impossibility-claim. Drawing on Rousseau's work "The Social Contract", four dif-

ferent types of impossibility-arguments will be distinguished. The involved propositions will then be scrutinized and it will be shown that none of the discussed arguments persist. Based on the findings, the impossibility-claim will be disbanded. The thesis that the focus on the moral problem of slavery should rather lie on the legitimacy of contractual slavery will be defended. The presentation concludes with the suggestion that contractual slavery should be condemned on grounds of invalidity and not on the basis of impossibility.

Section: Political Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Maciej Juzaszek
Date: 16:15-16:45, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.006



Elias Moser (Institute for Criminal Law, University of Berne, Switzerland)

Elias Moser is assistant at the Institute for Criminal Law, University of Berne. MA Political and Economic Philosophy. Dissertation on the concept and the moral dimensions of inalienable rights. Fields of interest:

- Legal ethics
- Applied ethics
- Political philosophy

E-Mail: elias.moser@krim.unibe.ch

Erfahrungstheoretischer Naiver Realismus und Metaphysischer Naiver Realismus

Adem Mulamustafić



Wie hängt die Welt, wie sie uns die Wahrnehmung präsentiert, mit der Welt, wie sie an sich ist, zusammen? Naive Realisten behaupten, dass Wahrnehmung uns mit der Welt an sich bekannt macht. Sie befürworten üblicherweise folgende drei Behauptungen:

(i) Gute Fälle der Wahrnehmungserfahrung bestehen fundamental in einer nicht-repräsentationalen Bekanntschaftsrelation zu geistunabhängigen Objekten und ihren Eigenschaften.

(ii) Der phänomenale Charakter von guten Erfahrungsfällen wird (zum Teil) erklärt durch die Bekanntschaftsrelation zu geistunabhängigen Objekten und ihren Eigenschaften.

(iii) Auf Grundlage des phänomenalen Charakters können wir Wissen darüber erwerben, wie geistunabhängige Objekte unabhängig von der Erfahrung beschaffen sind.

Nennen wird jede Position bzgl. Wahrnehmungserfahrungen, die (i) bis (iii) enthält, einen erfahrungstheoretischen Naiven Realismus (ENR). ENR ist nicht die einzige Position, die als ‚Naiver Realismus‘ bezeichnet wird. Die andere Position, die dieses Etikett trägt, besagt, dass nicht-wahrgenommene Objekte jeden Typ von Eigenschaften besitzen (können), die uns in der Wahrnehmung offenbart (engl. to reveal) werden. Nennen wir diese Position den metaphysischen Naiven Realismus (MNR). ENR setzt MNR voraus. Wenn uns nämlich Wahrnehmung mit geistunabhängigen Objekten bekannt macht und uns dadurch Wissen darüber ermöglicht, wie diese Objekte unabhängig von der Erfahrung beschaffen sind, dann besitzen nicht-wahrgenommene Objekte jeden Typ von Eigenschaften, die uns in der Wahrnehmung offenbart werden.

MNR enthält, wie ich darlegen möchte, den sogenannten Farbprimitivismus, d. h. diejenige realistische Position bzgl. der Metaphysik von Farben, die besagt, dass Farben Eigenschaften sui generis darstellen.

In meinem Vortrag möchte ich vor diesem Hintergrund für folgende zentrale These argumentieren:

Der Farbprimitivismus ist inkompatibel mit dem derzeitigen Stand wissenschaftlicher Forschung. Da MNR den Farbprimitivismus enthält und ENR als Voraussetzung MNR besitzt, sind auch MNR und ENR inkompatibel mit dem derzeitigen Stand wissenschaftlicher Forschung. Anders gesagt: Die Welt der Wahrnehmung ist inkompatibel mit der Welt der Wissenschaft.

Section: Epistemology
Language: German
Chair: Maximilian Kiener
Date: 11:15-11:45, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: HS E.002



Adem Mulamustafić (Universität Potsdam, Germany)

I am a PhD student at the University of Potsdam, working mainly in metaphysics. The problem I'm concerned with in my PhD project is whether scientific realism and metaphysical naïve realism are compatible.

E-Mail: adem.mulamustafic@outlook.com

Supererogation and Over-Demandingness

Lukas Naegeli

Under the labels “supererogation” and “over-demandingness”, two different philosophical debates have evolved during the last decades. Much material exists, focusing on both topics individually, but very few contributions handle them jointly. At the same time, the discussions seem to be thematically related: In both cases we are concerned with alleged limits of moral demands. Supererogationists claim that some actions lie beyond the call of duty and advocates of the so-called over-demandingness objection argue against some moral theories that they make unreasonably high demands on individual agents.

In the light of such similarities, the following questions arise: How exactly are the two debates thematically related? And to what extent is it philosophically fruitful to discuss their thematic relation? After outlining what seem to be the focal points of the respective discussions, I try to clarify the connection between them by examining two propositions:

Implication thesis: If there are any supererogatory acts, then there are some moral theories that are too demanding.

Reverse implication thesis: If there are any moral theories that are too demanding, then there are some supererogatory acts as well.

Although both proposals seem to be intuitively plausible, they are confronted with convincing counterexamples. While heroic and saintly acts fit well with the implication thesis, a third kind of supererogatory acts poses a problem to someone who wants to defend this proposition: Since small acts of favour do not involve great sacrifices, it seems natural to say that it would not at all be too demanding, in the sense of too heavy a burden for individual agents, to require them. And if a moral theory is not only too demanding, but also does not correctly identify the domain of moral goodness, then the existence of supererogatory actions does – contrary to the reverse implication thesis – not necessarily follow from it. Nevertheless, supererogation and over-demandingness are linked closely enough so that it is advisable for philosophers who intend to resolve one debate to deal with the best arguments of the other debate as well.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Albert Anglberger
Date: 16:15-16:45, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.003




Lukas Naegeli (Universität Zürich, Switzerland)

Ich habe in Zürich und Berlin Philosophie, Germanistik und Kulturanalyse studiert und doktoreiere zurzeit am Philosophischen Seminar der Universität Zürich bei Prof. Dr. Peter Schaber. In meinem Dissertationsprojekt beschäftige ich mich mit den Grenzen moralischer Forderungen. E-Mail: lukas.naegeli@uzh.ch

The Boundaries Around us: An Ontological Approach to the Surfaces of Things

Gonzalo Nunez

his paper is a metaphysical approach to boundaries. It specifically addresses the ontological dependence between surfaces and ordinary material objects. The first task is thus to outline an account of boundaries. Two intuitive claims: (1) Bound-

aries exist in the extremity of something and (2) Boundaries exist between things. In the case of (1), Euclid defines a boundary as “that which is the extremity of anything”. We might say that “E is the extremity of x ” means that E is part of x and the outermost part enclosing x . In the case of (2), a boundary is something separating two entities or two parts of an entity which are continuous each other: if x has a boundary y , then nothing of x can be found beyond y , so y exists by separating x from something else immediately continuous to x .

From those claims, surfaces would be the boundaries of ordinary physical things. I suggest that the surface of an ordinary object x can be defined as that part of x that encloses x by being spread along x 's extremity before finding the spatial environment where x is located. A surface is a boundary insofar as it is (i) the extremity of some bulk and (ii) separates that bulk from its spatial environment.

Surfaces are two-dimensional boundaries that cannot exist in our ordinary physical world without being attached to some ordinary material object. This implies modal-existential elements. From a *de re* modality, the existence of a surface x necessarily depends upon the existence of an object y , i.e., x cannot exist unless y does, and y is not identical to x . The kind of ontological relation is such that a surface rigidly depends upon its particular object. From a *de dicto* modality, necessarily, an object cannot exist without some surface. Although ordinary material objects might exist without a particular surface, they cannot exist without having some surface since they have a finite spatial extension given by its current boundary that separates it from its spatial environment. It can be thus said that the spatial existence of an ordinary material object generically depends upon the condition of having some surface. Both rigidity and generality define the ontological relation between objects and surfaces. Surfaces are ontological parasites that only exist by being attached to some host, but without them, ordinary physical things could not take any place in the world.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Date: 11:10-11:40, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004




Gonzalo Nunez (University of Sheffield, United Kingdom)

Gonzalo Nunez studied a Bachelor in Philosophy and a Master in philosophy at Alberto Hurtado University, Chile. His main interests during that time was focused on clarifying the concept of limit in Wittgenstein philosophy of language. Currently, Gonzalo is a full time PHD student at the University of Sheffield, UK. He is interested in metaphysical topics such as material constitution, identity through time, ordinary objects, or mereology. His research is an ontological approach to boundaries of ordinary material things.

E-Mail: ggnunez1@sheffield.ac.uk

Trust Responsibly—Towards a Virtue-Account of Entitlement

Jakob Ohlhorst

 n “Warrant for Nothing (and Foundations for Free)?” (2004) Crispin Wright – pointing out a gap in sceptical arguments – has suggested an internalist solution to scepticism. Sceptical argument only undermines evidential justification for our beliefs. Meanwhile, there may be another form of warrant: inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein and Hans Reichenbach, he proposes that we may be entitled to claim rational trust in cornerstone beliefs without any evidential justification.

However, there is a worry with this approach: without the checks of evidence, what keeps us from running epistemically wild and trust any arbitrary cornerstone proposition? The demarcation problem has not seen extensive treatment in the literature. Nikolaj Pedersen’s “simple solution” distinguishes between good and bad entitlements. An entitlement is good if and only if it is true and bad otherwise. (“Entitlements, Good and Bad.” 2006) I argue that the simple solution misses its goal: it does not solve the demarcation problem.

I will instead suggest a virtue-epistemological solution: one is entitled to responsibly trust in cornerstone propositions. This accounts for what is wrong with trusting in bad entitlements; one is irresponsible. I will develop this responsibilist view by suggesting virtues for responsibly trusting entitlements such as parsimony, accountability and rationality; and explain how they handle the demarcation problem.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Yannic Kappes
Date: 16:50-17:20, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: HS E.002



Jakob Ohlhorst (University of St Andrews, United Kingdom)
Jakob Ohlhorst is an MLitt Student at the University of St Andrews. He completed his bachelor's degree in Philosophy and Sociology at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland.

His main interests lie with epistemology—notably with scepticism and its foundations. Other fields of interest are philosophy of language and the modal modelling of normative terms like reasons.

E-Mail: jakob.ohlhorst@gmail.com

Interdependency as a source of moral duties and claims. Toward a universal understanding

Eva Maria Parisi

Ny argumentation presents itself as a relational approach to global justice and bases upon an understanding of personal interdependency as the source of our moral duties and claims. Existing as a human being necessarily implies being part of social relationships binding oneself to other human beings. This condition of interdependency is not merely a mental and physical connection, but also the source of the responsibilities we bear toward one another. By developing close personal relationships, we experience duties and claims which do not arise by virtue of our special characteristics, but rather in the strong interdependency which exists between us and others.

The main aim of my paper is to claim that by valuing our close personal bonds, we set a fundamental statement within our evaluative standpoints, namely one according to which interdependency provides us with reasons for non-egoistic actions. It is according to this statement and by virtue of a principle of coherence that we ought to act in the same non-egoistic way whenever we are confronted to interdependence

relations with other individuals, be them compatriots, acquaintances or complete strangers.

Such a claim is particularly interesting if confronted to the more and more popular belief that moral responsibilities exist primary – if not even exclusively – within closed classes of people such as family members, fellow citizens or followers of the own religion. My argument shows that such a limitation of the scope of morality is not just questionable, but also deeply inconsistent with one of our most evaluative statements, namely the one concerning interdependency as providing reasons for non-egoistic action. Therefore, it is not by building walls between cultures that our values are best defended, but rather by acting in a way which is consistent with them.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Enno Fischer
Date: 15:40-16:10, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003




Eva Maria Parisi (Ludwig Maximilian University Munich, Germany)
Eva Maria Parisi is a postgraduate student in Philosophy at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich. She moved to Germany after obtaining her High School Degree in Classical Studies at the Liceo Prati in Trento, Italy. In autumn 2015, she attended an exchange semester at the University of Sheffield, UK. Eva's main interests are in the field of Practical and Political Philosophy. In October 2015, she took part at the Conference for Interdisciplinary Approaches to Politics at the University of Leeds and gave a speech on Personal Relationships as School of Morality. Eva is currently employed at the Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich as graduate assistant in the Faculty of Philosophy. She is offering a tutorial on Partiality and Special Obligations. Starting from 2014, she is active member of EDIW, an international non-profit association promoting and fostering actions and projects to build an inclusive society toward a better understanding of a multicultural and interdependent world.

E-Mail: evamparisi@gmail.com

Epistemic Possibility and the Future Aspect

Meagan Phillips

 I am concerned with epistemic possibility expressions (EPEs) such as “It might be raining.” Much of the discussion of EPEs has concerned the fact that a given EPE can seem true in one context and false in another. Motivated by this data, contextualists have argued that modal expressions are sensitive to information at a context of use. Contextualist analyses encounter problems when it comes to disagreements centered on EPEs. Relativists such as John MacFarlane[1] argue that epistemic modals are sensitive to information available to an assessor at a circumstance of evaluation. I side with a relativistic account of epistemic possibility, on which the truth conditions of EPEs depend not only on a context of use but also as on a context of assessment. The stipulation of contexts of assessments explains why third parties can judge an interlocutor’s utterance false, and why the interlocutor will retract her previous utterance. However, judgements of falsity and retraction seem to be absent in future-oriented EPEs such as “It might rain tomorrow.” I propose an amendment to John MacFarlane’s semantics that better models this quirk of epistemic possibility expressions.

[1] In *Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications*, 2014.

Section: Philosophy of Language
 Language: English
 Chair: Till Gallasch
 Date: 10:35-11:05, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
 Location: SR 1.007



Meagan Phillips (Northern Illinois University, United States)

I began to study philosophy in high school through a dual enrollment program, and though I have developed other interests, philosophy has remained steadfast in my life. I was originally drawn to continental philosophy and postmodernism, but when I spent a scholarship year abroad at Universiteit van Amsterdam, I developed an interest in philosophy of language after studying pragma-dialectics with Frans van Eemeren.

Returning stateside, I also developed an interest in Arabic philosophy, the Kyoto school of philosophers, and philosophy of science.

After graduating from University of Massachusetts Boston, I spend near a decade traveling in Asia while teaching English. My interest in philosophy persisted, but inclined more heavily towards its linguistic aspects. When I returned stateside, I sat in on classes at MIT to learn about conditionals and epistemic modals. This last has developed into a special obsession of mine that I have been allowed to pursue at the Master's program at Northern Illinois University.

E-Mail: pheaganm@gmail.com

Proxies, Necessary Existents and Necessitism

Andreea Popescu

My intention is to analyze one critique against the view supported by Edward Zalta and Bernard Linsky regarding their actualist view (Zalta & Linsky, 1994). Their proposal is to treat the thesis that “necessarily, everything necessarily exist” as a new type of actualism. The same thesis is also supported by Timothy Williamson, however, he labels it as necessitism rather than actualism. The critique I am concerned with was advanced by Karen Bennett in “Proxy ‘Actualism’” (Bennett, 2006). Her charge regards the description of this thesis as actualist. Her arguments are based on the attempt to prove that their view is a proxy-committed metaphysical thesis. My concern regards both the correct labeling as actualism, and the consideration that this view is committed to proxies.

I would like to argue that the metaphysical view supported by Zalta, Linsky, and Williamson, is a proxy-free view. I will firstly present the answer provided by Zalta and Michael Nelson in “Bennett and ‘Proxy Actualism’” (Nelson & Zalta, 2009) continuing with the arguments I will try to develop against Bennett's view. For this I will use the following elements: the technical aspects of the logical systems developed in “In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic” (Zalta & Linsky, 1994) and “Bare Possibilia” (Williamson, 1998), the classification of the metaphysical views concerning possibilia proposed by Kit Fine (Fine, 2003), and the nature of the Barcan Formula and the assignment of individuals to the variables.

In the second part of my presentation I will try to argue that the

thesis analyzed is not an actualist one, being on the same side with Bennett regarding this aspect. However, my reasons for adopting this view are different from the ones presented by Bennett. The importance of this endeavor is given by the possibility to provide a better separation of the metaphysical views treating possibilia.

References

- Bennett, Karen (2006). "Proxy 'Actualism'". *Philosophical Studies* 129 (2): 263–294.
- Fine, Kit (2003). "The Problem of Possibilia". In Michael J. Loux & Dean W. Zimmerman (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics*. Oxford University Press. 161–179.
- Linsky, Bernard, and Zalta, Edward N. (1994). "In Defense of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic". *Philosophical Perspectives* 8 (Logic and Language): 431–458.
- Nelson, Michael, and Zalta, Edward N. (2009). "Bennett and 'Proxy Actualism'". *Philosophical Studies* 142 (2): 277–292.
- Williamson, Timothy (1998). "Bare Possibilia". *Erkenntnis* 48 (2/3): 257–73.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Eirini Georgia Mandopoulou
Date: 14:00-14:30, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004



Andreea Popescu (University of Bucharest, Romania)

I am currently a PhD. Candidate at the Doctoral School of Philosophy, University of Bucharest. My philosophy studies begun in 2008 at this institution where I have obtained both my Bachelor and Master degree. The Master program concerned the study of different topics in Analytic Philosophy such as Philosophical Logic, Ontology or Philosophy of Language.


Concerning my PhD thesis, the topic regards one of the problems in modal metaphysics, namely the problem of possibilia. However, since this issues were raised by the development of modal logic, the technical

aspects are also present in my research. My first interest of analysis is related to Timothy Williamson's proposal to treat this problem in terms of necessitism and contingentism and to the nature of the objects which are non-concrete, but not abstract either. Thus, the ontology proposed by necessitism represents my first interest. The main goal is to see whether this recent proposal has more advantages than the possibilist one. Regarding the technical aspects of modal logic, the reintroduction of the Barcan Formula in the definition of the systems of modal logic proposed and the changes made in order to validate it will also be part of my research. Since the metaphysical view proposed comes as a support for the technical aspects, an analysis of the relation between modal logic and modal metaphysics will be necessary.

E-Mail: andreeastefaniaaa@gmail.com

Structural Representation and the Role of Mathematics in Natural Sciences

Agnieszka Proszewska

he realism vs. antirealism debate within the philosophy of science has been recently revived by development of different forms of structural realism, that shifts focus from the standard “object-oriented” ontologies to the structures that seem to remain even through decisive theory change. In general, such views have typically been expressed in the context of physical theories, strongly motivated by the presence of mathematical equations, which allow instant and straightforward representation of the relevant structures.

In my presentation I will analyze the applicability of structural representation in natural sciences and try to establish the criteria of such applicability, as dependable on eg. ability to determine inferential relations between empirical phenomena and mathematical structures. For this purpose, I will present the “Three Step” concept of the inferential role of mathematics introduced by Bueno & Colyvan, consisting of Immersion, Derivation and Interpretation and discuss the philosophical implications of the role of mathematics in scientific explanations.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Colin Elliot
Date: 14:35-15:05, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006




Agnieszka Proszewska (Jagiellonian University, Poland)

Agnieszka M. Proszewska is a Ph.D. student and teaching assistant in the Department of Philosophy at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, where she teaches logic and set theory, epistemology and philosophy of science. She graduated from Philosophy and Swedish Philology at the Jagiellonian University and currently, she is also working on her Master's thesis on computational complexity theory at the Department of Physics, Astronomy and Applied Computer Science. Her research interests focus on the philosophy of natural sciences, mathematical logic and theories of complexity and computation. Since 2014 she serves as a regular member of Polish Artificial Intelligence Society.

E-Mail: agnieszka.proszewska@gmail.com

Against Duties of Friendship

Jakob Reckhenrich

 It is widely thought that we have duties to our friends that we don't have to strangers. In this talk I argue that there are no such duties of friendship. I will consider and reject two arguments for duties of friendship and then offer two explanations of why we might be tempted, falsely, to think that there are such duties.

I first consider a promise-based account of duties of friendship. I argue that while we can make promises by doing "nothing at all" it is implausible to think that the relevant conditions are met when becoming friends. I then consider the argument that duties of friendship are constitutive of friendship, that there exist friendships and that, therefore, there are duties of friendship. I argue that the first premise is mistaken. We can imagine a world in which act-utilitarianism is true

but where friendships exist. As there are no duties of friendship in such a world, they are not constitutive of friendship.

Having rejected what seem to me to be the most plausible arguments for duties of friendship I offer two explanations of our intuitions that such duties exist. I first argue that we have greater imaginative access to the lives of our friends than to the lives of strangers. This causes us to act on our general duties of aid more often in the case of friends than the case of strangers. This explains, in part, our mistaken thought that there are duties of friendship. I then argue that there are roles that have normative standards, i.e. there is a notion of what it is to perform those roles well and poorly. Friendship is one such role. Insofar as having a role is an important part of our self-conception the standards of that role make non-moral demands on us that we might confuse with moral duties of friendship.


Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Christoph Lernpaß
Date: 11:50-12:20, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003



Jakob Reckhenrich (Brown University, United States of America)
Jakob Reckhenrich is originally from Berlin, Germany. After receiving his BA from Humboldt Universität zu Berlin, with stops at Warwick and New York Universities, he moved to Oxford for the BPhil. He is currently in the fifth year of his PhD at Brown University. His dissertation focuses on the place of partiality in morality and in particular on the role that personal relationships play in accounts of partiality.
E-Mail: Jakob_Reckhenrich@brown.edu

How to imagine a photon?

Nina Retzlaff

 It is a quite well known fact that photons exhibit wave-like as well as particle-like behavior in certain experimental setups. However, it is still controversial how this fact should be explained. For such an explanation there are several candidates on the market. According to collapse interpretations (such as the Copenhagen interpretation) photons are in superposition before measurement (wave-like behavior) and in a specific state after measurement (particle-like behavior). This process of state reduction is still critically debated and does not exist in non-collapse interpretations (such as the many-worlds interpretation or the de Broglie-Bohm theory). But at this point there arise other objections, e.g. within the context of probability statements. In this talk I discuss several of these interpretations and illustrate their ontological consequences by means of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer. I aim at evaluating which one of these interpretations turns out to be the most plausible one from a philosophical point of view. I will especially focus on the problem of the transition from a photon's superposition state to its specific state.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: German
Chair: Colin Elliot
Date: 15:45-16:15, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



Nina Retzlaff (Heinrich-Heine-University, Germany)

Nina Retzlaff is a research fellow at the Düsseldorf center for Logic and Philosophy of Science (DCLPS) at the Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf. She studied mathematics with a minor in biology at the University of Cologne and is interested in quantum mechanics. Her research interests lie in philosophy of physics, especially in causality within quantum mechanics. In the context of her PhD thesis, she is investigating causality with regard to quantum mechanics.

E-Mail: Nina.Retzlaff@uni-duesseldorf.de

On differences as grounds for negative truths

Julio de Rizzo

Any account which makes truth depend on the way the world is struggles with the problem of accounting for the truth of what is not. The accounts split in two groups: acceptance of negative entities going around and attempts at reducing negative truths to alleged positive ones. By adopting the latter option the two most promising candidate notions one might rely upon are the notions of incompatibility, or exclusion; and otherness, or difference in their reduction base, which give rise to two groups of proposals. These in turn might be read in different ways, varying essentially according to how one conceives of metaphysical reduction and the relata involved. Relying on the notion of grounding - an asymmetrical, transitive, non-causal explanatory relation hereby expressed by the sentential connective “because” - one gets to the following claims:

i) $\forall x(\neg Px \rightarrow (\neg Px \text{ because } (\exists Q(Qx \wedge (Q \text{ is incompatible with } P))))))$

ii) $\forall x(\neg Px \rightarrow (\neg Px \text{ because } (\exists y((y \text{ is other than } x) \text{ because } Py))))$.

While i) is relatively known in the literature, largely due to a debate between Russell and his former student Demos, who proposed a related account, ii) has received much less attention. Aiming at partially filling this gap, in this talk I examine ii) and some closely related variants in some detail. After presenting both accounts, their implications and some possible objections to them, I will discuss alternatives to ii) which employ the notions of relative non-identity, according to which two individuals might be different-in-a-respect, and essence (both individual and generic). I end by pointing out some interesting common features on the general structuring of properties, akin to the one discussed in the literature on determinables and determinates, suggested both by i) and the accounts presented.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Jonas Werner
Date: 14:30-15:00, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



Julio de Rizzo (Universität Hamburg, Germany)

Julio de Rizzo is a Ph.D. Student at the University of Hamburg, supervised by Prof. Dr. Benjamin Schnieder and funded by the institutions Capes and DAAD, and a member of the research group Phlox. He was born in São Paulo, Brazil, where he got his Master in Philosophy in 2014 at the University of São Paulo. His primary interests are metaphysics, philosophy of logic and 18th century rationalism.

E-Mail: julioderizzo@gmail.com

Composition of Causes, Superponibles and Combination Laws

Johannes Roehl

Already for simple problems in elementary physics the problem of the combination of causal factors arises. Rules for such combinations like the vectorial addition of forces are usually independent of the actual force laws (such as the law for gravitational attraction) and it has been argued that they are more general. With accounts of laws of nature that base laws on dispositions we have the following situation: Dispositions give maybe the best option for understanding how the composition of causal factors works because they are entities that can be superposed, obstruct and cancel each other. This will be explicated with the example of classical forces. It will be argued that there is a class of physical entities, superponibles, that can be superposed in such a fashion and follows the simplest combination law, namely forces and fields. They have dispositional character and this character gives the best understanding of their superponibility although a full characterization of the peculiar combination beyond the mathematical representation as vectorial addition seems difficult. Still, the law of combination has to be presupposed and it is hard to see how it could in turn be based on dispositions as it governs their combination. It will be explored whether it is plausible to base a combination law on some disposition of the complex system within which the combination of causal factors arises or whether one should rather opt for a mild pluralism allowing that in contrary to force laws combination laws are not grounded in the disposition of the interacting entities.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Gregor P. Greslehner
Date: 11:10-11:40, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



Johannes Roehl (Universität Giessen, Germany)

Studium der Philosophie, Physik und Mathematik an den Universitäten Gießen und Seattle. Magisterarbeit zum Teilchenbegriff in der Quantenfeldtheorie; Dissertationsprojekt zu dispositionalen Eigenschaften in der Physik. Wissenschaftlicher Mitarbeiter an der Universität Gießen 2003-09. 2010-13 Projektmitarbeiter an der Universität Rostock im DFG-Projekt “Good Ontology Design” zu formaler Ontologie im Bereich der Lebenswissenschaften.

Forschungsschwerpunkte und Veröffentlichungen in Bereichen der Philosophie der Physik, Dispositionen und formaler Ontologie.

“Mechanisms in biomedical ontology”, *Journal of Biomedical Semantics* 2012, 3 (Suppl 2):S9;

“Dispositions, Causation and Mathematical Physics” in: Hoeltje/Spitzley/Spohn (Hrsg.): Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. (DuEPublico) 2013, 162-171.

“Feld oder Fernwirkung? Konkurrierende Paradigmen in der Elektrodynamik des 19. Jahrhunderts”, in Stephan Kornmesser, Gerhard Schurz (eds.): Die multiparadigmatische Struktur der Wissenschaften. Springer VS Wiesbaden 2014, 271-304.

“Ontological categories for fields and waves”, in Horbach, M. (ed.): INFORMATIK 2013. Informatik angepasst an Organisation, Mensch und Umwelt. 16.-20. September 2013 Koblenz. Gesellschaft für Informatik, Bonn 2013, 1866-1874.

(mit Ludger Jansen) “Why functions are not special dispositions: an improved classification of realizables for top-level ontologies”, *Journal of Biomedical Semantics* 2014, 5:27

E-Mail: parrhesia@web.de

Attitude ascriptions, substitutivity, and descriptions

Wojciech Rostworowski

Attitude ascriptions raise many issues in contemporary philosophy of language. Especially, the ascriptions of “non-doxastic” attitudes (e.g., ‘S wants p’) are problematic, since they apparently do not allow for substitution of equivalent sentences in their scope. In brief, a biconditional such as (1) seems to analytically true, while biconditional (2) can be intuitively false, given respective contextual assumptions:

(1) The murderer of Smith is convicted iff Smith has been murdered and his murderer is convicted.

(2)(?) Jones wants Smith murderer to be convicted iff Jones wants Smith to be murdered and his murderer to be convicted.

Many theorists (e.g., Elbourne 2010, Heim 1992) argue that this peculiar feature of non-doxastic ascriptions is due to a difference in presuppositions of the embedded clauses and can be satisfactorily explained in terms of presupposition projection. Based on this account, Elbourne argues that Frege-Strawson theory of definite descriptions – which claims that ‘The F is G’ presupposes the existence of the F and does not assert it – is superior to Russell’s proposal. However, the problem is that the failure of substitutivity in attitude ascriptions is not strictly related to presuppositions. As I will argue, the substitutivity also fails when there is no apparent presuppositional difference between the embedded clauses; consider:

(3) Fred lied in a court iff Fred was in a court at least once and Fred lied in a court.

(4) Anna regrets that Fred lied in a court iff Anna regrets that Fred was in a court at least once and that Fred lied in a court.

In my presentation, I will discuss the problem concerning substitutivity in the scope of non-doxastic attitude ascriptions and argue that Heim-Elbourne account is incorrect. In particular, I will show that once we appreciate that the problem is not strictly related to presuppositions, we have no longer a basis to reject standard quantificational account of descriptions in favor of Frege-Strawson theory.

References:

Elbourne, P., (2010), “The Existence Entailments of Definite Descriptions”, *Linguistics and Philosophy* 33: 1-10.

Heim, I., (1992), “Presuppositions Projection and Semantic of Attitude Verbs”, *Journal of Semantics* 9: 183-221.

Section: Philosophy of Language
Language: English
Chair: Viktoria Knoll
Date: 14:30-15:00, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.007




Wojciech Rostworowski (University of Warsaw, Poland)

Wojciech Rostworowski is a doctoral candidate at the Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology, at the University of Warsaw. His main interests focus on analytical philosophy of language, in particular, theories of reference, descriptions and attitude ascriptions. His dissertation concerns the semantics of definite descriptions. He published in international journals “Kriterion” and “Philosophia”.

E-Mail: wrostwor@wp.pl

Two Wittgensteinian approaches to religious beliefs

Stanisław Ruczaj

 In my talk, I will assess two different approaches to the nature of religious beliefs, both inspired by Wittgenstein’s philosophy and both ascribing a central role to the notion of seeing an aspect. What particularly interests me is how well they deal with the problem of doxastic inertness of religious beliefs (PDI).

PDI has the following form: a rational unbeliever may be presented with various philosophical proofs for the existence of God, and even though she would accept the premises of these arguments as true and the reasoning as valid, she would not accept a conclusion (i.e., become a believer herself). How can we explain this situation without accusing the unbeliever of irrationality?

The first approach, based on “Philosophical Investigations”, has recently found exposition in works of N. K. Verbin. According to Verbin,

religious beliefs function analogously to perceiving aspects of gestalt figures, such as duck-rabbit. Just as one can see the figure as a picture of duck or as a picture of rabbit, one can see the landscape as a creation of God or certain event as a miracle. Accepting a proof is not enough to elicit such a perception, hence the unbeliever described above is not irrational.

I argue that Verbin's approach does not take us very far. Consider a person who is not able to see God in events of her life or see the world as created. While Verbin grants that such a person is not irrational in the standard (propositional attitude-related) sense of the word, she suffers from another kind of cognitive defect, i.e. "aspect-blindness". The charge of irrationality is therefore replaced by the charge of being "blind" to certain aspects of reality. Surely these two diagnoses are equally uncharitable to the unbeliever!

Another approach is based on Wittgenstein's "Lecture on Ethics". There, Wittgenstein also applies the language of seeing an aspect to religion. However, the philosophy of language that underlies his analysis blocks the uncharitable consequences of Verbin's approach. Religious propositions lack any sense. Therefore, one cannot accuse someone who does not see the world religiously of failing to see something (of being blind to certain features of reality), because there is literally nothing out there that can be seen. Whatever the religious way of seeing the world amounts to, it is not something that can be expressed in meaningful terms. Thus, PDI does not present a serious reason for charging the unbeliever with irrationality of any kind.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Yannic Kappes
Date: 18:00-18:30, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: HS E.002




Stanisław Ruczaj (Jagiellonian University, Poland)

My master's thesis was devoted to Soren Kierkegaard's philosophy. Currently I am completing my PhD thesis on the topic of religious belief formation.

E-Mail: stanislaw.ruczaj@gmail.com

Essentiality without Necessity

Petter Sandstad

 It is widely accepted that if a property is essential then it is necessary. Against this I present numerous counterexamples from biology and chemistry, which fall into two groups: (I) A property is essential to a genus or species, yet some instances of this genus or species do not have this essential property. (II) A property is essential to a genus, yet some species of this genus do not have this essential property. I discuss and reject four minor objections against the denial of the claim. Then I discuss in depth whether a distinction between constitutive and consequential essence is able to handle these counterexamples. I conclude that this distinction is better put as one between (1) the essence as the real definition and substantial universal, which is necessary, and (2) the essential properties which follow from the essence, are non-substantial universals, and are not formally necessary.

Keywords: Essential properties, necessary properties, exceptions

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Eirini Georgia Mandopoulou
Date: 14:35-15:05, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004



Petter Sandstad (Universität Rostock, Germany)

I am a doctoral student in philosophy at Universität Rostock (third year), working on formal causation in Aristotle and contemporary philosophy. Before that I studied at the university of Oslo.

E-Mail: Petter.Sandstad@gmail.com

Bioethics Committees and Collective Moral Responsibility

Lovro Savic

Bioethics committees emerged as a consequence of the increasing need of state's parliaments, governments, public and political institutions, hospitals, clinical and research centers to acquire advices and recommendations on ethical questions yielded by developments in biomedical sciences (Düwell, 2013). Advices and recommendations of the bioethics committees are seen as a source of guidance in the cases of pressing and socially relevant situations in which there are different and conflicting ways of intervention available. In these cases, bioethics committees are often appealed to by decision-makers for a counsel and provisions of recommendations concerning different interventions such as formulations of various policies and regulations (MacDougall, 2013). However, bioethics committees are not the ideal or perfect way for dealing with uncertainty, disagreement, and pressing dilemmas (Thompson, 2004, p. 286) in hospital, biomedical and broader research settings. That is, bioethics committees are susceptible to the provision of wrong and faulty advices and recommendation which can sometimes end in serious harm to the society.

Therefore, the question remains whether and to what extent bioethics committees can be held morally responsible and accountable for the outcomes of their advices. In other words, the question is whether bioethics committee can be held as an appropriate target of blame, resentment, indignation (Kozuch and McKenna, 2016, p. 92) or some form of compensation for the resulted wrongdoing of their decisions.

In this talk, I will argue that bioethical committees can be held morally responsible for the outcome of their advices even when bioethics committees merely advise but do not put forward the final decisions. If my account of bioethics committee's collective moral responsibility, which I will discuss in my talk, is plausible, it might bear some repercussions for the practice of bioethics in the institutional settings and for the exemption of bioethicists-as-advisers from accountability for the harmful outcomes of their advices. I will first provide a brief overview of the structure, functions and goals of bioethics committees. Second, I will investigate existing theories of responsibility of advisers provided by Thompson (Thompson, 1983) and show that, when applied, bioethics

committees cannot be morally responsible for the harmful consequences of their advices. Finally, I will argue that bioethics committees can be ascribed with only collective moral responsibility if the following conditions are met:

- (1) Bioethics committees are moral agents,
- (2) they function as a We-mode group (See: Mäkelä and Tuomela 2002 and Tuomela, 2013)
- (3) their advices and recommendations result from their collective expertise (role, See: Thompson, 1983) and authority (based on the group's collective structure, See: Tuomela, 2007)

References:

- Düwell, M., 2013. *Bioethics: Methods, Theories, Domains*. Routledge.
- Kozuch, B., McKenna, M., 2016. Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Mental Illness, in: Moseley, D.D., Gala, G. (Eds.), *Philosophy and Psychiatry: Problems, Intersections and New Perspectives*. Routledge.
- MacDougall, D.R., 2013. Liberalism, authority, and bioethics commissions. *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics* 34.
- Mäkelä, P., Tuomela, R., 2002. Group Action and Group Responsibility. *Protosociology* 16.
- Thompson, D., 1983. Ascribing Responsibility to Advisers in Government. *Ethics* 93, 546–560.
- Thompson, D.F., 2004. *Restoring Responsibility: Ethics in Government, Business, and Healthcare*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK; New York.
- Tuomela, R., 2013. *Social Ontology: Collective Intentionality and Group Agents*. OUP USA.
- Tuomela, R., 2007. Group Responsibility, in: *The Philosophy of Sociality*. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 233–253.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Michael Klenk
Date: 11:10-11:40, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003




Lovro Savic (University of Groningen , Netherlands)

Lovro Savic is a second year student at the Faculty of Philosophy (Department of Ethics, Social and Political Philosophy) – University of Groningen, the Netherlands. His main research interests include Philosophy of Psychiatry, Bioethics, Philosophy of Pseudoscience, and Collective Moral Responsibility. He has published articles and reviews in “Bioethics”, “Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics”, “Medicine, Healthcare and Philosophy” and “RIFAJunior”.

E-Mail: l.savic@student.rug.nl

Sind Parthenoten wirklich keine Embryonen?

Hannah Schickl

 In der ethischen und rechtlichen Debatte wird überwiegend davon ausgegangen, dass menschliche Parthenoten keine Embryonen sind und sie aus diesem Grund auch nicht unter denselben normativen Schutz fallen wie menschliche Embryonen. Daher gelten aus Parthenoten gewonnene Stammzellen im Forschungs-, Anwendungs- und Patentierungskontext als ethisch vertretbare bzw. rechtlich zulässige Alternative zu embryonalen Stammzellen. Angeheizt wurde die Debatte dabei von den beiden sich widersprechenden Urteilen des Europäischen Gerichtshofes von 2011 und 2014 zu dieser Frage.

Die Annahme, dass Parthenoten keine Embryonen sind, stützt sich im Wesentlichen auf zwei Argumente: 1. Menschliche Parthenoten können sich nur bis zum Blastozystenstadium entwickeln, 2. um sich über das Blastozystenstadium hinaus weiterentwickeln zu können, bedürfen sie einer zusätzlichen genetischen Manipulation. Das erste Argument verweist auf das Kriterium der Totipotenz, d.h. der Entwicklungsfähigkeit zu einem (geborenen) Menschen, das als zentral angesehen wird für die Zuschreibung des Begriffes “menschlicher Embryo” zu einer bestimmten Entität. Der Vortrag wird die Frage untersuchen, ob ein eingeschränktes Entwicklungspotenzial und der Bedarf an zusätzlichen externen Bedingungen Ausschlusskriterien darstellen für die Zuschreibung des Begriffes “menschlicher Embryo”. Vor dem Hintergrund, dass sich faktisch ca. 80 % aller Embryonen in vitro und in vivo nicht bis

zur Geburt entwickeln und sich auch bestimmte Subklassen von Embryonen innerhalb der Extension des Begriffes “menschlicher Embryo” typischerweise nicht bis zur Geburt entwickeln (wie z.B. aneuploide Embryonen), macht deutlich, dass Totipotenz entgegen der gängigen Annahme keine notwendige Bedingung für die Zuschreibung des Begriffes “menschlicher Embryo” ist. Daneben stellt auch der Bedarf an zusätzlichen externen Bedingungen kein Ausschlusskriterium für die Zuschreibung des Begriffes “menschlicher Embryo” dar, da auch Embryonen in vitro und in vivo für ihre Entwicklung zahlreicher externer Bedingungen bedürfen. Ausgehend von der sich aus der Argumentation ergebenden Konklusion, dass Parthenoten (auch) Embryonen sind, wird vorgeschlagen, sie als spezifische Subklasse innerhalb der Extension des Begriffes “menschlicher Embryo” als parthenogenetische Embryonen zu bezeichnen (parallel zu z.B. aneuploiden oder anenzephalen Embryonen).

Section: Ethics
Language: German
Chair: Michael Klenk
Date: 10:35-11:05, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.003




Hannah Schickl (FAU Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany)

Ich bin Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Lehrstuhl für Systematische Theologie II (Ethik) an der Friedrich-Alexander-Universität Erlangen-Nürnberg und arbeite dort an dem Projekt “Bioethik an der Schnittstelle zwischen Forschung, Therapie und Kommerzialisierung” innerhalb des Bayerischen Verbundprojektes “Humane Induzierte Pluripotente Stammzellen” (ForIPS). Ich promoviere in Philosophie zu dem moralischen Status menschlicher Embryonen bei Frau Prof. Dr. Ursula Wolf an der Universität Mannheim. Ich habe Philosophie/Ethik und Germanistik an den Universitäten Mannheim und Heidelberg studiert und 2012 mein Erstes Staatsexamen abgelegt.

E-Mail: hannah.schickl@fau.de

How to think about Weakness of Will?

Clemens Emanuel Schlink

 here are two levels of how to think about weakness of will. The first is ambivalence where the weakness lies with the agent who cannot form a will. The second sort of weakness lies with the agent who cannot maintain her will. I am interested in the latter which I suppose is also the more common understanding of the phenomenon of weakness of will.

Suppose you judge it best to read a paper right now without any further delay. You also have the opportunity, however, to watch the football game that is on right now. Subsequently you give in and watch the football game. You justify this to yourself by thinking that there is enough time to read the paper later. In doing so you act akratic. Most contemporary philosophers take weakness of will to be equivalent with akrasia. I will call this the “standard theory”. The “standard theory” then holds that weakness of will consists in acting against one’s best judgment.

There are, however, cases where agents act akratic but not weak-willed and vice versa. The “standard theory” must be refuted because it cannot properly accommodate cases of weakness of will without akrasia. Because it takes desires as its basis it is vulnerable to judgment shifts. Richard Holton takes this as the starting point to his undertaking to understand weakness of will differently than the mainstream theorists. He argues for an understanding of weakness of will as the violation of an agent’s resolution.

Because resolutions are a special kind of intention it is important to have a look at the properties of intentions first. Drawing on the work of Michael Bratman I am going to show that we can expect intentions to have a certain stability. Holton claims that an agent acts weak-willed if it overreadily abandons her resolution. Consequently you would act weak-willed in the example if you would have resolved – and not just thought best – to read the paper without any further delay.

This talk has the modest aim to critically assess Holton’s view and examine its plausibility with the help of drawing on literature that is critical with the somewhat unique account Holton is arguing for. Ultimately I am arguing that Holton’s view of weakness of will as the violation of one’s resolutions is superior to the “standard theory”. Weakness

of will is best understood as the violation of one's resolutions.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Florian Leonhard Wüstholtz
Date: 15:45-16:15, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005



Clemens Emanuel Schlink (Universität Hamburg, Germany)
Clemens Emanuel Schlink received his B.A. in Politics from the TU Darmstadt in 2012 and holds M.A.'s in both, Political Philosophy from the University of York, UK in 2013 and Philosophy from the University of Hamburg in 2016.

He is about to start his PhD in Philosophy at the FU Berlin. His dissertation explores the significance of personal commitments for human agency.

Current research interests include metaethics, action theory, as well as political philosophy.

E-Mail: clemens_schlink@hotmail.com

Gibt es Propositionen? Hofwebers Einwände gegen die sog. einfachen Argumente.

Matthias Schürmann

Die Frage, ob es Propositionen gibt, ist Gegenstand einer kontrovers geführten Debatte. Vertreter sog. einfacher Argumente sind der Auffassung, dass sich die Frage nach der Existenz von Propositionen durch eine zweischrittige Überlegung bejahen lässt. Gegen die Auffassung hat Thomas Hofweber Einwände erhoben, die er in kondensierter Form im zweiten und dritten Kapitel von "Ontology and the Ambitions of Metaphysics" darlegt. Er argumentiert gegen diese einfachen Argumente nicht ausgehend von theoretischen Überlegungen im Zusammenhang mit ontologischen Fragestellungen, sondern anhand von bestimmten Phänomenen des natürlichen Sprachgebrauchs. Es handelt es sich dabei um einen

um das Phänomen einer strukturbedingten Fokussierung, zum anderen um das der Mehrdeutigkeit von Quantoren.

In meinem Vortrag werde ich darlegen, dass Hofwebers Einwände gegen die einfachen Argumente für die Existenz von Propositionen nicht überzeugend sind. Das Vorliegen einer strukturbedingten Fokussierung hat nur für einfache Argumente, welche die Existenz von Zahlen betreffen, unliebsame Konsequenzen. Die These, dass in den einfachen Argumenten für die Existenz von Propositionen bestimmte Ausdrücke als singuläre Terme verwendet werden, ist davon nicht betroffen. In der Auseinandersetzung mit der Mehrdeutigkeit von Quantoren argumentiere ich dafür, dass Hofwebers Beispiele nicht zeigen, was sie zeigen sollen. Sie machen zwar deutlich, dass Quantoren in der natürlichen Sprache mehrdeutig sind. Aber erst Beispiele von wahren Aussagen eines bestimmten Typs, in denen singuläre Terme verwendet werden, die tatsächlich auf keinen Gegenstand Bezug nehmen, liefern einen Einwand gegen die einfachen Argumente. Da sich solche Beispiele bei Hofweber nicht finden lassen, bleibt auch diese These der einfachen Argumente für die Existenz von Propositionen unbestritten.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: German
Chair: Thomas Spiegel
Date: 16:50-17:20, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.004



Matthias Schürmann (Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg, Germany)

Ich bin Doktorand bei Andreas Kemmerling an der Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg und beschäftige mich in meiner Dissertation mit dem ontologischen Status von Propositionen. Den Bachelor in Philosophie erlangte ich an der Philipps-Universität Marburg mit einer Abschlussarbeit über G. Frege. Für das Masterstudium der Philosophie wechselte ich an die Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg. Neben Fragestellungen aus dem Bereich der Ontologie interessiere ich mich insbesondere auch für solche aus den Bereichen der Sprachphilosophie und der Philosophie des Geistes.

E-Mail: Schuerm3@yahoo.de

Explaining Fuzzy Concepts with Prototype Frames

Annika Schuster

The prototype theory of concepts assumes that the meaning of certain concepts is constituted by their proximity to the prototype of the category to which the concept belongs. The prototype is commonly understood as a summary representation of weighted properties and the proximity to a category's prototype is called the concept's typicality for that category. Something is typical for a category when it shares many important properties with the prototype and untypical when it shares only few and unimportant properties with the prototype. The importance of properties is determined by their diagnosticity, which reflects the possibility to discriminate instances by means of that property. Thus, the more typical a concept is for its category, the more highly diagnostic properties it shares with its category's prototype.

An advantage of prototype theory is that it can explain category membership for concepts for which the classical theory offer no or no satisfying definition in terms of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions. For example, being able to fly cannot be part of the classical definition of birds, because not all birds can fly (like penguins and ostriches). Still, being able to fly is a very important property of birds and it discriminates them from many sibling categories, thus it has a high diagnosticity. In prototype theory, the property being able to fly receives a high diagnosticity value by which it captures that it is an important property for birds, but at the same time does not require all birds to fly.

In my talk, I want to present a special representation of prototype concepts: prototype frames. Based on the frame theory proposed in (Barsalou, 1992) and developed in (Petersen, 2007, Löbner, 2014, Schurz & Votsis, 2014), I will construct prototype frames to represent fuzzy concepts as attribute-value structures containing diagnosticities on each level. Then I will discuss different measures of typicality and diagnosticity, and present how prototype frames can deal with the most prominent criticism of prototype theory: the failure of compositionality.


Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Mandy Stake
Date: 10:35-11:05, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005



Annika Schuster (Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf, Germany)
Annika Schuster (B.A.) studied philosophy and linguistics (minor) at the Heinrich-Heine-University Duesseldorf. She is a research fellow at the CRC991: The Structure of Representations in Language, Cognition, and Science, in the subproject D01: Frame representation of prototype concepts and prototype-based reasoning.
E-Mail: aschuster@phil.hhu.de

Prima-Facie und Nicht-Inferentielle Rechtfertigung sowie grundsätzliche Fallibilität – Grundcharakteris- tika eines Ethischen Intuitionismus

Markus Seethaler

 In den letzten Jahren kam es in der Moralphilosophie zu einer wahren Renaissance des ethischen Intuitionismus. Robert Audi, Michael Huemer und andere greifen Ideen von Henry Sidgwick, G.E. Moore und W.D. Ross auf und entwickeln diese zu einem moderaten und elaborierten Intuitionismus weiter. Wie in den meisten Bereichen der Philosophie ist die Feststellung der Ausgangsposition strittig. Es gibt nicht nur eine Definition dafür, was unter einem “ethischen Intuitionismus” zu verstehen ist. Sowohl bezüglich der Frage, was genau Intuitionen sind, als auch jener, wie uns diese mit Rechtfertigung ausstatten, gibt es keine übereinstimmende Meinung. Eine entscheidende Frage für den ethischen Diskurs ist, ob sich ein belastbares und grundlegendes Verständnis von Intuitionen finden lässt, auf dem eine weitere ethische Debatte aufbauen kann.

Dieser Grundlage möchte ich mich annähern, indem ich definierende Charakteristika eines ethischen Intuitionismus identifiziere. Mein Ziel ist zu zeigen, dass folgende Merkmale entscheidend für eine moderate

Theorie zu anschaulich gegebenem Wissen sind, welche sich nicht auf dogmatische Positionen zurückziehen muss:

1. Intuitionen statten uns mit prima-facie Rechtfertigung aus.
2. Bei der Rechtfertigung handelt es sich um eine, die nicht-inferentiell zustande kommt.
3. Wir sind grundsätzlich fallibel in Bezug auf anschauungsbasiertes Wissen.

Zunächst werde ich zeigen, dass sich diese fundamentalen Aspekte in aktuellen intuitionistischen Ethiken finden lassen. Dies werde ich anhand der Theorien von Huemer und Audi darstellen. Huemer steht dabei stellvertretend für die Sichtweise, die Intuitionen als eine besondere Form von Seemings (also dem, was uns der Fall zu sein scheint) interpretiert. Audi dagegen nimmt seinen Ausgang bei selbstevidenten Propositionen.

In einem zweiten Schritt werde ich argumentieren, dass sich dieses Verständnis von Intuitionen als definierende Grundlage eignet, um eine weitere Beschäftigung in der Ethik zu ermöglichen.

Section: Ethics
Language: German
Chair: Enno Fischer
Date: 16:15-16:45, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003



Markus Seethaler (Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, Österreich)
Currently, I am working on my Ph.D in philosophy at the University of Graz, Austria. My focus is ethical intuitionism and moral disagreement. In 2014 I completed my diploma (Mag. phil.) at the University of Graz. My research interest revolves around practical philosophy, especially Kantian ethics and ethical intuitionism.
E-Mail: markus.seethaler@edu.uni-graz.at

Understanding as an Activity: The Role of Apt Reasoning in Understanding

Shambhavi Shankar & Torsten Nies

Epistemologists' traditional focus on propositional knowledge has recently shifted towards understanding (De Regt 2005; Elgin 2006; Grimm 2006; Kvanvig 2003; Pritchard 2009; Zagzebski 2001). Whereas knowledge consists of atomistic propositions, understanding additionally requires connections – broadly construed – between them. In this paper, we urge a new conception of understanding, arguing that it obtains not when an agent is merely in possession of the right beliefs and connections, but only when the agent actively draws the connections between her beliefs. In other words, understanding is justified true beliefs plus the exercise of apt reasoning to connect these beliefs.

If an agent understands something, then she is able to i) explain the connections between her propositions (Grimm 2010), ii) predict qualitatively characteristic consequences of said propositions (De Regt 2005), iii) answer “what-if-things-had-been-different?” questions (Woodward 2003) and iv) apply her knowledge to closely-related problems (De Regt 2009). All these abilities require an agent to exercise her reasoning faculties. Said differently, if an agent understands something, she is able to apply apt reasoning to her justified true beliefs.

Reasoning is an individual activity; the agent needs to do it for and by herself. Others can only present the results of their reasoning to the agent, but cannot reason on her behalf. Therefore, agents must individually and actively pursue understanding by exercising their reasoning. Further, this dynamic aspect of understanding prevents us from reducing it to mere atomistic propositions and their connections. In short, an agent fails to have understanding if she does not actively connect her beliefs by way of apt reasoning.

This picture of understanding makes three significant contributions to the literature: Firstly, it identifies a substantive difference between understanding and knowledge. Secondly, it clarifies why understanding is a cognitive achievement worthy of praise. Lastly, it explains why two agents, possessing the same propositions, may come to have different degrees of understanding.

References

- De Regt, Henk W. (2009). “The Epistemic Value of Understanding”. In: *Philosophy of Science* 76, pp. 585–597.
- De Regt, Henk W. and Dennis Dieks (2005). “A Contextual Approach to Scientific Understanding”. In: *Synthese* 144, pp. 137-170.
- Elgin, Catherine Z. (2006). “From Knowledge to Understanding”. In: *Epistemology Futures*. Clarendon Press, pp. 199–215.
- Grimm, Stephen R. (2006). “Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge?” In: *The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science* 57, pp. 515–535.
- Grimm, Stephen R. (2010). *Understanding*. Oxford University Press.
- Kvanvig, Jonathan L. (2003). *The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding*. Cambridge University Press.
- Pritchard, Duncan (2009). “Knowledge, Understanding and Epistemic Value”. In: *Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement* 64, pp. 19–43.
- Woodward, James (2003). *Making Things Happen: A Causal Theory of Explanation*.
- Zagzebski, Linda (2001). “Recovering Understanding”. In: *Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue*. Oxford University Press New York, pp. 235–252.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Giada Fratantonio
Date: 15:45-16:15, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002



Shambhavi Shankar (University of Bayreuth, Germany)

I am currently an M.A. student at the University of Bayreuth’s Philosophy & Economics program, set to graduate in December 2016. Presently, I am a visiting researcher at the CPNSS program at LSE. My work pertains to the philosophy of mind in general, and reasons for belief in specific. My other academic interests include political philosophy and metaethics. I intend to continue research in one of these areas at the PhD level next year.

E-Mail: shambhavi.shankar@stmail.uni-bayreuth.de




Torsten Nies (University of Bayreuth, Germany)

I am reading for an M.A. in Philosophy & Economics at the University of Bayreuth, where I expect to graduate in December 2016. Currently, I am a visiting researcher at the CPNSS program at LSE. My work pertains to topics in epistemology in general and understanding in specific. My current interests include social epistemology, belief revision, and network theory. I intend to continue research in one of these areas at the PhD level next year.

E-Mail: torsten.nies@stmail.uni-bayreuth.de

Re-Inspecting Inequality

Abhay Nidhi Sharma

he paper re-examines the idea of Inequality and again challenges the idea that Inequality is man-made and proposes that every Inequality is a direct or an indirect result of natural selection process. The theory is backed by exploring the relationship between the evolution of inequality and the evolution of societies. The paper then accepts that Inequality is an issue impacting humanity and hence classifies the inequalities in an order called “Natural Priorities”. These Natural Priorities are listed in descending order of priorities, based on popular belief and uses research Center for Survey Research and Analysis at the University of Connecticut, International Social Survey Programme and Pew Research Center This classification hence becomes a precursor to the last idea put forward in the paper i.e. Populist Approach. Under the Populist Approach, the paper asserts that social problems can only be solved if there is a popular demand for them to be resolved. Hence, government and other world organizations should prepare a list of Natural Priorities, which is regularly updated and reviewed, based on regular surveys done. Because of the elements proposed i.e. Natural Priorities and Populist Approach, the ideas presented in the paper can be used by various national and international organizations to reassess the efforts needed to address the issue of inequality.

Section: Political Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Maciej Juzaszek
Date: 17:25-17:55, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.006




Abhay Nidhi Sharma (Total Nurture Technologies, India)

I am an Engineer by degree, Technology by Profession but writer/thinker by passion. I have written several political articles in online magazines. As such I have never had a formal learning in Social Sciences or Philosophy and hence I work as an individual researcher. But that's what allows me to have fresh perspective on some social issues. Inequality is one such issue, which I have read extensively on, from Rousseau to Sen to Deaton. After having worked in 3 continents, including Africa and Europe, I have unique on several social and political subjects. The summary of the paper I am looking to present has already been praised by Prof. Noam Chomsky. Also, this paper will eventually be just a part of a complete treatise I am writing on Inequality.

E-Mail: abhaynidhi17@yahoo.com

The Species Problem and an Analysis for a Criterion of Species Concept

Garry Moore Soronio

 In this paper, I argue that Aristotelian Essentialism grounds the basis of species on intrinsic non-accidental properties of individuals, which sufficiently resolves the main concerns of the species problem, theoretical and operational, while being complimentary with contemporary evolutionary biology and has the capacity to subsume under it the major species concepts in use. I will first discuss the species problem, and derive a criteria for good species concepts: (1) applicability, (2) non-arbitrariness and (3) compatibility with evolutionary theory criteria. These criteria are grounded on the notion that species is the basic unit in taxonomy, biodiversity and evolution. Second, I will illustrate how widely accepted species concepts, while capable of unifying certain organisms into distinct groups, do not

pass one or two of the criterion. Third, I will introduce the dominant biological species concept of Mayr, counting species as interbreeding populations that are reproductively isolated. Then I will discuss how Mayr's biospecies concept was developed into the thesis that species are individuals, and will argue that this suffers from analogous problems of synchronic and diachronic identity of individuals. Fourth, I will argue that Aristotelian essentialism, contrary to popular belief, is compatible with contemporary evolutionary theory. Together with this, I will explain how essentialism addresses sufficiently the species problem, passing the rest of the aforementioned conditions. Finally, I will argue that Aristotelian essentialism is capable of accommodating other major species concepts grounded on various principles, and as such can salvage the contemporary operations of the different sciences using various species concepts.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Matthew Baxendale
Date: 14:30-15:00, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.006




Garry Moore Soronio (University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA))

I, Garry Moore Soronio, studied at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) double major in philosophy and history. I have presented and published multiple philosophy papers for undergraduate conferences within the United States and abroad. The paper topics range from philosophy of biology, philosophy of religion, medieval philosophy, early modern philosophy, philosophy of physics and ethics. I founded a Forum Club in UCLA and prepare talks for weekly discussion on different Western thinkers from Aristotle, Aquinas and Anselm to Galileo, Descartes and Kant. I have an associate degree in the biological and physical sciences and history from my junior college, College of the Canyons.

E-Mail: gmbSORONIO@hotmail.com, gmbSORONIO@ucla.edu

Carnap-Categoricity and the Question of Logicality

Sebastian G.W. Speitel

espite logic having experienced a far-reaching expansion of its methods, scope and subject matter over the last century the “first-order thesis” (Barwise 1985), i.e. the position that the predicate calculus with its usual logical constants occupies a “privileged role in our thought” (Feferman 1999, 32) and enjoys a special status among all “logics”, remains prevalent and widespread. Whatever the merits of a precise delineation of a domain of the logical along the lines of standard first-order quantification theory, attempts to establish the exceptional status of this particular logical system have tended to suffer from a lack of a criterion that is both, formally precise and philosophically informative.

In his paper “Which Logic is the Right Logic”, Leslie Tharp remarks with respect to the standard universal and existential quantifier that “[o]ne can consider stronger quantifiers, but one does not have as clear a grasp of their meaning” (Tharp 1975, 18) without further elaborating why and how this is the case. Following recent work by Denis Bonnay and Dag Westerståhl (forthcoming) on Carnap’s Problem - the underdetermination of the model-theoretic meanings of the logical constants by the standard proof-systems, - this talk aims at making Tharp’s remark precise and to transform it into an adequacy constraint on any system to qualify as logical.

Following this, we continue to sketch how this constraint might help a proponent of the first-order thesis preferring a semantic approach to the delineation of the logical constants defend her position.

References

- Barwise, J., “Model-theoretic Logics: Background and Aims”, in: *Model-theoretic Logics*, J. Barwise and S. Feferman (eds.), New York 1985, pp. 3–23.
- Bonnay, D. and Westerståhl, D., “Compositionality Solves Carnap’s Problem”, *Erkenntnis*, forthcoming, pp. 1–19.
- Feferman, S., “Logic, Logics, and Logicism”, *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 40/1, 1999, pp. 31–54.
- Tharp, L., “Which Logic is the Right Logic?”, *Synthese* 31/1, 1975, pp. 1–21.

Section: Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics
Language: English
Chair: Hasen Khudairi
Date: 11:50-12:20, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005




Sebastian G.W. Speitel (UC San Diego, USA)

I am a graduate student in Philosophy at UC San Diego, working on topics in the philosophy of logic and their connections to issues in the philosophy of science. In the philosophy of logic I am particularly interested in the delineation problem of the logical constants, and here specifically in combined approaches to it.

E-Mail: sebastian.speitel@gmail.com

Is Naturalism Coherent?

Thomas Spiegel

aturalism is the current philosophical orthodoxy. However, the content of naturalism is unclear. I aim to demonstrate that naturalism cannot be formulated coherently. Naturalism here is understood as methodological naturalism, the idea that “philosophy is continuous with science” (Quine 1960). This is commonly understood as saying that philosophy should only make statements that can be countenanced by the standpoint of science. This construal presupposes the unity of science. The unity of science claims that the entities and laws of the special sciences can be reduced to a master science, commonly identified as physics.

I briefly rehearse two lessons from Fodor (1974) and Horgan (1993). Fodor convincingly argued against the inter-level reducibility of special science laws to the laws of physics. Horgan’s argument starts with the observation that a sensible version of reductive physicalism has to be cashed out in terms of supervenience. But, he shows, no available conception of supervenience accounts for reductive physicalism. Hence, the naturalist simply cannot entitle herself to an uncontroversial notion of the unity of science that is presupposed by naturalism.

However, even if the naturalist can establish the unity of science

thesis, it is subject to an argument from incoherence. The methodological commitment states that in philosophy only those claims can be made which are countenanced from the standpoint of natural science. This is the standard for philosophical practice set by naturalism. And naturalism is itself a philosophical thesis. But naturalism qua methodological commitment cannot be countenanced from the standpoint of natural science. The claim that philosophical practice should only include statements that can be countenanced from the standpoint of science, is itself not a statement that is countenanced by natural science. Since this standard was set by naturalism qua methodological commitment, I conclude that naturalism turns out to be an incoherent doctrine.

Bibliography

Fodor, Jerry (1974): “Special Sciences (or the Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis)”, *Synthese* 28:2, 97–115.

Horgan, Terence (1993): “From supervenience to superdupervenience”, *Mind* 102, 555–586.

Quine, Williard V. O. (1960): *Word and Object*, MIT Press.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Julio de Rizzo
Date: 11:50-12:20, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



Thomas Spiegel (University of Leipzig, Germany)

Born in Berlin 1986

Undergraduate degree earned from Free University Berlin, 2010

Mphil stud earned from King’s College London, 2012

PhD candidate at the University of Leipzig, since Fall 2013

Visiting scholar at Keio University (2014) and University of Pittsburgh (2015-16)

E-Mail: thomas.j.spiegel@gmail.com

Sorites Paradoxes and the Legacy of the Ideal Language Approach

Jan Stěpanek

Bertrand Russell was among the first philosophers to comment on the problem of vagueness during the resurgence of philosophical interest in sorites paradoxes early in the twentieth century. His solution consists in banishing all vague terms from the realm of logic, since logic can only be applied when precise terms are used. This “ideal language approach” doesn’t belong among the most prominent even though its proponents were influential philosophers like Frege and Quine.

Most of the contemporary approaches to solving sorites paradoxes agree that logic applies even to vague terms. They, however differ in their opinions regarding how logic should be applied when dealing with vague terms or even which logic should be utilized. Epistemicists, for example, believe that it is only our ignorance that prevents us from distinguishing clearly between cases to which vague terms apply and cases to which it doesn’t. Supervaluationists claim that we need to consider different sharpenings or precisifications of vague terms in question. Degree theorists assert that since possessing a vague property is a matter of degree, so should be truth value we assign to sentences containing vague predicates. These are just a few of responses to sorites paradoxes.

In my talk I would like to show that most of modern approaches to solving sorites paradoxes share a common feature with the ideal language approach. So even though ideal language approach plays only a marginal role in a contemporary discussion of vagueness, it still can reveal substantial details regarding vagueness and logic itself.

Section: Philosophy of Language
 Language: English
 Chair: Meagan Phillips
 Date: 11:15-11:45, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
 Location: SR 1.007



Jan Stěpanek (Masaryk University, Czech Republic)
 Jan Stěpanek. Masaryk University, Brno. 2010 baccalaureate in phi-

losophy; thesis on Tarski's semantical concept of truth; 2013 master in philosophy; thesis on sorites paradoxes. Publications in logic and analytic.

E-Mail: honza.stepanek@mail.muni.cz

Shared attention as requirement for self-consciousness?

Mandy Stake

A recent hypothesis suggests that the ability to participate in a situation of shared attention can be seen as a requirement for understanding another person's perspective. Taking another person's perspective is often labeled with the term "second-person-perspective", which seems to differ significantly from first person- and third person-perspective. Unfortunately, it is not quite clear which epistemic surplus the second-person-perspective can provide compared to the other two perspectives.

In the first step of my talk, I will sketch a suitable meaning of "second-person-perspective". In a second step, I will try to explain why this concept is useful for an understanding of the notion of self-consciousness. The assumption I want to defend is that the phenomenon of shared attention is indeed a requirement for second-person-perspective and, therefore, for self-consciousness.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Date: 15:05-15:35, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



Mandy Stake (IWE, University of Bonn / INM-8, FZ Jülich, Germany)


Since December 2015, I am a research fellow and PhD student both at the Institute for Science and Ethics (Institut für Wissenschaft und Ethik, IWE) of the University of Bonn and at the Institute of Neuroscience and Medicine - Ethics in the Neurosciences (INM-8) at the

Research Centre Jülich (Forschungszentrum Jülich). For my thesis, I currently research in the field of philosophy of mind, especially to questions concerning self-consciousness and representation.

E-Mail: stake@iwe.uni-bonn.de

On some Problems with Fodors Causal Theory of Content

Jessica Struchhold

 In his book “Psychosemantics” (1987) Jerry A. Fodor develops a causal theory of content which answers the question how it is possible for one thing “X” to mean another thing X or how it is possible for thoughts to be about things. According to Jerry A. Fodor’s theory of content mental representations are meaningful in virtue of a causal connection between a mental representation and their objects in the world. If I have a desire, this desire has often an influence on my subsequent actions. But how do mental representations get their contents? How can contents be physically realized or naturalized?

Fodor answers this question with his crude causal theory which starts with the proposal that that a symbol expresses a property if it is nomologically necessary that all and only instances of the property P cause tokenings of the symbol S. This first version of an analysis obviously fails because of two problems: (1) it seems implausible that all instances of P should cause tokenings of S. And (2) the proposal seems implausible, because it does not allow misrepresentation. According to (2) it would be impossible to mistake for example a horse for a cow in bad lighting conditions. If it is possible that horses sometimes cause cow-representations, this leads to the disjunctive problem. In his second, modified proposal Fodor offers a solution to the disjunctive problem by arguing that there is an asymmetrical dependency upon Ps causing ‘S’s.

In my talk I focus on the second proposal and discuss one famous critique that has been offered by Fred Adams and Kenneth Aizawa in their paper ““X” means X: Semantics Fodor-Style” (1992) in which they’re arguing that Fodors conditions are open to objections in a sense that they are both too strong and too weak. I will reconstruct their arguments and show that Fodor’s conception has some serious flaws.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Mandy Stake
Date: 10:00-10:30, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005



Jessica Struchhold (Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Germany)

Jessica Struchhold (B.A.), Studium der Philosophie und Germanistik an der Heinrich-Heine-Universität in Düsseldorf. 2016 Bachelor of Arts in Philosophie mit einer Arbeit über Jerry A. Fodors These einer Sprache des Geistes.

E-Mail: struchhold@phil.hhu.de

An Even Safer Place for Epistemic Normativity

Gábor Tasnádi

According to William P. Alston “the deontological conception of epistemic justification is viable only if beliefs are sufficiently under voluntary control to render deontic concepts applicable to them.” The problem is, he claims, that we do not possess sufficient voluntary control (VC) over our beliefs. Instead of arguing for doxastic voluntarism, or rejecting the “Ought” implies “Can” principle (OC) (which is supposed to motivate Alston’s argument) Philippe Chuard and Nicholas Southwood try to make “the world a slightly safer place for epistemic normativity” by showing that OC simply does not motivate Alston’s argument.

However, I believe their solution is too fragile. I will argue that the main threat for epistemic normativity is the idea that normative principles must be in accordance with our capacities. This claim stems from the strong reading of OC (OCS). As long as we read OC as OCS the missing link between “Ought” and VC could be established, and Alston’s argument could be complemented. Proposing a more relaxed interpretation of OC (OCW) will be the direction I take to challenge Alston’s argument.

The relevant difference between the two readings is that while OCS

is used to argue that normativity is at least partially derived from our capacities, OCW permits that the source of normativity has nothing to do with them. OCW weakens the link between VC and normativity. More precisely, by accepting OCW, we are not committed to regard the link between some deontic concepts (e.g. blameworthiness) and VC to be generally applicable to deontic claims. While blameworthiness might depend on VC, the scope of deontic claims could still not be determined by our capacities. Thus, OCW makes it possible to make distinctions within deontic terms, separating those which require VC from those which do not. This way, accounts generally taken to give up OC might remain viable options to defend epistemic normativity, since they are not required to reject OC – only OCS.

Section: Epistemology
Language: English
Chair: Giada Fratantonio
Date: 15:10-15:40, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: HS E.002




Gábor Tasnádi (KU Leuven, MPhil, Hungary)

I completed my Bachelor's and Master's degree in Budapest. During my university studies I had two main fields of interest: Kant's first Critique (especially the four Antinomies) and the contemporary free will debate. I have won second place at the analytic section of the XXXII. National Scientific Students' Associations Conference with a paper on Kant's Third Antinomy. Currently, I am studying at KU Leuven, and writing my thesis on Saul Smilansky's Joint Perspective of compatibilism and incompatibilism.

E-Mail: tasnadi90@gmail.com

Logical Pluralism, Deductive Justification, and Transmission

Elena Tassoni

ogical pluralism is, roughly, the thesis that there is more than one notion of logical validity. This thesis has been developed, among others, by Beall and Restall (2000; 2001; 2006). Recently, philosophers interested in truth pluralism – Lynch (2009); Pedersen (2014) – have been arguing that, if one endorses truth pluralism, then, given some plausible assumptions, one ought to be a pluralist about logic as well. Truth pluralism claims that there are different truth properties, which characterize different propositional domains - i.e. subject matters. Thus, truth pluralism seems to deliver a domain-specific version of Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism (DLP).

I argue that DLP is subject to the objection of mixed inferences, which Tappolet (1997) raised against truth pluralism. Mixed inferences are inferences whose premises belong to different propositional domains. The endorser of DLP claims that different domains are governed by different logics. Therefore, in evaluating the validity of a mixed inference, it is not clear which logic one should use among those of the domains involved. I consider some replies that the endorser of DLP might provide and show that they are not sufficient to sidestep the objection.

Moreover, I present a case against Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism that seems to me problematic. Like the objection of mixed inferences, the case arises when different logics are at work. Suppose we make two inferences using different logics and, later, we want to use the conclusions of these inferences as premises of a further inference. I argue that it is dubious whether this move is allowed in Beall and Restall’s pluralist framework. That is because argumentative steps are governed by different logics, and a step that is allowed by a certain logic may not be allowed by another logic. On the other hand, reason is universal in its scope, so the latter inference seems legitimate because its premises are justified by legitimate argumentative steps.

Section: Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics
Language: English
Chair: Hasen Khudairi
Date: 12:25-12:55, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



Elena Tassoni (University of Bologna, Italy)

I am a first-year PhD student at the University of Bologna. My thesis is about mixed discourse in pluralism, metaphysics, and epistemology. I am working under the supervision of Sebastiano Moruzzi and Matti Eklund. Before entering the PhD, I completed an M. Litt. at the University of St. Andrews.

E-Mail: elena.tassoni2@unibo.it

Thomas Nagel is, at bottom, not an anti-physicalist but a defender of it

Serdal Tümkaya & Aysun Sen

Contrary to what many philosophers believe, Thomas Nagel tends to believe that (though not a strong but) a weaker form of physicalism is true. What he argues against are certain sorts of physicalism: scientific, reductionistic, and naturalistic ones. His notion of physicalism (more accurately, the forms to which he objects) can be summarized as the following: an approach that is based upon common-sense, assuming the possibility of logical reductionism, granting the correctness of folk psychology, instead of explaining subjective aspects of experience ignoring it. Along the same lines, if there is really such a sort of physicalism, in the way Nagel conceives it, then the leading naturalists such as Quine and the Churchlands would denounce it. Such a kind of physicalism, I believe, is not a particular theory but an idealistic-oriented armchair philosophy. Moreover, the point for Nagel in fact is not physicalism as such but the objectivity problem. In this particular debate, Nagel should be regarded as being on the (relatively) objectivist side. On the other hand, Nagel stipulates that every physicalist explanation must be objective. In addition, he, in his 1965 article, “Physicalism”, explicitly states that a weaker form of physicalism is likely to be true. But it would be better, he argues in “What is it like to be a bat?” (1974) and “Conceiving the Impossible and the Mind-Body Problem” (1998), if we conceptually revise our mentalistic ideas. Hence, we should see him as a revisionary materialist, as he explicitly calls himself. Furthermore, since he powerfully argues against the primary tools, which recently gained excessive popularity among analytical philosophers, such as conceptual analysis, relying on

intuition, and irresponsible thought experiments, philosophical naturalism becomes one of the few practical ways for Nagel to adopt. In this work, I both argue for these and a further claim that Nagel is somewhat a naturalist and even a reductivist, under the light of his articles and books written in 1970, 1971, 1986, and 1998, such as the ones I have noted above.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Florian Leonhard Wüstholtz
Date: 12:25-12:55, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.004



Serdal Tümkaya (Middle East Technical University, Philosophy Department, Turkey)

Serdal Tümkaya is a Ph.D. student and teaching assistant in the Philosophy Department at the Middle East Technical University where he assists teaching introductory courses both for philosophy majors and psychology majors. His research interests focus on philosophical naturalism, with specific emphasis on neurophilosophy.

E-Mail: stumkaya@metu.edu.tr




Aysun Sen (Middle East Technical University, Philosophy Department, Turkey)

Aysun Sen is a third-year undergraduate student in the department of Philosophy at Middle East Technical University. She is - at the same time - a second-year double major student in the department of Sociology, and also a first-year minor student in the department of Psychology at Middle East Technical University. Her research interests focus on philosophy of sciences, with specific emphasis on social and behavioral sciences.

E-Mail: aysunsen.metu@outlook.com

On Future Generations' Present Rights

Charlotte Franziska Unruh

 In this talk, I defend the view that within a rights-based ethical framework, the moral status of future generations is best understood as that of present rightsholders. I argue that only in this way it can be justified that we have obligations towards future generations. This justification in turn is of great relevance for many issues in moral theory and applied ethics.

In the first part of the talk, I argue that the mere fact that future persons will have rights in the future does not suffice to ground present obligations. The missing link in this argumentation cannot be provided by reference to so-called non-correlative duties.

In the second part of the talk, I argue that existing is not a necessary condition for being a rightsholder. First, our own future selves as well as past generations should be said to have rights even though they do not exist at present. Second, even at present, obligations can exist without rightsholders: often enough, obligations depend on presuppositions or suspicions about other persons' existence. In these cases, rights can be ascribed to place holders, that is, relevant definitions of a set of (possible or actual) individuals whose existence or identity is unknown or indetermined. Therefore, future generations can coherently be said to have rights now that correspond to our present obligations towards them.

Section: Ethics
Language: English
Chair: Christoph Lernpaß
Date: 12:25-12:55, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.003



Charlotte Franziska Unruh (Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany) Charlotte is currently studying towards a Master's degree in Philosophy at Ruhr-University, Bochum. Her research interests focus on ethical theory, with specific emphasis on rights theories, rationality, and Kant. During her undergraduate studies at the University of Bamberg, she spent a year at the University of Prince Edward Island, Canada. She

receives a scholarship by Evangelisches Studienwerk Villigst e.V.
E-Mail: charlotte.unruh@ruhr-uni-bochum.de

Explanation, idealization, and scientific realism

Kate Vredenburg

Consider the following puzzling feature of some explanations found in the sciences: To explain some feature of the world, we say false things about it (we idealize). Even more puzzlingly, idealizations seem to be explanatory precisely because they're false, rather than explanatory in spite of their falsity.

The purported fact that idealized explanations are genuinely explanatory seems to fly in the face of scientific realism. Scientific realism takes the accurate representation of reality, including unobservable aspects thereof, to be one of the central aims of science. For the scientific realist, explanations that achieve this aim will be better, at least qua explanation, than explanations that do not.

We end up with a serious tension: Idealized explanations do not represent the way the world is in a fully accurate manner. However, for the scientific realist, explanations are better or worse insofar as they represent what reality is like. This potential tension erupts into a full out conflict if we endorse the following two plausible, and widely held, theses:

Scientific realism about explanatory value: Explanations are good qua explanation only insofar as and because they represent real and explanatorily relevant structure.

Idealization as explanatorily valuable: Some idealized explanations are better qua explanation than their non-idealized counterparts.

The argument of this paper is simple: The above two plausible theses are incompatible; thus, we need to give up one of them.

This paper has a four-part structure: In P1, I outline and motivate scientific realism about explanatory value and idealization as explanatorily valuable. In P2, I argue that the two theses are incompatible. In P3, I respond to an objection to the argument of P2. In P4, I outline the ramifications of giving up each thesis, and conclude that giving up either comes at a serious cost.

Section: Philosophy of Science
Language: English
Chair: Colin Elliot
Date: 14:00-14:30, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.006



Kate Vredenburg (Harvard University, USA)

Kate Vredenburg is pursuing a PhD in philosophy at Harvard University. She received a bachelor of arts from Gettysburg College and a master's degree from Oxford University. Her research interests are in philosophy of science, metaphysics, and epistemology. Her dissertation focuses on the question of why we find certain kinds of information explanatory, from information about causes to information given by normative theories, such as first-order ethical theories. She spends her free time dreaming up increasingly complicated salad recipes and finding ways to injure herself with a variety of sports.

E-Mail: kvredenburg@fas.harvard.edu

Grounding Non-Existence in Contingently Fundamental Totality Facts

Jonas Werner

S In my talk I'll argue that those who try to ground non-existence with the help of totality facts have to accept that some totality fact is contingently fundamental, if they want to uphold that grounding is necessary, i.e. that full grounds necessitate what they ground. My argumentation will proceed by distinguishing between totality facts that tolerate non-existence and those that don't. If a totality fact of the former kind obtains at a world w , then it also obtains at worlds at which some things that exist in w fail to exist. If a totality fact of the latter kind obtains at a world w , then it only obtains at worlds at which all and only the things exist that also exist at w . Denying that such a non-existence intolerant totality fact is partially grounded in facts about what exists will be shown to be implausible. For this reason, these totality facts cannot be fundamental and the necessitist has no option but to accept their being grounded in facts about what

exists together with a non-existence tolerant totality fact. To avoid an explanatory regress or a circular explanation, the necessitist should take this non-existence tolerant totality fact to be fundamental. I'll argue that, given that some things only contingently exist, this fundamental non-existence tolerant totality fact will possibly be grounded in another non-existence tolerant totality fact. Hence a necessitist should accept that some totality fact is fundamental, but only contingently so.

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharder
Date: 10:35-11:05, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004



Jonas Werner (University of Hamburg, Germany)

I am a PhD-student at the University of Hamburg. My dissertation is about the relations between grounding, essence and metaphysical modality. Before coming to Hamburg I did my MA at the Humboldt University Berlin. I obtained my bachelor degree at the University of Magdeburg in Philosophy, Neuro- and Cognitive Sciences.

E-Mail: jonas.h.werner@gmx.de

Ethics through institutions or ethics of institutions? On moral foundations of order ethics and the idea of individocracy

Andreas Wolkenstein

Debates within applied ethics often face insurmountable differences and disagreement. Order ethics proposes a solution to this problem, i.e. to shift the burden away from questions of value to questions of rules. These rules must, a dominant strand within order ethics holds, meet the requirement that they be justifiable to all those involved. The order ethical approach considers itself neutral as to its moral foundations. However, this approach faces problems itself. To mention but two: It is not clear why rules are better agreed upon than values; and the justifiability criterion at least raises

the question of an ethical founding of its own. To answer these problems in an unorthodox way, I propose to add a moral foundation to order ethics that is derived from Aristotelianism, in particular from the work of Douglas Rasmussen and Douglas Den Uyl. This fits in well because the (political) solutions to solving ethical disagreement are similar to those of order ethics.

In the paper, I will therefore (1) address the shortcomings of order ethics in a more detailed way. I will then show (2) why the surprising step of adding a Aristotelian perspective is a benefit for both those who deny and who welcome foundational approaches. The next step consists in outlining the Aristotelian approach put forward by Rasmussen and Den Uyl (3), in order to show how this approach resembles order ethics in some important dimensions. In the final section (4) I will then explain how the (political) solutions to solving ethical disagreement based on an integrated view on order ethics and Aristotelianism looks like: both attempts shift the focus towards political orders and their making room for normative pluralism. Most importantly, I will introduce and discuss the idea of “individocratic political orders” and show how this idea fulfills what has been envisaged by order ethics and the kind of Aristotelianism discussed here.


Section: Political Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Maciej Juzaszek
Date: 18:00-18:30, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.006



Andreas Wolkenstein (University of Tübingen, Germany)
Studies in Philosophy, Theology and History (Magister Artium) in Tübingen and Paris (2001-2010). Researcher at the International Center for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities (2010-2013). Parental Leave (2014). Since January 2015 researcher at the Department of Psychology, University of Tübingen and at the Universitätsklinikum Tübingen. PhD-Candidate (with Prof. Dr. Thomas Schramme).
E-Mail: andreas.wolkenstein@uni-tuebingen.de

A Duty to Kill

Nathan Wood

 In just war theory, and the ethics of self-defense more generally, it is a commonplace to focus on what conditions must be met in order for it to be “permissible” to use lethal force in self- or other-defense. This focus on permissions is, I believe, an error, as it obscures the full normative import of just war theory. In this paper I argue that just war conditions should be understood in terms of obligation and forbiddance, with permission being reserved for only those cases where it is truly morally indifferent whether one kill or not. As the taking of human life is a significant moral act, I argue that the scope of (bilateral) permissions will be quite narrow, and the majority of moral prescriptions in war will become either statements of obligation or forbiddance. In arguing for this point, I will briefly examine the formalized conceptions of obligation, permission, and forbiddance provided by standard deontic logic, in order to address a potential objection. I conclude that in nearly all cases of war and conflict where we may kill, it turns out that we must kill.

Section: Political Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Maciej Juzaszek
Date: 16:50-17:20, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.006




Nathan Wood (University of Bayreuth, Germany)

Nathan Wood received a B.A. in Philosophy from the California Polytechnic State University in 2011, and an M.A. in Philosophy & Economics at the Universität Bayreuth in March 2016. His MA thesis explores the proportionality condition in Just War Theory, with the aim of providing a more formal analysis of key just war concepts. Current research interests include further explorations of formal analyses of just war concepts, as well as related work in the logic of action and deontic logic.

E-Mail: wood.nathang@yahoo.com

Shortcomings of two-dimensional theories of de se beliefs

Florian Leonhard Wüstholtz

he problem of de se beliefs is the following: How can we accommodate our beliefs about ourselves into the semantic or epistemological theory of our choice in such a way as to account for their characteristic and intrinsic features? Among these features of de se beliefs is the connection to self-knowledge, the possibility of immunity to error through misidentification, and the crucial role of motivating intentional actions. In this talk I will sketch three important strands of two-dimensional theories of de se beliefs. First, the linguistic approach which is due to Kaplan's (1989) distinction between character and content. Secondly, the functional approach which is based on Perry's (1979) distinction between belief state and belief content. And thirdly, the epistemic approach that's present in Peacocke's (2014) Fregean account. I will argue that all of these two-dimensional theories fall short of doing justice to the features of de se beliefs. The linguistic approach faces the following dilemma: Either the meaning of "I" is necessary to explain the features or it isn't. If it is, then the account runs the risk of overlooking nonlinguistic cases of de se beliefs. If it isn't, then the account is underspecified and has to rely either on a functional or epistemic theory to help explain the relevant features. The functional approach is apt to explain the motivational powers of de se beliefs, but fails to account for their epistemic features - such as the connection to self-knowledge and the possibility of immunity to error through misidentification. And finally, the epistemic approach - being dependent on the concept "I" - suffers from a similar dilemma as the linguistic approach. It either overlooks nonconceptual cases of de se beliefs or the first person concept is insufficient. After dismantling these theories, I will offer some positive lessons to be learned from the failure of these three two-dimensional theories of de se beliefs.

References:

- David Kaplan (1989): "Demonstratives". In: Almog, Perry & Wettstein (Eds.): *Themes from Kaplan*. 481–563.
- Christopher Peacocke (2014): *The Mirror of the World*.
- John Perry (1979): "The Problem of the Essential Indexical". *Noûs* 13. 3–21.


Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Alexander Gebharter
Date: 14:30-15:00, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
Location: SR 1.005



Florian Leonhard Wüstholtz (University of Fribourg, Bern)
Florian Wüstholtz (MA). University of Fribourg, Switzerland. 2010 BA in philosophy from the University of Bern, Switzerland. 2011 MA in philosophy from the University of Sheffield, UK. PhD thesis on the first person in thought and action.
E-Mail: florian.wuestholz@unifr.ch

Reductionist and anti-reductionist theories of intention

Marta Zareba

 The aim of my presentation is to critically analyse two radically different (i.e. reductionist and anti-reductionist) theories of intention developed in analytic philosophy of mind and action and to examine the role of intention in intentional action.

My considerations will begin with an analysis of a reductionist theory of intention, according to which a cognitive component of an intention should be identified with a belief and a motivational component with a desire [Audi 1973, Davis 1999]. In particular, I will raise several objections against Donald Davidson's reductionist view [1963], according to which belief-desire pairs which rationalize actions also cause them. In opposition to the reductionist theories of intention stands the view that intentions constitute an irreducible kind of attitude with a distinctive functional role. In order to answer the question whether we should postulate a new kind of mental entity, I will evaluate the main arguments formulated in favor of (i) Michael Bratman's [1987] planning theory of intention, according to which intentions understood as components of plans serve as inputs in practical reasoning and play specific coordinating role in guiding human behavior, and (ii) Alfred Mele's [1992] anti-reductionist account of intentions as executive attitudes toward plans.

The second part of my presentation will offer a detailed analysis of two competing accounts of the relationship between intentions and intentional actions, according to which:

[Simple View] An agent A intentionally ϕ -ed only if A intended to ϕ : A's mental states at the time of action must be such that ϕ is among those things A intends [Adams 1986, McCann 1986]

[Single Phenomenon View] Both the intentional action and the state of intention involve a certain common state, and it is the relation of an action to this state that makes the action intentional.

The main goal of the last part of my presentation is to justify the claim that although Bratman's influential objection against the Simple View (so called 'the video game example') is an unsound one, we still have some compelling reasons to reject the Simple View. I will end my talk with several critical comments about selected arguments in favor of the Single Phenomenon View.

References.

- ADAMS, F. (1986), Intention and Intentional Action: The Simple View, *Mind and Language* 1 (4), 281–301.
- ADAMS, F., MELE, A. (1989), The Role of Intention in Intentional Action, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 19 (4), 511–531.
- AUDI, R. (1973), Intending, *Journal of Philosophy* 70, 387–403.
- BRATMAN, M. (1987), *Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- DAVIDSON, D. (1963), Action, Reasons, and Causes, *Journal of Philosophy* 60 (23), 685–700.
- DAVIDSON, D. (1978) Intending, in: *Philosophy of History and Action*, Yirmiahu Yovel (eds.), Dordrecht: D. Reide, 41–60.
- DAVIS, W.A. (1999), A Causal Theory of Intending, in: *The Philosophy of Action*, A. Mele (eds.) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 131–148.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Florian Leonhard Wüstholtz
Date: 15:10-15:40, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005



Marta Zaręba (University of Warsaw, Poland)

Marta Zaręba - PhD student at the Institute of Philosophy, University of Warsaw, master in philosophy; master thesis about the debate on action individuation; PhD thesis (in progress) about the concept of intention in analytic philosophy of action;

Areas of philosophical interest: analytical philosophy of mind and action, ontology and analytical aesthetics.

E-Mail: zareba.ma@gmail.com

The Ambivalent Nature of the Hume-Newton Relationship

Roman Zavadil

Hume is well known for his use of experimental method of reasoning in his *A Treatise of Human Nature* and *An Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*. Hume's attitude towards Newton is generally addressed as positive application of Newton's methodology on his *Science of Man*. While this approach might not be deemed erroneous it is for certain substantially limiting. In my talk I will re-examine the positive proposition considering two main aspects. First, I will apply a more historical approach towards Hume's position in the philosophical tradition of 17th and 18th century. Second, I will examine the degree of possibility of Newton's influence in light of Hume's education and knowledge of mathematics. Therefore the main aim of my talk is to introduce Hume-Newton relationship in a considerably more critical manner.

Section: History of Philosophy
Language: English
Chair: Christian J. Feldbacher
Date: 16:15-16:45, 7 September 2016 (Wednesday)
Location: SR 1.007



Roman Zavadil (Palacky University Olomouc, Czech Republic)


I am a student of second year master's program under the departments

of Philosophy and Sociology, Palacky University Olomouc. My primary aim is Modern philosophy with special regard to philosophy of David Hume and Isaac Newton.

E-Mail: roman.z@seznam.cz

The Rationality Debate from the Perspective of X-phi and Psychology

Tereza Zbiralova

he great rationality debate traditionally used to be a domain of philosophy and accordingly a subject to philosophical reflection and conceptual analysis. However, the cognitive research in heuristics and biases tradition brought a methodological revolution with the aid of experimental method and consequently portrayed people as prone to systematic errors in judgement. Therefore, the allegedly scientific nature of our cognitive abilities and the distorting influence of additional factors can be questioned or even rejected. Experimental philosopher Joshua Knobe criticises “person as scientist” analogy and instead highlights the role of moral considerations in both ordinary and scientific reasoning. On the other hand, Alison Gopnik’s promotes “child as scientist” model supposing a connection between the evolutionary learning mechanism in children and theory change in science.

In my talk I will analyse the scientific analogies, being primarily focused on their plausibility and fruitfulness regarding the future research into the nature of human thinking. Although the inevitable decision whether to emphasise the differences or similarities seems to invalidate the analogy itself, it could still be productive in further attempts to describe the cognitive mechanisms underlying both ordinary and scientific cognition.

Section: Philosophy of Mind
Language: English
Chair: Mandy Stake
Date: 11:45-12:15, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.005



Tereza Zbiralova (Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic)

I am a 1st year doctoral student at the Department of Philosophy at Palacký University in Olomouc, Czech Republic. My research project has been focused on philosophy of mind, especially the rationality debate from the perspective of experimental philosophy and psychology.

E-Mail: tereza.zbiralova@gmail.com

In Defense of Epistemological Disjunctivism

Paweł Zięba



he aim of this presentation is to defend the idea known as epistemological disjunctivism from a number of objections which have been recently raised in the literature.

Madison and Ghijsen (Ghijsen, 2015; Madison, 2014) argue that epistemological disjunctivism is not worthy of the “holy grail of epistemology” sobriquet (cf. Pritchard, 2012) because it fails to incorporate the intuitions standing behind both internalism and externalism about epistemic justification.

Ghijsen (Ghijsen, 2015) rejects the strategy proposed by Pritchard (Pritchard, 2011) to solve the so-called basis problem for reductive (JTB) version of epistemological disjunctivism.

Ghijsen and Kelp (Kelp & Ghijsen, 2016) argue that neither reductive (JTB) nor non-reductive (knowledge first) formulation of epistemological disjunctivism is satisfactory. The former faces the so-called hyper-intellectualization problem, whereas the latter has some untoward consequences (e.g. that justified belief is stronger than knowledge).

My strategy of defending epistemological disjunctivism consists in pointing out that each of these objections rests on some unobvious premise. Furthermore, while particular objections are aimed at specific formulations of epistemological disjunctivism, none of the objections reaches the core claim common to all formulations.

References:

- Ghijsen, H. (2015). The Basis Problem for Epistemological Disjunctivism Revisited. *Erkenntnis*, 80(6), 1147–1156.
- Kelp, C., & Ghijsen, H. (2016). Perceptual Justification: Factive Reasons and Fallible Virtues. In Chienkuo Mi, M. Slote, & E. Sosa

(Eds.), *Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue*. Routledge.

Madison, B. J. C. (2014). Epistemological Disjunctivism and the New Evil Demon. *Acta Analytica*, 29(1), 61–70.

Pritchard, D. (2011). Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Basis Problem. *Philosophical Issues. A Supplement to Noûs*, 21(1), 434–455.

Pritchard, D. (2012). *Epistemological Disjunctivism*. Oxford University Press.

Section: Epistemology
 Language: English
 Chair: Pascale Lötscher
 Date: 16:15-16:45, 8 September 2016 (Thursday)
 Location: HS E.002




Paweł Zięba (Jagiellonian University, Poland)

Paweł Zięba (MA Phil.). PhD Candidate in the Institute of Philosophy at Jagiellonian University in Cracow; 2010 Master in Philosophy (thesis about the zombie argument in philosophy of mind); 2011 Master in History. Research interests: mutual relations between philosophy of mind, philosophy of perception, epistemology and cognitive science. The PhD thesis is going to concern both epistemological and metaphysical formulations of the claim known as “disjunctivism”.

E-Mail: multipawelek@gmail.com

Advanced modal claims. Disambiguating between the intra- and trans-world quantification.

Tomasz Zyglicz

avid Lewis’s theory is by far the most serious contender for providing a reductive analysis of our ordinary modal discourse. The putative result is achieved by a combination of modal realism and counterpart theory “CT”: the former being “the thesis that the world we are part of is but one of a plurality of worlds, and

that we who inhabit this world are only a few out of all the inhabitants of all the worlds” (Lewis 1986, p. vii), the latter a theory of classical predicate logic. Lewis believes that CT fares better than quantified modal logic for at least three reasons: (a) it is not a special-purpose intensional logic (b) it accounts for commonly shared worries about the notion of analyticity (c) it is more expressive.

The subject of my talk will be an argument from the so-called advanced modal claims (raised in e.g. Divers 1999, Jago 2014), according to which the combination of modal realism and CT is untenable. It poses a Lewisian with the following dilemma: either to accept certain plausible modal inference rules and be committed to highly undesirable ontological consequences or to reject them and thus admit failure in reducing modality (thereby losing a central motivation for her theory).

Their arguments take the following form:

1. There are many worlds. (An uncontroversial statement of modal realism)
2. It is possible that there are many worlds. (possibility introduction)
3. $\exists x(Wx \wedge \exists y\exists z(Pyx \wedge Pzx \wedge Wy \wedge Wz \wedge y \neq z))$ (translation according to the scheme offered in Lewis (1968)*)
4. Contradiction (no world can be a part of another world)

I will respond to this argument by disambiguating between intra-world and trans-world quantification. My central point is that modal realist is not committed to accepting (1) on the former reading, while the latter does not allow the troublesome analysis. This generalizes to cases involving modal ubiquity. The upshot of the argument is that it is quantified modal logic that introduced confusion about truth value of our initial statements.

* Wx — x is a world, Pxy x is a part of y .

Section: Metaphysics and Ontology
Language: English
Chair: Eirini Georgia Mandopoulou
Date: 15:10-15:40, 9 September 2016 (Friday)
Location: SR 1.004



Tomasz Zyglewicz (University of Warsaw, Poland)

Tomasz Zyglewicz studies Philosophy and Law at the University of Warsaw. His research interests include metaphysics, philosophy of language, philosophical methodology, and normative ethics.

E-Mail: tomek.zyglewicz@gmail.com

Index

- Akhlagi-Ghaffarokh, Farbod, 47
Alexandrie, Gustav, 30
Andréka, Hajnal, 7, 24
Ayhan, Sara, 31
Azzano, Lorenzo, 32
- Badura, Christopher, 34
Baraghith, Karim, 35
Barrett, Thomas, 7, 24
Bartels, Andreas, 7, 20
Baxendale, Matthew, 36
Bogacz, Szymon, 37
Bordonaba, David, 38
Buonomo, Valerio, 40
Butterfield, Jeremy, 7, 14
- Canson, Chloé de, 42
Cekiera, Kamil, 43
Claas, Jan, 46
- Dittrich, Jonathan, 47
- Edgington, Dorothy, 7, 15
Elliot, Colin, 50
- Feng, Shuyi, 51
Fischer, Enno, 53
Fischer, Florian, 7, 20
Fox, Philip, 54
Fratantonio, Giada, 56
- Gallasch, Till, 57
Gaszczyk, Grzegorz, 58
Greslehner, Gregor P., 60
Guo, Yuhang, 61
- Hüttemann, Andreas, 7, 20
Hagenström, Felix, 63
Hausmann, Marco, 64
- Hesse, Roland, 65
Heyndels, Sybren, 67
Hopfe, Till, 68
Hudetz, Laurenz, 7, 24
- Ipakchi, Sara, 69
- Jansen, Ludger, 7, 20
Joecks, Andreas, 70
Juzaszek, Maciej, 72
- Kühle, Laila, 86
Kalde, Dennis, 74
Kappes, Yannic, 75
Khudairi, Hasen, 77
Kiener, Maximilian, 78
Kim, Jiwon (Sonia), 79
Kleczka, Karol, 80
Klenk, Michael, 82
Knödte, Johannes, 84
Knoll, Viktoria, 85
- Lang, Lukas, 87
Lernpaß, Christoph, 89
Liedl, Bernd, 90
Lin, Hsuan-Chih, 92
Lipuš, Alen, 93
Lo, Tien-Chun, 94
Luchetti, Michele, 96
Lutz, Linus, 97
- Maheshwari, Kritika, 99
Mamin, Cyrill, 101
Mandopoulou, Eirini Georgia, 102
Marraffa, Rodolfo, 103
Matuszkiewicz, Maria, 105
Mayerhoffer, Daniel Matthias, 106
McIntosh, Sean Aidan, 107

- Miller, Gregory , 108
 Mindt, Garrett, 109
 Moriarty, Siobhan, 111
 Moser, Elias, 112
 Mulamustafić, Adem, 113
 Murzi, Julien, 7, 16

 Némethi, István, 7, 24
 Naegeli, Lukas, 115
 Nies, Torsten, 145
 Nunez, Gonzalo, 116

 Ohlhorst, Jakob, 118

 Parisi, Eva Maria, 119
 Phillips, Meagan, 121
 Popescu, Andreea, 122
 Proszewska, Agnieszka, 124

 Reckhenrich, Jakob, 125
 Retzlaff, Nina, 127
 Rizzo, Julio de, 128
 Roehl, Johannes, 129
 Rosenstock, Sarita, 7, 24
 Rostworowski, Wojciech, 131
 Ruczaj, Stanisław, 132
 Rumberg, Antje, 7, 20

 Sandstad, Petter, 134
 Savic, Lovro, 135
 Schürmann, Matthias, 140
 Schickl, Hannah , 137
 Schlink, Clemens Emanuel, 139
 Schuster, Annika, 142
 Seethaler, Markus, 143
 Sen, Aysun, 159
 Shankar, Shambhavi, 145
 Sharma, Abhay Nidhi, 147
 Soronio, Garry Moore, 148
 Speitel, Sebastian G.W., 150
 Spiegel, Thomas, 151

 Stěpanek, Jan, 153
 Stake, Mandy, 154
 Struchhold, Jessica, 155

 Tümkaya, Serdal , 159
 Tasnádi, Gábor, 156
 Tassoni, Elena, 158

 Unruh, Charlotte Franziska, 161

 Vredenburgh, Kate, 162

 Wüstholtz, Florian Leonhard, 167
 Waters, Chapman, 45
 Weatherall, James, 7, 24
 Wenmackers, Sylvia, 7, 17
 Werner, Jonas, 163
 Wolkenstein, Andreas, 164
 Wood, Nathan, 166

 Zaręba, Marta, 168
 Zavadil, Roman, 170
 Zbiralova, Tereza, 171
 Zięba, Paweł, 172
 Zyglewicz, Tomasz, 173